The Dynamics of Power

Preceding volumes of Science and Psychoanalysis

Science and Psychoanalysis   Volume XX

The Dynamics of Power

Scientific Proceedings of the
American Academy of Psychoanalysis

Edited by

JULES H. MASSERMAN, M.D.

Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology
Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois

Contents

v

PART 4. CLINICAL APPLICATIONS

PART 5. THE FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN
AWARD

Contributors

Adler, Kurt A., Ph.D., M.D., Medical Director and Associate Dean, Alfred Adler Institute, New York, New York.

Alger, Ian, M.D., Training Analyst, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Arieti, Silvano, M.D., Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Bettelheim, Bruno, Ph.D., Rowley Distinguished Service Professor of Education, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Bieber, Irving, M.D., President, American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 1971–1972; Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Bonime, Walter, M.D., Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Broderick, Carlfred B., Ph.D., Professor of Sociology and Head of Marriage Counselling Training Program, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California.

Cantor, Morton B., M.D., Assistant Dean, Specialty Training Program in Psychoanalytic Medicine, Postgraduate Center for Mental Health, New York, New York.

Dince, Paul R., M.D., Training Analyst, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Drellich, Marvin G., M.D., Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Eckardt, Marianne H., M.D., President-Elect, American Academy of Psychoanalysis; Training Analyst, Washington, D.C.

Enelow, Morton L., M.D., Director, Psychoanalytic Program, Tulane University School of Medicine, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Fortes, Abraham R., M.D., Professor, School of Psychology, University of Mexico, U.N.A., Mexico.

Gadpaille, Warren J., M.D., Committee on Adolescence, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Denver, Colorado.

Gelb, Lester A., M.D., Director, Outpatient Psychiatric Service, Maimonides Medical Center, Brooklyn, New York.

Gershman, Harry, M.D., Dean, American Institute for Psychoanalysis, New York, New York.

Kelman, Harold, M.D., Dean, Specialty Training Program in Psychoanalytic Medicine, Postgraduate Center for Mental Health, New York, New York.

Leif, Harold I., M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Temple University School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

vii

Masserman, Jules H., M.D., Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology, Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois.

Naiman, J., M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

Olson, David H., Ph.D., Family Development Section, Child Research Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland.

Rifkin, Alfred H., M.D., Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, New York Medical College, New York, New York.

Ryder, Robert G., Ph.D., Chief, Family Development Section, Child Research Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland.

Salzman, Leon, M.D., Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York.

Schimel, John L., M.D., Director of Clinical Services, Willian Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology, New York, New York.

Wittkower, Eric D., M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Section of Transcultural Psychiatric Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; President, American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 1970–1971.

Yankelovich, Daniel, Professor of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York.

Preface

At the May, 1971, Scientific Meeting of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, the individual and social dynamics of the protean phenomena of power were examined with incisive scholarship and clinical significance in a series of presentations edited and published herewith. Curiously, the only omission was an essay on the power of the published word, so that it may be appropriate to point out that this series of volumes has demonstrably led psychoanalytic and sociologic thought toward more comprehensive and integrated formulations of human behavior, and to their more effective applications to individual and social problems. It is my hope that the current issue will merit equal scientific influence.

JULES H. MASSERMAN, M.D.

Chicago, Illinois
October, 1971

ix

part I
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Psychoanalysis in
International Perspective

ERIC D. WITTKOWER, M.D.
WITH THE COLLABORATION OF J. NAIMAN, M.D.

A presidential address is a kind of stocktaking. A person who by age, position, and perhaps scientific standing has proved himself worthy of such an honor is elected by members of an organization to its presidency. At the end of his tenure he is expected to look back and to suggest what in his opinion could be improved: (a) in the organization he represents, and (b) in the field his organization represents. Words of wisdom are supposed to pour from his lips.

I intend to depart from this procedure. Instead of dealing with a general theme I intend to present to you a research project which, in accordance with my general research orientation, is aimed at giving you a worldwide view of the present status of psychoanalysis. In carrying out this project I was assisted by Dr. J. Naiman, a senior member of our Canadian Psychoanalytic Society. Questions which among many others we hope to answer include: What is the definition of a psychoanalyst? Which psychoanalytic concepts are accepted or rejected by the international community of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists? What differences exist in the acceptance of psychoanalytic concepts between the "orthodox" group of psychoanalysts and deviant groups? In which parts of the world

is interest in psychoanalysis increasing and in which is it decreasing? In which parts of the world is interest in psychoanalysis absent? And why? And to what extent can psychiatrists in these countries share with us views which we hold?

Although most such addresses are written by a president at his desk, mine was written at least in part in a hospital bed while I was recuperating from a difficult back operation. I have tried to do my very best. A few highlights of our research must suffice.

Material and procedure of examination

Two sets of questionnaires were designed: one for psychoanalysts in various parts of the world and another for psychiatrists in countries where there are no psychoanalysts or very few. The questions asked were partly of the choice type; for instance, psychoanalysts were asked: Which of the following psychoanalytic concepts do you find acceptable? They were partly of the factual type; for instance: To which analytical group do you belong? And they were partly of the opinion type; for instance: Is interest in psychoanalysis increasing or decreasing in your country? Analogously psychiatrists in countries where there are no analysts were asked: Which of the following psychoanalytic concepts do you find acceptable? (choice type); Which forms of psychotherapy are practiced in your country? (factual type); And, Would you like to have a psychoanalyst in your country? (opinion type).

In all, 154 questionnaires were sent to psychoanalysts and 65 to non-analysts. Replies were received from 72 psychoanalysts and from 30 nonanalysts. Psychoanalysts from the following countries replied: United States, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, France, Spain, Switzerland, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Israel, India, Japan. Psychiatrists from the following countries replied: Jamaica, U.S.S.R., East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Greece, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, New Zealand. The analysts approached either were leading members of their national societies or were taken without selection from the I.P.A. roster; the nonanalysts occupied leading positions in the field of psychiatry in their countries. Special attention was paid to the orientation of psychoanalytical subgroups such as Horneyans and Sullivanians. Jungians and Adlerians were also consulted for comparative purposes.

Definition of a psychoanalyst

One of the questions we asked was: What is the definition of a psycho-
analyst? The answer to this question seems to be easy. For instance, one
might say a psychoanalyst is a person who treats patients in need of psycho-
analytical treatment by the psychoanalytic procedure. But this would
be an oversimplification.

We offered the following alternative answers to 39 persons listed as
psychoanalysts in the roster of the International Psychoanalytical Associa-
tion all over the world: (1) a present member of a psychoanalytic society
affiliated with the I.P.A., (2) a present member of a psychoanalytic society
whether or not affiliated with the I.P.A., (3) a graduate of a psychoanalytic
institute, (4) a person who accepts all or some of the following tenets of
psychoanalytic theory: the unconscious, the libido theory, infantile sexu-
ality, the Oedipus complex, the death instinct, intrapsychic conflict, object
relations from the beginning of life, neutralization, resistance, trans-
ference.

As stated before, the choice of names in the roster was not random. On
economic grounds we turned to people whose views could be regarded as
representative of other members of their society, e.g., presidents of national
societies. In some countries in which there is only one psychoanalyst or
very few psychoanalysts or only affiliated members of the I.P.A., we had
to turn to those who were available.

The only choice accepted by 50 percent of the respondents was the
operational definition that a psychoanalyst is — and has to be — a member
of the I.P.A.; if he is not, he cannot be regarded as a psychoanalyst. Eighty
percent felt that a person must have graduated from a psychoanalytic
institute and/or be affiliated with either the I.P.A. or another psychoanalytic
society to be a qualified psychoanalyst. Nearly half of this group (43
percent) felt that certain concepts must also be adhered to if one is to be
considered a psychoanalyst.

It may be argued that the respondents who insist that a person must
not only adhere to certain concepts, but also have been trained in an in-
stitute as well as belong to a society to be a psychoanalyst (43 percent),
have a narrower or more restrictive definition of a psychoanalyst than
those members of the I.P.A. who insist only upon either: (a) membership
in the I.P.A. or graduation from an institute, or (b) acceptance of certain
psychoanalytical concepts.

By contrast there are I.P.A. members who in exceptional circum-
stances would accept in the analytic fold persons who are not graduates of

a psychoanalytic institute—Freud would be a classical example—provided that, as Freud suggested, these persons interpretatively apply such basic psychoanalytic principles as the unconscious, repression, intrapsychic conflict, resistance, and transference.

Going beyond our questionnaire it is our impression that the view is gaining ground all over the world that the activities of a psychoanalyst need not be confined to the psychoanalytic treatment of a small number of patients; instead, as Freud himself demonstrated, the application of psychoanalytic knowledge to other activities, be they medical or non-medical, is not only compatible with the role of the psychoanalyst but also desirable. In the extreme, a person who treats no patients at all but devotes himself to studies based on psychoanalytic theory could still be regarded as a psychoanalyst.

As might be expected the range of views on any of the subjects discussed is wider on the North American scene than in other parts of the world.

2. Deviant Groups

There is a large body of persons all over the world who practice psychoanalysis, are qualified psychoanalysts, or regard themselves as such, who have not applied for membership in the I.P.A. or who for some reason or other have not been regarded as acceptable by the I.P.A. These persons have formed groups labeled for the sake of this presentation deviant groups, such as the Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft, the Tokyo Institute for Psychoanalysis, Fromm's Sociedad Psicoanalitica Mexicana, predominantly in Mexico, and the Sullivanian and Horneyan groups in the United States. Membership in the last two groups and the I.P.A. is not exclusive. Followers of Melanie Klein, especially common south of the Panama Canal, have remained within the I.P.A. fold.

The deviant groups named have their own training institutes: their members often accept many or all orthodox Freudian theoretical concepts. But there may be marked differences in theoretical orientation, such as in the Horney and Sullivan schools, and these groups may deviate from I.P.A.-acknowledged institutes in training requirements and in analytic treatment procedures, e.g., frequency of weekly sessions. The picture that presents itself as one travels round the world is rather sad. Members of the "orthodox" group and those of the deviant groups are often bitter enemies and frequently not on speaking terms with each other.

As would be expected, the members of deviant groups differed significantly from I.P.A. members in their definitions of a psychoanalyst.

Summarizing their responses briefly: (1) One-third (as opposed to 80 percent of the I.P.A. members) felt that a psychoanalyst must be a member of a society whether or not affiliated with the I.P.A. (2) Only half of these respondents believed that psychoanalysts must be graduates of an institute, which again contrasts with the I.P.A. members, of whom 80 percent felt graduation from an institute was a must. (3) Eighty-five percent, as opposed to less than half of the I.P.A. respondents, indicated that acceptance of certain psychoanalytical concepts was a prerequisite for defining a psychoanalyst.

Two examples typifying deviant views conclude this section. An eminent member of the Academy, Marianne Eckardt, states: "I would consider anyone a psychoanalyst who has been trained in psychoanalysis [in any school] and is practicing psychotherapy. I do not believe that theoretical concepts or techniques should 'define' one's practice. I think of concepts and techniques as constructs, models, or guidelines, which in all their variety constitute our basic tools. These, we then use in many modified ways depending on our clinical judgment of the problem we meet."

Erich Fromm writes: "I believe that Freud's metapsychology, including the libido theory and the theory of the death instinct is to be understood only as an expression of the particular philosophical and scientific frame of reference of his time." He considers himself a "true Freudian who follows the main path of Freud." However, he continues: "To follow a master means to grasp his essential findings and to revise the time-conditioned accidents which are unnecessary for the understanding and the further research of what is essential in the theory."

Conceptual differences

Our questions dealing with the acceptance or nonacceptance of various theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis revealed that certain concepts had almost universal acceptance whereas others were accepted by certain groups but not by others.

The unconscious, intrapsychic conflict, and transference were accepted by all the psychoanalysts who returned their questionnaires and may therefore be regarded as the most universally accepted. Resistance fared almost as well, being accepted by all except one (a North American I.P.A. member). At the opposite extreme was the death instinct, which was accepted by only 8 percent (all I.P.A. members).

In the intermediate range were certain concepts which, in addition to being accepted by some and not by others, also seemed to have the characteristic

of differentiating between I.P.A. members and deviant analysts. These included the libido theory (accepted by 50 percent of the I.P.A. members but only 5 percent of the deviants), infantile sexuality (75 percent I.P.A., 20 percent deviant), the Oedipus complex (50 percent I.P.A., 15 percent deviant), and neutralization (33 percent I.P.A., 5 percent deviant).

"Object relations from the beginning of life" was interesting in that it was the only concept with a greater acceptance among deviant analysts (68 percent) than among I.P.A. members (50 percent). One can legitimately consider it as an addition to psychoanalytic theory which took place after Freud. In other respects, the deviant analysts are characterized by their abandonment of certain psychoanalytic concepts.

It is worth noting that the European analysts seemed, in this respect, more orthodox than their American counterparts. One hundred percent of the European I.P.A. members accepted, in addition to the unconscious, intrapsychic conflict, transference, and resistance, *all* of the following concepts: the libido theory (as against 50 percent of North American I.P.A. respondents), infantile sexuality (as against 75 percent North American I.P.A. respondents), and the Oedipus complex (as against 57 percent of North American I.P.A. respondents).

There is, of course, no way of knowing whether there is any causal relationship between the greater orthodoxy of European analysts and the reported increased interest in psychoanalysis in Europe, as compared with the relatively lesser orthodoxy in North America and reported decreased interest in psychoanalysis. This is a question which would seem to warrant further investigation.

It seemed to us interesting to explore specifically the position taken up by Jungians and Adlerians toward Freudian theory.

Dr. H. K. Fierz, president of the Swiss Jungian Society, states: "S. Freud is of course in psychology a very important man. Many of his findings are basic findings: the Oedipus complex is a landmark although we think that also other myths can be found in the human soul and behaviour. Most of his aspects on dream interpretation cannot be denied. Repression has been proved. Psychopathology of everyday life is true." As regards sex, Dr. Fierz does not deny its dynamic significance, which, however, can be overrated. Without minimizing the importance of sex, "higher inspiration ('spirit') should also be taken into account."

Kurt Adler, representing the Adlerians, is strongly opposed to Freudian concepts. He writes: "I am not speaking of the death instinct, which even many very staunch Freudians negate. I am speaking of such earlier and basic tenets as 'infantile sexuality,' the Freudian states of 'psychosexual

development,' the 'Oedipus complex,' the concept of 'repression' as basis for neurosis, the division of the personality into 'id, ego, and super-ego,' the 'unconscious' as a noun [while Adlerians very much believe that man is unconscious as an adjective of many things, they prefer to speak of 'being unaware' of things]. These are but a few of the basic concepts of Freudian origin that Adlerians reject."

University affiliation

The question "Is your psychoanalytical society affiliated with any university?" yielded few results. One leading French psychoanalyst answered: "Merci Dieu, non!" Full or partial affiliation exists mainly in the United States. For instance, the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, although not officially affiliated, has a working liaison with New York University–Bellevue Hospital, and the Flower and 5th Avenue Society is part of the New York Medical College. Outside the United States, as far as we know, Mexico's Sociedad Psicoanalitica Mexicana, Fromm's society, seems to be the only one which is affiliated with a university, the University of Mexico.

Individual psychoanalysts hold university positions in many countries, e.g., in the U.S.A., Canada, Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Chile, India, Israel, and Japan. Unfortunately we failed to inquire whether there has been an increase or decrease in the employment of psychoanalysts as university teachers.

Interest in psychoanalysis

In response to the question "Is interest in psychoanalysis increasing or decreasing in your country?" 24 of 31 North American psychoanalysts reported a decrease in interest, 2 no change, and only 5 an increase. Asked to what they attributed the noted decline most of them replied that they believed it was due to growing interest in community psychiatry, behavior therapy, group therapy, and to a certain extent pharmacotherapy.

By contrast, of the 10 South American respondents, 8 reported an increase in interest in psychoanalysis and only 2 a decrease. Similarly, of the 22 European respondents, 18 reported an increase in interest in psychoanalysis and 4 a waning. New and active psychoanalytic societies and study groups have been formed in various European and South American

countries, such as in Finland, Spain, and Venezuela. A single analyst holds the fort in Peru and there are a fair number of members affiliated with the I.P.A. in Iron Curtain countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia where formation of psychoanalytic institutes is not permitted.

Does this mean that psychoanalysis is on the way out in North America? By no means. The fact that interest in psychoanalysis, e.g., the number of applicants for psychoanalytic training and of requests for psychoanalytic treatment, is waxing all over the world *apart from North America* indicates that Americans are highly receptive to new ideas and likely to look for shortcuts and panaceas (which do not exist) and that, laudably, American psychiatrists are increasingly aware of the need to cater to the needs of many rather than those of a few. Hence waves of national enthusiasm for varying causes are common on this continent. Actually, according to our observations and those of others in North America, the decline in applications for training at analytic institutes may well be made up by increasing requests for personal analysis by young psychiatrists. None of us has ever claimed that every patient suffering from a mental disorder should undergo psychoanalytic treatment. We all welcome other treatment procedures, as indeed did Freud, for the bulk of the mentally ill. But we venture to predict—and our worldwide survey supports this prediction—that long after the names of some of the enthusiastic proponents of some novel treatments have passed into oblivion, Sigmund Freud will be known and respected, and psychoanalysis will be practiced. At present a little less mudslinging by some of the enthusiasts against psychoanalysis would do no harm. As one American respondent in our study stated: "While psychoanalysis is declining as a classical form of treatment, its insights and modes of dealing with human behavior are becoming more [nearly] universal."

Countries without psychoanalysis

In writing to psychiatrists in countries in which there are, to our knowledge, no analysts or at most one or two, we received 30 replies, representing 17 countries. We were interested in the extent to which these psychiatrists accepted certain psychoanalytic concepts (the same concepts as on our questionnaire addressed to analysts).

We found that the three concepts (the unconscious, intrapsychic conflict, and transference) which were accepted by all analysts also had the highest degree of acceptance by these psychiatrists (the unconscious, 69 percent; intrapsychic conflict, 79 percent; transference, 66 percent).

The other psychoanalytic concepts had a lesser acceptance, again paralleling the views of analysts. For instance, resistance was accepted by 56 percent of the psychiatrists, as were object relations from the beginning of life. The Oedipus complex was accepted by 40 percent, infantile sexuality by 36 percent, neutralization by 20 percent, and the death instinct by 13 percent.

It is worth noting that several analytic concepts (the libido theory, infantile sexuality, the Oedipus complex, and neutralization) are actually slightly more acceptable to these psychiatrists than they are to deviant analysts. The acceptance of "object relations from the beginning of life" is higher among psychiatrists than among I.P.A. members. It is also higher among deviant psychoanalytic groups than among I.P.A. members. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the theoretical positions of the psychiatrists and of the deviant groups of analysts are to some degree similar.

We asked psychiatrists in countries without analysts whether psychoanalysts would be welcome in these countries. The answers ranged from an unequivocal "no" (from Bulgaria, East Germany, and the U.S.S.R.) to an enthusiastic "yes" (from Senegal, Turkey). In many instances it seemed that the respondents were interested in psychoanalysis and wanted analysts to settle in their midst, but were aware of many practical difficulties.

The answer from Nigeria was "not yet," perhaps reflecting the evolutionary process of a developing country. In Jamaica, an analyst would be welcome but he would have to be "prepared to use other methods as well" (perhaps this is not too different from North America). In Ireland, opinion is divided: "While most would regard the presence of psychoanalysts as desirable from many points of view, many would regard the method as relatively therapeutically ineffective and would feel, in any event, that its application was to too few." Largely positive replies were received also from Pakistan, Thailand, and South Korea, whereas there was more ambivalence in New Zealand, Indonesia, Nigeria, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic.

Ideology seemed more important than per capita income, since the most emphatic negative replies came from three Communist countries, one of whose per capita income is substantially higher than that of the developing countries who manifested a positive attitude toward psychoanalysis. Poland was more flexible. A voice from Poland—the writer remains anonymous—cries out for the presence of an analyst in his country, whereas another Polish psychiatrist bids welcome to an analyst though, as he adds, "not too exuberantly."

Professor Bassin's reply (Moscow) reflects some of the complexities

involved in a possible dialogue. He writes: "Not a single one of the psycho-analytical concepts listed by you, if interpreted in the classical psycho-analytical sense, is acceptable in my opinion. But this by no means implies that I do not appreciate the tremendous role played by the unconscious, by intrapsychic conflict, and by the emotions experienced in early childhood. However, the theoretical interpretation of the concepts cannot be based on a psychoanalytical approach." It is interesting to note that Professor Bassin selected for his comments two of the most widely accepted concepts of psychoanalytic theory. It seems reasonable to assume that even if he does not accept psychoanalytic theory he is at least sensitive to psychoanalytic influence. A similar approach has been adopted by Professor Lebedev in Leningrad.

Looking back at the material I have presented, it appears to me that an analyst is many things to many people. There is international consensus that he should be *adequately* trained, but disagreement exists regarding the meaning of the word adequate. Opinions are divided among I.P.A. members and obviously even more so among members of deviant groups regarding the required frequency of weekly sessions. As one would expect, orthodox analysts adhere more firmly than deviants to classical analytic concepts. The libido theory and infantile sexuality understandably are rejected by Horneyans and Sullivanians. The death instinct is dead all over the world. Hartmann's neutralization concept has found little acceptance outside the United States. Interest in psychoanalysis is growing all over the world apart from North America. The view has been expressed that psychoanalysis in years to come will flourish long after present-day highly praised novel forms of psychotherapy have been reduced to reasonable proportions of applicability. Psychoanalytic theory is by no means static. It is hoped that progress will continue; revisions of psychoanalytic concepts are likely to occur. Psychoanalytic concepts which are accepted to a remarkable degree in countries without analysts are: the unconscious, intrapsychic conflict, and transference. The interest shown in psychoanalysis by psychiatrists in countries without psychoanalysts surprised us. It is obvious that in some developing countries the time has not yet come to employ psychoanalysis; in others, the presence of a psychoanalyst would be welcome. The ideological barrier against psychoanalysis in eastern Europe is powerful.

In brief, then, taking a worldwide view, one finds that psychoanalysis is very much alive. It may be in flux, as Freud would like it to be, but it is far from being moribund, as some Cassandras on the American scene would like to make us believe.

part 2

THE MEANING OF POWER

The Relevance
of Power: An Introduction

JOHN L. SCHIMEL, M.D.

A psychoanalytic meeting in Washington in the troubled year of 1971 would seem to call for a close examination of the role of power in human affairs. Our studies deal with the vicissitudes of human development and experiences, all of which exist within a context of power relationships, whether in the family, the school, the job, government, international affairs, psychiatric organizations, or the psychotherapeutic encounter. The relationships are rarely couched in these terms, however. Earlier studies by the author dealt with power relations in the bedroom in which the decision-making process regarding sexual relations was analyzed. Other studies deal with adolescent encounters with family members, authority figures, and peers. All of these matters deal with hierarchies, decision making, and power relationships.

It is important to distinguish between *power,* defined as having weight and influence in interpersonal affairs (Harry Stack Sullivan), and *power over,* conceived in terms of coercion in fact or by intent. The experience of *power* in interpersonal affairs is consonant with good ego strength, sturdy self-esteem, the ability to enjoy people and events, and the capacity to endure ambivalence, ambiguity, and uncertainty. The experience of

14

power over, by contrast, is accompanied by anxiety and apprehension, an impaired capacity for intimacy, and a continual struggle for mastery and control over self and others as in the obsessional states.

These concepts come together in an anecdote told on herself by one of our deceased Fellows, Lillian Kaplan. One spring day, Dr. Kaplan "suggested" to her young daughter, "Why don't you play outside? It's such a lovely day." Her spunky youngster, with a clear sense of her own power, responded, "Why do you ask me such questions? You know that if I say 'I don't want to play outside,' you'll make me do it." These are consequential matters and are rarely stated with as great clarity as that used by the little girl.

Another example occurs to me from my practice. A veteran social worker, with years of experience in marital counseling, suddenly stopped in her recital of some difficulty in her work situation. She turned to me and stated, "Do you know, I've been saying the same thing to couples for over 20 years and I've just heard it myself for the first time. I say to couples, 'You have to realize that there are some decisions that have to be made by the wife alone; and there are some decisions that you have to make together!'"

We have been too simple in our grasp of power relationships. The literature is full of studies, for example, of families in which the mother is described as aggressive and domineering and the father as passive and dependent. Such marital couplings have been advanced to explain consequences in the offspring such as schizophrenia, homosexuality, and the choice of psychoanalysis as a career. The matter is more complex. The sociological conundrum of "who decides" is appropriate to consider in this context. In the families referred to above, the answer is simple; the mother decides! The next stage of the conundrum is to ask, "Who decides who decides?" It is clear that the father has a hand in that decision, and possibly the children as well. Next we ask, "Who decides who decides who decides?" This brings us to the grandparents (and their parents) à la Ronnie Laing, and the culture, the media, and the other agents, past and present, which, invisibly and insensibly, mold the decision-making processes that go on between and among people.

The Origin and Effect of Power

SILVANO ARIETI, M.D.

Definitions

Like many other cultural fields affecting society today, psychoanalysis is in the midst of a major crisis. More and more we recognize that in spite of its profound explorations of the human psyche, psychoanalysis has ignored, or inadequately studied or wrongly subsumed under too broad or too rigid categories, factors which are of vital importance in the development and function of the personality. One of them is power; and the American Academy of Psychoanalysis has to be congratulated for having devoted this meeting to this significant subject.

As a point of clarification, I want to indicate that in the paper that I am presenting the word power is not used in all its possible connotations. It connotes not a function or ability of the person—such as the capacity to paint, to sing, to breathe, or to climb a mountain—but a force, mostly in a negative sense, which derives from the actions of others and which is experienced by the individual as thwarting, deflecting, inhibiting, or arresting one's will, one's freedom, or one's capacity for growth and expansion in accordance with the rhythm of one's personality.

The concept of power in a psychological-psychoanalytic frame of reference is thus connected with the problem of will—another concept

16

which has been badly neglected in psychoanalysis and which only now reappears for reconsideration, especially in the works of Leslie Farber,[8] Rollo May,[14] Leon Salzman,[16] and myself.[3,7] Will, as capacity to make choices and to implement the choices, is the culmination of all psychic functions. This capacity may be hindered by internal forces, such as neurotic and psychotic complexes, or by external, that is social, forces.

These forces are experienced as power, starting from the end of the first year of life and continuing for the whole lifetime of the individual. Theoretically, they do not need to be experienced. If what Erik Erikson, Martin Buber, and other authors have included in the concept of trust, or basic trust, existed in a complete form, such forces would not be experienced. A state or relatedness and communion would exist among people, which would promote the growth and flourishing of the personality, and on account of which the joyful fleeting moment would leave a wake of trust that the next moment is going to be the same. The good mother is the representative of this world of trust.

But, unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Even when the individual was exposed to good motherhood the complexities of human existence make him gradually aware that he must mistrust. He experiences in various degrees people as hostile powers. At times this experience is very mild and may promote constructive vigilance, but most of the time it is better defined as fear, which may be mild, as in most cases, or very pronounced. The child must learn to deal with this external power, with which he must co-exist. He may learn to placate this power: to become a compliant, subservient, pleasing personality. Karen Horney[11] would call this type of personality "moving toward people." But in a language which is more effective today we may call it an Uncle Tom type of personality.

The child may instead learn to fight back, in his turn to intimidate the power. Karen Horney would say that he moves against people. The case, however, could be that since childhood the person has felt that he had more chance to preserve his own integrity by fighting and arguing than by pleasing, obliging, or submitting. The child may learn to deal with the hostile power by removing himself from it, either by physical distance or by emotional detachment. He may become an aloof, withdrawn person.

These enduring patterns of response, which come to constitute important parts of the personality, actually grow out of fear for the other, when the other is seen as a power possessing various degrees of enmity. When the resulting way of living is not too affected, the person may still be considered normal or mildly neurotic. When the individual exaggerates

these tendencies, he may develop a paranoid attitude toward the world, which he sees as a conspiracy of many inimical powers or a single, huge, omnipresent, all-engulfing threat.

The matter is obviously more complicated than I have so far outlined. We know that the external power is incorporated or introjected, so that the individual may have to obey or placate an inner dictate, a should, a superego or conscience, according to whatever terminology we prefer. In another publication,[7] I have called this internalized power endocratic, because it dominates from inside, in contradistinction to external power. This internalization is actually a necessity. Social life, with its numerous and complicated possibilities of behavior, would not be possible without such endocratic power.

But as analysts we have to ask ourselves whether this inimical power which the individual experiences from early life is fiction or reality. Is it just a fantasy of the unconscious or of the id of the patient? In what follows I shall refer mostly to the psychotic, but I believe that the same statements could be repeated in a milder form for the neurotic. To the analyst the patient's communications appear genuine and true as acts of experience, but the meanings attached to them seem progressively false, the more closely the patient approaches the psychosis.

As I wrote in another publication,[5] before the patient becomes openly psychotic he comes to believe that his future has no hope and the promise of life will not be fulfilled. More than that, he feels threatened by hostile powers from all sides, as if he were in a jungle of concepts, where the threat is not to survival, but to the self-image. The dangers are concept feelings such as that of being unwanted, unloved, unlovable, inadequate, unacceptable, inferior, awkward, clumsy, not belonging, being peculiar, different, rejected, humiliated, guilty, unable to find his own way among the different paths of life, disgraced, discriminated against, kept at a distance, suspected, and so on.

When the patient becomes a full-fledged psychotic, the jungle is no longer just of concepts. The experience, which before could be accepted at a partially metaphorical level, becomes a system of delusions. The patient may really see and hear human persecutors, appearing as lions and tigers, or as murderers, rapacious monsters, and so on.

The usual psychiatric interpretations given to explain this negative appraisal of the world, first in the prepsychotic and then in the psychotic experience, are the following two:

1. The parents were poor representatives of the world. Because of their own hostility, or neurosis or psychosis, they inflicted traumas on the

children, who became unfit for the world and distorted their own experiences.

2. The child's mentality is still under the influence of the primary process. This influence increases in unfavorable familial circumstances. The world is thus interpreted and incorporated by the child to a large extent according to the modalities of the primary process. When the psychosis finally occurs, the primary process takes over, at least as far as the delusional complexes are concerned.

I see a great deal of truth in these two hypotheses and until recently I felt contented in accepting these two prevailing interpretations. But now a third one, and by the way the most obvious, and the most natural, may complement them. The third hypothesis suggests that the world is really a hostile power and concedes more than a grain of truth to what the severely neurotic, the prepsychotic, and the psychotic experience. Although I have only recently accepted this third hypothesis, I still feel that Laing in Britain and Siirala in Finland presented similar ideas in a simplified fashion, without paying attention to other factors.

For Laing,[12] schizophrenia is not a disease, but a broken-down relationship. The environment of the patient is so bad that he has to invent special strategies in order "to live in this unlivable situation." The psychotic does not want to do any more denying. He unmasks himself; he unmasks the others. The psychosis thus appears as madness only to us ordinary human beings. Laing goes further and states that when we label some people as schizophrenics, this label is a social fact and the social fact a political event. What Laing says is literally true, but the implications are deceiving. Any labeling is a social fact because language is a social medium. Moreover I agree with him—although not many would—that a social fact is also a political event. Any activity of man which involves an act of will affecting others has a political dimension. But in disagreement with Laing, I believe that recognizing that a patient suffers from schizophrenia is not just a political event; it is also a medical event. When we call an event also medical and not just political we make fewer headlines, but we embrace more dimensions.

The implication in reading Laing is that the hostile power which caused the patient's difficulties is same hostility which will imprison him in an institution or at least label him psychotic. Now I believe that, although the psychotic is right in perceiving the hostility of the world, it is not exclusively or predominantly because of this hostility that he is sick. But inasmuch as he experiences it so intensely, he believes that his difficulties are connected with it in a relation of direct causality. It could be that other

reasons make the prepsychotic unable to cope with environmental hostility or with the warping of the ego which an unhealthy society inflicts. The inability to cope with these forces may be related to poor motherhood, to deprivation in childhood, to the parents' representing a hostile world, or even to biological predisposition. It may also be due to absence of spiritual ideologies, which could enable the patient to defend himself from the inimical power.

Siirala[17,18] discusses what he considers the prophetic value of many apparent delusions of schizophrenics. He sees the patient as a victim and as a prophet to whom nobody listens. He sees the therapist as a person who has the duty to reveal to society the prophecies of these patients. These prophecies would consist of insights into our collective sickness, into the murders we have committed for many generations and which we have buried, so that they will not be noticed. Siirala feels that schizophrenia emerges out of a common sort of sickness, a sickness shared by the healthy.

Although I believe that the Finnish psychiatrist omitted some facts, I am now more sympathetic to his point of view than I was a few years ago. I still insist that although the paranoid schizophrenic may borrow the scenario of the society-oriented person, his suffering can easily be recognized as a personal one and different from that of the philosopher, the prophet, the innovator, the dissenter, the revolutionary.

Nevertheless we must acknowledge that the schizophrenic responds more to this universal hostility than we do and crumbles more than we do. The psychological pollution of the world seems to concentrate the effects on him because he was weak, deprived in childhood, or biologically less equipped to defend himself. Fishes which absorb mercury tell us that mercury should not be discharged in the ocean.

To discuss whether the paranoid is delusional or a prophet is like discussing whether a dream represents irrationality or the real reality. The dream is very true as an experience and may indeed reveal a message which is not easily heard when we are awake. Although hostility exists in the world, the psychotic's version of it is pathological. The hostility is related etiologically to the psychosis, but predisposing factors enable it to become related, even though the patient concentrates on the environmental hostility. On the other hand, when the preschizophrenic and schizophrenic see society as a Darwinian jungle, we must remind ourselves that not the patient but Darwin himself made the first metaphor in the reverse order. After having studied society in Malthus' writing, Darwin saw the jungle as a reproduction of society. Inequality, competition, struggle,

and power prevailed in the two situations. Unless checked by human will, power wins out in both society and jungle. The future schizophrenic is certainly not the fittest in any jungle. When he becomes psychotic, he is not a prophet, at least in the literal sense, but a reminder of the inimical powers which most of the time win and say "Woe to the vanquished." And yet, in spite of its significance, his voice is most of the time too humble, too weak, too deprived of adaptational value to be heard. It is not possible briefly to describe, as I have elsewhere, the vicissitudes of this external power: how it may become introjected and continue to hurt from the inside, or how it may remain a destructive external force.

The dynamics of power

We may now consider the special characteristics and origin of power which tends to influence, deflect, subjugate, or use the will of other people.

The ethological theories of aggression, like those of Konrad Lorenz[13] or the classic psychoanalytic theories of Thanatos seem to explain only a small part of this complicated human phenomenon. The ethological theories focus on adaptational aspects of the problem; i.e., the human being, like the subhuman animals in the jungle, is endowed with aggressive mechanisms with which to fight other animals, secure food, maintain territorial rights, compete sexually, and defend the progeny. It is true that the capacity for aggression is very important for the preservation of animal species. Evolution has preserved this capacity with many selective mechanisms. One of them is to make aggression pleasant for the aggressor. Aggression is not as pleasant or as important as sexuality, but it has nevertheless a major role biologically and psychologically. Although these biological facts are undeniable they cannot explain the full range of human hostility. The neurophysiological functions of rage and physical aggression become in man only part of larger mechanisms. In many elaborated forms of human hostility they may not enter at all in these elementary manifestations.

Freud did not derive his theory of death instinct and aggression from the biological sciences. In formulating the theories of the two instincts he was influenced predominantly by cultural factors: in the case of Eros, by the sexual repression of the Victorian era; as to Thanatos, by what was occurring in Europe during the First World War. In the case of Eros Freud saw suppression, as related to repression, resistance, transference, symbolism, sublimation, displacement, and so on. Here Freud was great. With regard to Thanatos he did not see suppression-repression but, on

the contrary, expression and acting out as they were possible in the First World War. Freud here was not so great. He did not work out very well the origin or vicissitudes of aggression and the death instinct. He could not determine the somatic zones responsible for them or their phases of development, as he did for sexuality.

Neither Freud nor the ethologists could give us adequate theories, because at a certain point in the life of man or in the history of the human race new factors emerge that change completely the aim and potentiality of aggression. To view some of man's complex psychological processes purely as behavioral manifestations of instinctual aggression or of neurophysiological mechanisms is part of a reductionistic approach; it is another example of genetic fallacy. The complex functions that range from rage to hostility have at least five aims, often combined: first, self-defense, or elimination of fear; second, hurting others; third, depriving others; fourth, revenging; fifth, dominating others. This paper deals only with this fifth function, which is manifested when aggression bypasses the other four aims. Power is the result: the capacity to manipulate, control, deflect, exploit, crush the will of others. The aim is to dominate irrespective of whether domination, or the means to achieve it, hurts or not. Power affects every interpersonal relation and disturbs it to such a point that a state of communion between two or more people is no longer possible. When two people are together an unequal distribution of power, that is, unequal ability to exert one's will, tends to develop, unless strong measures are taken to maintain the equilibrium. The result will be that one person will be dominant and the other submissive. This need to dominate may disturb the relation between parent and child, husband and wife, teacher and pupil, employer and employee, and so on. A relation which is meant to be based on love, affection, learning, or cooperation becomes corrupted by power seeking—most of the time implemented not just by conscious but also, and in many cases predominantly, by unconscious maneuvers. Generally society sanctions the more common unequal distributions of power, which may thus remain unchallenged for thousands of years, or until liberation movements occur.

Unequal distribution of power first gives origin to a hierarchy, then to control, finally to potential or actual subjugation. I repeat that the aim of power is not necessarily to hurt, but to dominate. Nevertheless the dominated person is hurt. In many cases the experience of being hurt is conscious; in many other cases it is unconscious and the psyche suffers without being aware of the suffering. The person's autonomy and individuality are attacked; the individual becomes an Uncle Tom, an extremely subservient person, a compulsive, a queer, a psychopath, a paranoid,

and so on. When the dominated person seems to accept being dominated, he does so in order to avoid stronger fears and anxiety or because he cannot conceive other ways of experiencing life. I can only allude here to the unequal distribution of power in such large groups of people as some social classes or entire countries.

The need for power has characteristics of its own, not found in primitive biological needs such as hunger, thirst, sleep, and sex. These biological needs that we have in common with other animal species are indeed powerful, but also self-limiting. A man cannot eat more than a certain amount of food and cannot have sexual relations with more than a certain number of women. Even very large harems, as they exist in some countries, are built to signify prestige and wealth, more than sexual prowess. Contrary to sexual ability the need for power is potentially endless and boundless. Some people in search of power cannot conceive any limitation to it. Such people as Alexander the Great and Napoleon in the early period of their political life could have had all the wealth and sexual exploits they wanted, yet they continued to seek more and more power. Even the meaning of money has to be reinterpreted in relation to power. If money is a means to obtain food and sex, it cannot go beyond physiological satisfaction. But money can buy status, prestige, and power.

Marx's theory about the economic interpretation of history is susceptible of revision. It is true that the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie wanted an economic position in which it could prosper and exploit the masses. The whole theory, however, could be understood in terms of the dynamics of power. In a capitalistic society in which birth privileges are not important and the aristocracy plays a minimal role, the most common way to increase power is by accruing capital. If we cannot be aristocrats, we can become plutocrats. Marx's ideology can conceive a classless society as far as economy is concerned, but certainly the system by which the ideology is supposed to be actualized does not lead to equal distribution of power. In Russia there is an elite of the powerful, and a mass of the powerless.

What theories have psychoanalysis and related sciences advanced about the origin of power? Adler has offered very meaningful hypotheses.[1,2] The child starts to feel inferior in the world of adults, and later he learns that "to be human means to feel inferior." This explanation is plausible but leaves unanswered many questions. Why does the individual continue to feel inferior when he grows up? Why does everybody feel inferior, even kings and presidents? And why is inferiority compensated for by domination of others?

Although the inferiority feeling becomes manifest as a feeling of

helplessness in the child, it is actually grounded on and perpetuated by intrinsic properties of the human psyche.[4] It is based on the fact that a discrepancy exists between the way man sees himself and the way his symbolic processes make him visualize that he could be. Man is always short of what he can conjecture; he can always conceive a situation better than the one he is in. This discrepancy is caused by the power of his symbolic processes, actually by a much larger or inclusive philosophy of life which he comes to build in his contacts with other human beings. I have become increasingly[4,6] aware that cognitive processes, such complicated structures as so-called philosophies of life, or what the sociologist Gouldner[10] calls domain assumptions, are responsible for many constructive as well as destructive motivations. These domain assumptions operate most of the time at an unconscious level or at the periphery of consciousness. Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts should expand on the work of sociologists by revealing more of these assumptions and elucidating their ramifications. A great deal of human behavior, generally believed to be motivated by primitive instinctual drives, is motivated instead by unconscious presuppositions which are part of elaborate cognitive structures. At the same time these high-level cognitive motivations may reinforce more primitive ones and overdetermine man's behavior.

What are the philosophies of life or domain assumptions which urge people to dominate others? At a certain time in his phylogenetic or ontogenetic development, man transcends his biological nature and becomes aware of a basic irreconcilable dichotomy: he conceives a theoretical or ideal state of perfectibility, and yet he is very imperfect, and in relation to the ideal, inferior. When he sees himself less than what he would like to be, he believes others too are dissatisfied with him. He faces a theoretical infinity of space, time, things, and ideas, which he can in a vague sense visualize but not master. On the other hand, he becomes aware of of his finitude. He knows he is going to die, and that the range of experiences he is going to have is limited. He cannot be better than he is capable of being and he cannot enjoy more than a certain amount of food and sex.

But being able to conceive the infinite, the immortal, the greater and greater, he cannot accept his littleness. If frustration were not such a weak and misused word, we could say that he feels frustrated about his own nature and desperately searches for ways to overcome his condition. At a certain period in history some religions have made him conceive compensations in another life, after death. However, these conceptions of immortality were conceived not earlier than 3500 years ago. Earlier in human history the only way to obtain an apparent expansion of the pre-

rogatives of life was to invade the life of others. Since then, this method has remained the prevailing one. My life will be less limited if I take your freedom, if I make you work for me, if I make you submit to me. Thus instead of accepting his limitations and helping himself and his fellowmen within the realm of these limitations, man developed domain assumptions which made him believe that he could bypass his finitude and live more by making others less alive.

These assumptions ramified and built up networks of rationalizations. If someone's life was limited it was only because the others impinged upon him, restricted his potentialities, and infringed his will. If he succeeds in ruling others he will expand and live intensely; he will have the pleasure of exerting an unbounded will; he will increase his ego and decrease his superego. The conception of superman, which reached full consciousness and distinct formulation in the philosophy of Nietzsche, has existed in related forms since prehistoric times in the psyche of the masses of men as an unconscious domain assumption. Because of it the individual tends to confuse the concept of freedom and of individual autonomy with the irrational illusion of infinity, and by doing so he diminishes the freedom of others.

I must stress once more that most of the time these conceptions are not in the mind of men in a state of consciousness or full consciousness. Contrary to the early theories of classic psychoanalysis, it is not just the primitive which is repressed or kept at a preconscious level. Whatever is not acceptable to the self tends to be repressed or to be kept at the periphery of consciousness, whether it comes from primitive, ordinary, or unusually high levels of the psyche. Again I must stress that the mentioned interpretation does not rule out more primitive motivations for dominating others, such as the need to hurt, to deprive, to revenge, or to remove fear and anxiety. The unconscious aim to overcome the human limitation may become the ally of the pleasure principle and of what some authors call id motivation.

When man became the only entity to discover the predicament of his finitude in the midst of the infinite he could, theoretically at least, react in three possible ways:

1. He could accept his finitude with the proviso that by following the endless symbolic processes which are at his disposal he could continue to grow as long as he lived.

2. He could recognize that his fellow human beings shared the predicament of his finitude and try to help them by fostering justice, equality, and individual growth.

3. In a futile attempt to overcome or decrease his finitude he could try to overpower others and make others even more limited.

History shows in an indisputable manner that with rare exceptions man has selected the third possibility as the acceptable domain assumption. Obviously it was the easiest and most gratifying; it was the one which permitted man to be aggressive in a deflected way; it was the one by which he felt he could get quick admiration and approval from others. However, the tendency toward this choice was certainly reinforced by the fear of the other. If you do not dominate the other, the other will dominate you. Thus we go back to the problem of presence or absence of basic trust. We enter a circular process in which it is impossible at the stage of our knowledge to distinguish the initial from the subsequent steps.

At a sociopolitical level the accumulators of power are few, and the subjugated are many. Thus man always lived in fear of being overpowered. This fear has existed from prehistory to present times. Politics is to a large extent the art and science of acquiring power, preserving power, and defeating the opponent's power. But as we very well know, power is also very important in private life within the family. The threat of being overpowered that the little child experiences, as Alfred Adler was the first to describe, is perpetuated in the life of the adult, at a sociopolitical as well as at a family level.

After this reflection the temptation comes again to consider the paranoid and paranoiac patient as a real prophet or proclaimer of the truth. I have already mentioned how some authors have accepted this interpretation. In this regard we must remember that people have been able to adapt to the most cruel situations, such as slavery and Nazi concentration camps, without becoming psychotic. Again we may reaffirm that the psychotic is not a prophet, but is one of the first and most severely injured victims. The fact that other factors, including biological, are necessary to make him become the first and total victim is immaterial in the present context. The fact remains that by being so sensitive and so vulnerable he may counteract the callousness that our healthy capacity for adjustment and adaptation has brought about.

As already noted, the most common roles of unequal distinction of power become sanctioned and crystallized by society. The person who wants to achieve autonomy must thus be liberated from inner restrictions and emancipated from some external ties. The greatest episodes of emancipation have so far been left to the unpredictable games of history. It seems that the time is ripe for psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to make in new ways modest contributions to this vast subject. By adding their

knowledge of personality to certain social trends, which are quickly developing in our times, they may help the individual acquire a healthy autonomy in a complicated context of collective interdependence.

Power in the therapeutic situation

Not enough attention has been paid to the topic of power in the transference situation, especially with psychotic patients in psychoanalytic therapy. Obviously the analyst and the patient are not on an equal footing. The patient sees the analyst in a position of power: not just power as a function to illuminate, to interpret, to help, but actually as a controlling power of which the patient is afraid. Perhaps this is unavoidable at the beginning of therapy, as the patient transfers to the analyst the feelings he once had for the parent. At the end of therapy, when the transference is solved—somebody could argue—the patient will no longer experience the analyst in this way. However, this seems to be rarely the case, unless a different therapeutic attitude has been adopted. Even at an advanced stage of treatment the psychotic or formerly psychotic patient tends to to see the analyst not as a peer, or a person he respects, but as a person he must obey. Even when many other transferential problems of parental origin have been solved, the problem of personal power remains. In my opinion, as long as the power problem exists no basic trust is established, and a prepsychotic or psychotic potentiality remains.

Perhaps I shall make my position clearer if I say that at an earlier stage in my development I was much impressed by a sentence that the French psychoanalyst Racamier [15] used in defining Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's position in the treatment of the psychotic. Racamier wrote that contrary to John Rosen and Marguerite Sechehaye, who in their treatment entered the world of psychosis, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann assumed and retained the role of ambassador of reality and did not pretend to accept the delusions of the patient. On the contrary, she relied on the part of the patient which was adult and mature in order to guide him back to the world of reality of which she was the ambassador.

In my opinion the analyst must have a double and therefore difficult role: he must be a companion of the patient in his journey in the world of unreality, and at the same time he must remain in the realm of reality. But I do not think that the term ambassador of reality defines this second role, or Fromm-Reichmann's attitude. Fromm-Reichmann had no rose gardens to promise in this world of reality. It is only when the patient feels that the analyst is not an ambassador, but a peer in this imperfect

reality, a person who shares the human predicament without succumbing, that he will not necessarily see human beings as hostile powers. Only then will an atmosphere of basic trust and relatedness develop. The analyst is not a representative of any country, society, religion, parents, establishment, and so on; he is just there, involved with the patient whom he considers an equal in his human worth and in his potentiality to will.

In this position of equality it is essential that countertransference be equal in importance and intensity to the transference. To define a therapeutic relation with the psychotic as a working alliance is indication of a misalliance. "Alliance" smacks of militarism. "Working" seems to imply that the analyst and the patient work together as the employer and the employee. Moreover the analytic situation is not for the psychotic only work or mainly work, but also a place, like home is for a small child, where he can grow even without working, or by working very little. The work will increase the more the therapist and patient become peers and share even the negative aspects of the environment.

Power in psychiatric and psychoanalytic institutions

In spite of excellent training, teaching, research activity, and therapy, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts are not immune to power maneuver, but are as susceptible to it as are other people. And why should they be different? Don't analysts dream like other people or have personal problems like other people? Here are some of the observations:

In many psychiatric hospitals the director acts like a king who rules over the life not only of patients but also of the medical and paramedical staff. The medical staff is generally divided into at least two groups or parties, both of which try in a subtle way to become the one preferred by the director, in order to have special privileges or to have their own policies accepted. One is reminded of the situations described by Theodore Lidz in the family: family schism and family skew. If one party loses, its members live for one thing: the hope that the director will die or retire. It is pathetic to see how submissive and obsequious to the director some members of the staff become in order to be in his good graces. The director is always right, never contradicted. In the hospital with which I was once associated, residents were warned against dating nurses, although they were allowed to date female psychologists, social workers, and occupational therapists.

Faculty appointments in medical schools, especially as chiefs of departments, follow the games of power. In a European country, where the medical schools are controlled by the state, when a vacancy to a chair-

manship occurs, all the other chairmen of departments of psychiatry of the country have a meeting during which they choose three candidates. Obviously they are supposed to choose the best or the most qualified. This is seldom the case; instead, power coalitions are formed. Each chairman tries to nominate his assistant or pupil, since (a) the pupil is likely to maintain friendship with his former chief and therefore form with him the nucleus of a new power coalition, (b) the pupil will continue to spread the ideas of the teacher and perpetuate his prestige and power, and (c) because the pupil did the research or writings for papers published under the name of the chairman, the latter must show his gratitude. Inasmuch as it is not possible to nominate more than three persons, coalitions among the chairmen and secret alliances are formed. When a coalition becomes powerful enough it will be able to nominate one candidate, pupil of a chairman, with the understanding that, later on, candidates who are pupils of the other members of the coalition will also be nominated. Finally, the three candidates are selected. The battle does not end there, since the senate of the medical school will have to select one among the three suggested by the commission of chairmen. Strong pressures start to be exerted again by political parties, the church, the members of the cabinet of the government, and so on. The one of the three who is able to collect the greatest political support will finally be chosen; rarely the best.

In the United States there are no pressures from the government, but certainly there are from various ruling coalitions, including the academic coalition. In the United States there are in addition other complications, which are intradepartmental. Departments of psychiatry have become huge organizations with many branches. Often the chairman, consciously or unconsciously, imitates the prevailing methods of the corporate state. The chief of the department is generally an administrator concerned only with the smooth organization and with producing as many finished products as possible. He must deliver so many well-trained doctors and psychiatrists. Thus the school maintains the function of providing professional men, but not that of establishing a climate propitious to academic freedom. In many cases the chief of department becomes increasingly skillful in administrative practices and more and more stale in clinical, teaching, and research activities. Since he must retain some academic prestige, in some instances he persuades other people to do academic work for him. Thus he asks people to write articles or even books in which the name of the chief appears even as the senior author, although he may have done little or none of the work. For these services he will reward his collaborators with academic titles, such as professor or assistant professor, just as kings

of old used to appoint devoted subjects as dukes, counts, barons, and so on.

In most cases economics does not enter into the picture, only prestige and power. The atmosphere is thus different from that prevailing in other institutions of learning, such as colleges and nonmedical universities, where economics plays a role and makes the situation even worse. Obviously I do not imply that this method is the only one by which promotions are made. Merit still remains the main qualification in many departments.

In order to maintain top efficiency some chairmen do not want to grant autonomy to the different sections of the department, for instance, to the section of psychoanalysis or of group therapy. Such autonomy would stimulate self-determination and all the prerogatives which go with academic freedom. On the contrary, some chairmen want to retain the controlling power by appointing the new members and the chiefs of the various sections. When nominally the members of the section have the right to nominate a chief by democratic means, some chairmen with political means succeed in having their man elected. When nominally a new member is nominated by the faculty, the chairman may veto his appointment.

It is easy to determine what is wrong with such organization of hospitals and departments of psychiatry. The directors of the hospitals and the chairmen of the departments cannot be properly checked and balanced by the subordinate members of the staff. The sections should have as much autonomy as necessary to create a climate of academic freedom. A rotating system of chairmanship of departments and sections should be in operation. Fortunately this is the case now in an increasing number of departments. The majority of departments, however, have not yet been reorganized, and a few occasionally revert to a more archaic system of autocracy. With the rotating system some efficiency would undoubtedly be lost, but the values gained in a climate of academic freedom would in the long run show telling results. Theoretically members of hospital staffs or of departments who feel manipulated within the system of hierarchy could complain to the commissioner of mental health or to the dean of the school. This is seldom the case, as the climate of courage for such steps rarely exists. And courage is necessary, because commissioners and deans are generally on the side of the recognized authorities, on whose benevolence they themselves depend. The would-be protesters might be labeled queer or paranoid.

In order to avoid these situations many psychoanalytic schools have organized and developed independent institutions. Alas! We may avoid

Scylla and veer toward Charybdis. In a brilliant article published in 1958 in the *Saturday Review*, Erich Fromm exposed the intrigues which had taken place in the psychoanalytic association in its early history. By interviewing and quoting witnesses, Fromm documented the historical truth of these power manipulations. We would be extremely naïve to think that these maneuvers go on only among the orthodox Freudians. Let us face it! Power games are played all over. When the founding fathers of a school retire or die out, new coalitions are formed. As in Roman, Napoleonic, or recent Russian history, at first dyarchies or triumvirates are formed, but eventually only one chief emerges. The chief will maintain the ideas of the founding chiefs (now part of the ideology of the establishment) and will keep at the periphery dissenting or not totally compliant members of the faculty.

A European group that I have observed for many years was organized according to a dyarchy. One of the two chiefs was very capable as an administrator, the other as an innovator in theory and therapy. For a long time the group was kept together and prospered. Finally a power game between the two chiefs occurred: each one resented the power of the other and the group split into at least two major groups. In other cases, a conspiracy against a chief occurs; he is finally ousted and he founds another group. Often these splittings are purported to occur because of the different ideologies held by the members of the group. Actually the difference in ideology is only a pretext or a manifest motivation, just as it was in the religious wars of the past. Scientific organizations should welcome differences in ideology which certainly would add to the spirit of inquiry. The latent and real motivation is a different one.

In conclusion, power as a force which tends to deflect, restrict, or eliminate the will of the individual is indeed more powerful than many other psychological factors that psychoanalysis has for a long time dealt with. Only if the individual becomes fully conscious of this power, and fully conscious of his will, may his self flourish, grow, and reach autonomy. At times he may have to pay the big price of standing alone, but he will be more of himself. And by being more of himself, he will be able to give more of himself to others. He must become aware that although it is true that he is partially made of biological components, whether we call them instinctual drives or genetic codes, and although it is true that he is also partially made of interpersonal and sociocultural influences, he is also made by the choices that he himself has made in life. Yet, not totally, but in his most significantly human part, he is made of what he himself has

voluntarily chosen. But again, his choices are not entirely free. As analysts, we must do whatever we can to remove or weaken any power, external or internal, which restricts his free and constructive choices.

References

1. Adler, A.: A study of organ inferiority and its psychical compensation. Nerv. Ment. Dis. Monogr. No. 24, 1917.
2. Adler, A.: Understanding Human Nature. New York, Greenberg, 1927.
3. Arieti, S.: Volition and value: a study based on catatonic schizophrenia. Compr. Psychiat. 2:74–82, 1961.
4. Arieti, S.: The Intrapsychic Self: Feeling, Cognition and Creativity in Health and Mental Illness. New York, Basic Books, 1967.
5. Arieti, S.: The psychodynamics of schizophrenia: a reconsideration. Amer. J. Psychother. 22:366–381, 1968.
6. Arieti, S.: The structural and psychodynamic role of cognition in the human psyche. In: Arieti, S. (Ed.): The World Biennial of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Vol. 1. New York, Basic Books, 1970.
7. Arieti, S.: Writings in preparation, 1971.
8. Farber, L.: The Ways of the Will: Essays Toward a Psychology and Psychopathology of the Will. New York, Basic Books, 1966.
9. Fromm, E.: Debate with Jacob Arlow on psychoanalysis. Saturday Rev., June 14, 1958.
10. Gouldner, A. W.: The Coming Crisis of Western Civilization. New York, Basic Books, 1970.
11. Horney, K.: Our Inner Conflicts. New York, W. W. Norton, 1945.
12. Laing, R. D.: The Politics of Experience. New York, Pantheon Books, 1967.
13. Lorenz, K.: On Aggression. New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963.
14. May, R.: Love and Will. New York, W. W. Norton, 1969.
15. Racamier, P. C.: Psychoanalytic therapy of the psychoses. In: Nacht, S. (Ed.): Psychoanalysis of Today. New York, Grune & Stratton, 1959.
16. Salzman, L.: Personal communication, 1971.
17. Siirala, M.: Die Schizophrenie des Einzelnen und der Allgemeinheit. Gottingen, Vandenhoeck Ruprecht, 1961.
18. Siirala, M.: Schizophrenia: a human situation. Amer. J. Psychoanaly. 23:29, 1963.

Discussion by Ian Alger, M. D.

Silvano Arieti has called on us as analysts to . . . "do whatever we can to remove or weaken any power, external or internal, which restricts his [the individual's] free and constructive choices."

Arieti's sincerity is apparent because in the very act of presenting this challenging paper he has demonstrated his own courage in delineating so explicitly the corrupt intricacies of the power structures which he personally has been able to observe and to experience in psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric departments,

and psychoanalytic institutes in three countries. Because his own power base is small, by "telling it like it is," he runs the risk of personal loss, and also the risk which he has noted in his paper, that anyone who so speaks out is in danger of being labeled paranoid. My own experiences give corroborative evidence that the power structures and power manipulations he has described do indeed exist not only in the institutions he has mentioned but throughout our society. It would have been tempting, and it would have been much easier, had Dr. Arieti spoken in generalities and left us comfortable with our suppressions undisturbed. Instead, by his examples of the politics of therapy, and of the psychiatric institutions, he has created a more urgent and immediate personal reason for us as analysts to utilize the understanding of power developed in the initial half of his presentation.

Because Dr. Arieti's scope is so broad, including definitions of power and will, developmental hypotheses, comparison of theories on the origin of power, as well as critiques of the models of schizophrenia put forth by Laing and Siirala, my discussion will focus primarily on the coercive, unjust use of power, to which Dr. Arieti ascribes the term domination. Within this framework I shall stress the relationship between external power systems and the self-systems with reference to the effects on individual behavior as well as on society as a whole.

The use of power to dominate is the major focus of Dr. Arieti's paper. Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary defines power as the possession of control or command over others. Clearly some distinction must be made between just and unjust control by an authority. Thomas and Marjorie Melville have made such a clarification by defining the unjust exertion of power as "violence." In noting that "violence" comes from the Latin verb *"violare,"* to violate, they contend that political, economic, psychological, or physical power can be used to violate human rights. Dr. Arieti is referring to this violence when he describes the power of domination as one which "is experienced by the individual as thwarting, deflecting, inhibiting, or arresting one's will, one's freedom, or one's capacity for growth and expansion, . . ." in effect, one's human rights.

I admire Dr. Arieti's frank admission that until recently, in seeking to explain his patients' negative appraisal of the world, he had rejected the hypothesis that the world really can be, "a hostile power and that there is more than a grain of truth in what the severely neurotic, the prepsychotic, and the psychotic experience." His appreciation of the work of Laing and Siirala, albeit with reservations and modifications, is further evidence of his own freedom to alter formulations. In discussing Laing he agrees with the latter that a social fact is also a political event, and that any activity of man which involves an act of will affecting others has political dimension. Since politics is actually the influencing of peoples' behavior by other people, it is a nuclear issue in any discussion of power. Arieti's concept of endocratic power is, I believe, metaphorical. He describes external power as being incorporated or introjected so that an individual may have to obey or placate an inner dictate. The relationship between external power and a person's self-concept and beliefs (endocratic power) is a

crucial factor in understanding how covert leverage is so easily maintained in human maneuvers. This covert relationship between external power and personal belief systems may also be most pertinent in an understanding of some so-called pathological behavior of people, much as Laing sees the labeling of the schizophrenic as a social and political event, and Siirala understands schizophrenic behavior as prophetic.

I would like briefly to elaborate on this thesis. All human behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal, communicates, regardless of the other functions the behavior may have. Furthermore, every communication transmits, in addition to the content of the message, a command aspect. That is, in every communication we give, whether by word or by gesture, we tell someone else what we want him to do, or what we expect; that is, we issue a command. For example, if we ask, "Where is the post office?" we are giving the command to answer us. If we say, "This is my new watch," we are giving a command to give a reaction in response. Even silent behavior conveys a command, such as, "Do something to comfort me!"

Scheflen, in a personal communication, has remarked that animals' territoriality is maintained by the sounds and gestures members of each group send to one another, and that the limits of the territory are maintained in a reciprocal system limited by the distance within which mutual signaling can actually occur. Scheflen then discusses the fact that human grouping (for example family grouping) can be maintained even though the people involved move far apart, by certain learned signaling systems which stress personal responsibility and evoke guilt. Specifically, even though a son is on the other side of a continent, he may feel an inner dictate to return, or at least telephone home, at Thanksgiving. In a further elaboration, Scheflen suggests that the external power is especially influential when the idea is conveyed by the society that each individual has an inner danger of loss of control, and that he personally must strive to prevent an eruption of this destructive force. In Western religions the danger is sin, or possession by the devil; in classic psychoanalysis the danger is id impulses. Once a person believes in this concept of inner danger, he is more liable to accept a social code which purports to protect against an eruption of the danger if the dictates of the code are carefully followed. Scheflen completes the description of such a system by noting that when a person is actually trapped in an external power system (such as a dependent child in a family, or a salesman over 40 in a large company, or a worker in a hospital), and has also an unquestioning belief in the values inherent in and propounded by that power system, the conditions for a double bind are inevitable present, and the appearance of deviant or pathological or symptomatic behavior is unlikely.

Adler, Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm progressively expanded an understanding of the importance of society in determining man's behavior. This line of thinking has been supported and further elaborated by work in learning, communication, and systems theories. Bernard S. Robbins, a founding psy-

choanalyst of the Flower group at New York Medical College, was a pioneer in grasping the significance of social forces and the power of the social system to act inimically on the individual, and he was particularly sucessful in demonstrating clinically the relationship between an individual's neurotic behavior and the social systems in which he existed.

In discussing the origins of power, and the concept of domain assumptions, Dr. Arieti writes, "A great deal of human behavior, generally believed to be motivated by primitive instinctual drives, is motivated instead by unconscious presuppositions which are part of elaborate cognitive structures." And he further writes a few pages later, "Contrary to the early theories of classic psycho--analysis, it is not just the primitive which is repressed. . . . Whatever is not acceptable to the self tends to be repressed or to be kept at the periphery of consciousness. . . ." In short, people who have positions of power in the social systems and social institutions may exercise that power in ways which are hostile and antihuman, and furthermore, the influence on an individual developing in such systems is such that his attitudes and beliefs about himself and the world are limited, constricted, and distorted so that he becomes, without his own awareness, a participant in the reciprocal system and its perpetuation.

Psychoanalysis is an insight therapy. Our own awareness as analysts will hopefully continue to expand, so that we will more accurately understand the nature of our social and cultural institutions and will more clearly identify their malevolent and humanly destructive aspects. To the extent we develop such awareness, we will be more capable of entering into the more fully human peer-to-peer therapeutic relationships described by Dr. Arieti. Then we will be more able to challenge the patients' limited and distorted concepts, so that they will have more options to fight openly against the cruel and inhuman external powers, or to choose to escape from them without personal guilt; or, if neither open fight nor flight is possible, because of the actual coercive nature of the external forces, then to attempt an adaptational underground fight in which they may be able, especially if they join with others, to maintain their own clearer perceptions of reality and their own sense of humanity.

Finally, Dr. Arieti calls on us as analysts not only to bring our newer understandings of the nature and effect of power to the therapeutic relationship, but also to take the risk now, for ourselves, in confronting more directly the external hostile forces. He himself in this paper has personally taken that kind of risk. Those of us who are staff and faculty members of psychiatric and psychoanalytic hospitals and departments can accept the challenge and also take the risk of immediately moving to identify and oppose the power of unjust authoritarianism in these systems.

What Is Power?
Definitional Considerations
and Some Research Implications

ROBERT G. RYDER, Ph.D.

There are, it seems to me, three general classes of phenomena which can be placed under the heading of "power," as well as some subdivisions within classes. First, power can be used in a behavioristic way to refer to particular categories of acts. It can be defined in terms of some set of "assertive" or "manipulative" or "yielding" behaviors. Second, power can refer to overt or implied role attributions. A leader-and-follower, or even a master-and-slave, relationship might exist and be labeled as such, without worrying about the extent to which mastery depends on the cooperation of the slave. Finally, and here is a major source of difficulty, one can be concerned with actual or real power, or power per se, without being content to study assertive behavior or role attributions as such.

All of us who have studied interaction data know something about behavioristic definitions of power. "Please do something" might be coded as an assertive act, as might various questions. "OK, I give in" might be labeled as yielding, or negative assertiveness. Mere amount of speech might be used as a power index.

Outcome of a disagreement or decision-making process is of course the most popular power measure from interaction data, but it is one which

might better be set aside for the moment. What outcome means, and its status as either a bald operational measure or in relation to some concept, is not immediately clear, and whatever else is so, outcome is certainly not an item of behavior.

An immediate difficulty with some behavior codings is that they can look provincial, or not relevant, or at least odd, in relationship to many real-life contests or decision processes. When you want to get a raise, or avoid getting a traffic ticket, or get something out of your spouse, or change a social system, can even your actions, much less your actual power, be well described, much less manipulated, by keeping track of the numbers of assertive statements that are made in face-to-face interactions?

Behavioral scientists in this area are hooked on words, and on communication in general. For one thing we set up very polite situations. No one can really do anything to anyone, in the typical interaction situation, ercept talk, whereas in the real world what people say counts nowhere near as much as the sanctions which might be applied.[1]

Power-related coding systems, even those limited to communications, might be more useful if codes were more related, or more explicitly related, to fairly general conceptual variables. Assertive statements, for example, might be thought of as a special case of "urging" activities, and it might be possible to make generalizations about urging activities that would be widely applicable.

Power as role attribution can be unrelated to the frequency of, say, assertive speech, and also unrelated to power per se—a fact of some practical importance. For example, a wife may continuously demand things of her husband, and he may never say no, with it still being clear that the dance being enacted has a helpless wife entreating her lord and master to be good to her and a husband responding in terms of *nobless oblige*.

Questionnaire measures of power may fall into this general category of role attribution, since a respondent may be asked not who says or does what, but who *decides* what. It seems reasonable to suppose that he will answer in terms of his own personal attributions of power, and that these might be role attributions. Some other kinds of questions, such as, "Who is boss in your home?" are of course direct questions about role attributions.

Power per se, or "actual" power, is another thing entirely. It is a conceptual problem, carrying with it the danger that precise formulation is impossible, or that if formulation is possible adequate measurement may not be, or that if measurement is possible the results may be uninformative about the human situation under study. With any good luck, it will turn out that there are some human relationships in which the con-

cept of power is irrelevant. With really bad luck, situations will be found in which power is vitally important, but so complex and invisible in its operation as to be totally incomprehensible.

Addressing ourselves to the problem of formulation, let us consider several reasonable, and a couple of unreasonable, definitions of power per se.

Suppose particular actions by party A lead to particular actions by party B, or in other words B's actions are contingent on or are caused by prior actions by A. Such a relationship can *not* reasonably be thought to be one of power, without ruling out the possibility that the initial actions by A were themselves caused by still earlier actions by B; i.e., there may be an interactional system. Does the thermostat control the furnace, or does the furnace control the thermostat? One definition of power could then be that B's actions are contingent on A's, but A's are not contingent on B's. Since absolutes are rarely to be found, let us suggest a definition in relative terms for something to be called *contingency power:* A has power over B if B's actions are *more* contingent on prior actions by A than are A's actions on prior actions by B. According to this view, neither the furnace nor the thermostat is in control, but both are under the power of some person's temperature decisions.

Contingency power is meaningful only in partly open systems. For events not to be totally (and hence equally) dependent on each other, A's actions must depend in part on something outside the system. Thus an important fact about contingency power is that it depends in principle on the observer's frame of reference. As his frame of reference becomes more and more inclusive, contingency power must eventually tend to vanish.

Second, there is power defined in terms of relative *cost effectiveness.* Suppose A's and B's actions are both contingent on each other, but that A's actions are much less costly, in some sense, than are B's. A can be said to have power over B if A can get a lot from B, in some sense, at small cost, whereas B can get only a little from A, at greater cost. For example, one speech by a national leader, say party A, may seriously affect the contents of mass media all over the country, whereas a great deal of comment in the mass media, say party B, may produce only small changes in A's activities. By this definition it is clear that the thermostat, clicking on and off with minimal energy expenditure, is the controlling mechanism, and that the furnace, which must huff and puff to change the thermostat, is the controlled party.

It is in this sense that political assassinations, kidnappings, and acts

of terrorism or blackmail express a kind of power, since they may have major effects at a minimal cost and are very expensive to prevent. Terrorism and blackmail can operate within a marriage dyad as well. For example, spouse B may spend a great deal of energy trying to keep spouse A from making the one small remark that would be a social disaster from B's point of view.

This last set of examples presents three anomalies that suggest further possibilities for defining power. First, common usage is violated, in that acts of terrorism and the like are usually thought of as weapons of those without power. Second, A must consider the possibility that although his actions may be expensive to prevent, prevention might not actually be impossible if B has adequate resources. Third, A must consider that B may attempt to respond favorably, as by payoffs or conciliation, or B may attempt a very negative response, such as getting rid of A. In short, definitional statements about power are not complete without considering available resources and favorableness of outcome. It is possible, then, to consider at least a third kind or definition of power, namely power as available *resources*. The possibility of contradiction between power as available resources and cost effectiveness power is culturally well recognized, in terms going from David and Goliath to the modern idea of a paper tiger, and is enshrined in the heart of every effectively misbehaving child. It can be the embarrassment of great nations, and of all who are muscle bound but slow witted. Unfortunately from the point of view of A, even if A is highly cost effective, he might run out of resources entirely if the game continues too long, as did the South in the Civil War, as did the resistance to Russian power in Czechoslovakia, and as a child might when his father finally corners him in the woodshed. The film *La Strada* includes a believable example of this kind of process, culminating in A's violent death.

It can be seen that the three kinds of power described here are not entirely independent of each other. The first two, contingency power and cost effectiveness power, characterize the extent and quality, respectively, of the pathways of influence between A and B. The last describes attributes or commodities of a sort which make the pathways function. If two of these forms are held constant, power can unambiguously be said to vary monotonically with the third, but only within certain limits. If there is no contingent relationship at all between A's and B's acts there is no power by any definition, as there is no power if cost effectiveness is totally nil, or if resources run out entirely.

Favorableness of outcome is or is not a distinct form of power, de-

pending on one's point of view. On one hand, it is certainly true that one who can force a greatly favorable outcome is thought of as more powerful than one who can force an outcome that is only marginally favorable, but that is perhaps encompassed by the idea of cost effectiveness. Evaluation of outcome can sometimes be an actual power resource, in the sense that A is more powerful if he does not really mind the worst that B can do to him. Furthermore, favorableness of outcome is subject to different interpretations by different observers, leading even to the interesting situation in which A and B fancy themselves to be in conflict when they might actually be cooperating. Suppose for instance that A wants B to make trouble in some way in order to justify repression, and B wants A to be repressive in order to recruit more troublemakers. The resulting interaction between A and B can chug on quite contentedly until there is an unmitigated disaster for one party or the other. Finally, there might be a situation in which outcomes are consistently favorable for A, but in which there is in fact no contingent relationship and no effectiveness of resource use. A might then feel himself to have power, but in fact he is only lucky.

Leaving open the question of whether outcome favorability is itself a form of power, given nonzero values for the other power forms, I would like to stipulate that if A is human, A cannot be said to have power over B unless he can get B to do something that is in some way favorable to A. That is, A's power activities must lead B's actions to become more closely in line with A's intentions.

A second stipulation relating to outcome is that if A has power over B, A must be able to get B to do something that B does *not* want to do. This stipulation could be stretched to one stating that B must do as A wishes whether or not B wants to, but if B always wants to perform actions which just happen to be what A wants, the whole concept of power is mooted. Note that the introduction of strictly psychological terms such as "intentions" and "wants" introduces another way in which power depends on the observer, since the observer must decide what he means by such terms.

Very little could be more important in a power concept than the preceding two stipulations. It would be totally senseless to define power in such a way as to include all causal or contingent relations between parties, regardless of intentions, because then all human interaction would be a matter of power. Apart from connotations, there would be no difference between power and, say, information. Almost anyone who has ever had a mutually happy relationship with another human being knows that

not all interactions are power struggles. Even in experimental situations set up to study power, A and B might refuse to cooperate with the experimenter, like Ferdinand the bull.

If we refuse to accept the happy fact that human relationships are possible apart from power struggles, we not only make our own lives miserable, but we turn power into a meaningless concept.

Unfortunately, there are still further complications to be considered in characterizing power per se. For one thing, we have talked exclusively of A's power over B, with A having power in some sense over B's actions. But the positions of A and B are not interchangeable; i.e., if A has no power over B it does not necessarily mean that B has power over A. It may only mean that with respect to A, B has a measure of freedom. B may require power over A in order to obtain freedom, but the two terms are not synonymous.

A more important, but related matter is that of metapower, as when A has power over B, but C has power over A's *power*. In order to secure his freedom from A, B might not want power over A in some concrete decision nearly as much as he wants power over A's power.

A while ago I spoke to a class of high-school girls in a Catholic high school, and while I was there I noticed that a few of the girls were not in the customary uniform. When I asked about it, I was told that the staff was deliberately ignoring this violation of rules, in order to avoid trouble. Eventually, when student rebelliousness had died down, the traditional rules would again be enforced. In other words, the girls had acquired the freedom to dress differently, but since they had acquired no control over the rule system, they were scheduled to lose that freedom again in due course. Perhaps much so-called gradual social change is like that, in which the fish believes himself to be free, when in fact the fisherman is merely feeding him a line, waiting for the fish to be tired enough to reel in. The failure for the girls, as for the fish, is perhaps in not going far enough—far enough to test the line and perhaps break it. That is, it might be necessary deliberately to force an open conflict, even if over an issue of no importance, so as to establish control over the rule system. For example, the girls might wear garish clothes, or not wear brassieres, or do one of the other silly things that students do which accomplish absolutely nothing—nothing, that is, except establish who has control over the rule system.

Here, as in the first-order definitions of power, the presumed nature of observed events depends in principle on the observer. The existence of meta- or second-order power, or of third-order or fourth-order power,

depends on the complexity of the system under observation, and that complexity depends in general on the frame of reference of the observer. Thus we can say that the thermostat controls the furnace, or that a tenant controls the thermostat-furnace relationship, or that the landlord limits the tenant's control, or that the city regulates the landlords, or that tenants put political pressure on the city to ensure adequate heating; and even higher orders of complexity can be included, in terms for example of the availability and cost of fuel oil, the durability of consumerism as a political force, the dependability of the political and legal system, and so on.

Finally, not only can metapower itself exist in terms of each of the forms of power per se, but it can be power *over* various permutations of these forms, leading to great complexity from the point of view of comprehension, but to numerous opportunities from the point of view of a power-oriented party.

Power strategy

Contingency

If there is an established contingency mechanism relating leaders to followers, contingency power can be directly acquired by taking over that mechanism. In the case where the mechanism is a government apparatus this possibility is well recognized, with the result that capitals and capitols are particularly well protected. The occurrence of *coups d'état* and the like indicates, however, that carelessness in this regard has not been universally eliminated. Power acquisition by this means is particularly easy in loosely organized situations, and in naïve groups. For example, there have been political demonstrations whose course has been altered by a few determined individuals commandeering the central information switchboard, or by someone grabbing a bullhorn. In the case of marriage, money-related power may not rest so much in who provides the income as it does in who controls the checkbook or the charge accounts.

Cost Effectiveness

If party A can put himself in a position where his doing absolutely nothing is highly motivating to party B, and the reverse is not true, A has maximum cost effectiveness power. A may, for example, be a child who declines to defecate at his parents' convenience, or an employer who withholds a pay raise until his employee works much harder, or the young woman

who once told me that her husband could have sexual favors only when he could walk across the floor on his tongue.

Considering only the case where A and B control equally favorable outcomes for each other, acquiring cost effectiveness power of the withholding variety is a matter of cultivating self-restraint and/or bluff. In the immortal words of Dean Rusk, it is a matter of who blinks first. In a bargaining situation of any sort, the party who is most willing to risk a total breakdown of negotiations, or who so appears, has an advantage.

The "madman" or "irrational process" ploy is one popular variation of holdout bargaining. This is a class of devices by which A persuades B that A will hold out even at the risk of total disaster. For example, A might take his shoe off and pound the table, and otherwise seek to convince B that he is simply not rational. As I have noted elsewhere,[2] wives often take this tack when their husbands' "logic" gets to be too tedius. When A is a representative of some group, he can say that it is not he, but his constituency, that is irrational and claim that he is trying to keep it under control, but that he cannot be responsible for the consequences if B does not perform properly. The movie *Dr. Strangelove* revolves around an inanimate variation on this theme of irrationality, namely, a so-called doomsday device. A's doomsday machine will destroy the world (including A), if B misbehaves. Self-destruction would clearly be irrational for A, but since the device has been engineered to be totally out of A's control, B had better be careful.

All of these last examples depend on the idea of A's helplessness. Since A cannot be rational, B must be not only rational but generous. One last variation involves the same principle but without the touch of madness. A simply sends errand boy C to deal with B. Since C is explicitly not empowered to give anything away, B must choose between generosity and refusing to negotiate on these terms.

Another way to acquire cost effectiveness power is, of course, by way of mobility and secrecy. If A can move fast enough or surprisingly enough, he can strike B where B is weak and make B work hard to strike A. Terrorism and guerrilla activities are oriented toward this kind of power, and so are helicopters, and sirens on police cars.

Then there are the organizational and technological multipliers by means of which a small action, such as pulling a trigger or pushing a button, can have great consequences. Thus an army might exert itself mightily, whereas its general only signs pieces of paper. Thus, while a war may be a cost effectiveness disaster from the point of view of nation A, national leader A may find it useful and inexpensive from his personal point of view.

Still another class of actions that can lead to cost effectiveness power is by means of involving some third party, C. It might be very difficult for A to influence B directly, but B might care greatly about treatment A can provide for C, leaving B vulnerable to blackmail of one sort or another. Formally speaking, it does not matter whether the threatened treatment of C is favorable or unfavorable from C's point of view, or even whether or not C cares about it, as long as the threat matters to B.

Resources Power

"Resources" refers to potential influencing strength and potential sources of such strength. Nation A's inaccessible geography may protect its freedom, but is not directly a source of influence, since A cannot throw it at B. However, A might notice that its inaccessible geography makes an excellent base from which to launch guerrilla raids or bombing missions, or that it is a good place to which hostages can be brought. Similar discoveries might be made for anything that initially seems to have only defensive significance, but the real point of this example is that resources are as much a matter of insight as of acquisition. Nonviolence is perhaps the most dramatic example of such an insight, in which the very absence of weapons becomes itself a powerful weapon.

Similarly, A's acquisition of resources may depend on B's lack of insight, as in the sales of American scrap metal to Japan shortly before World War II. There are thus two primary ways in which A can change the balance of resources. A can perceive a potential not previously noticed, or B can fail to perceive that A is acquiring resources. It might be thought that A could also acquire resources because B is just unable to stop him, but I would rather suggest that in this case A really already has such resources, by implication, since he has control over their acquisition. In the same way, A can be said to possess already, by implication, resources which it is known that he can create (as by technological development), given that B cannot stop him.

Although both ways of changing resource power depend upon awareness, there is at least one formal distinction between them that is of some practical importance. Acquisition of resources depends on A being smarter or less foolish than B. But increasing resources by redefining one's present possessions is something A can do without regard for B's capability, which can be a distinct advantage.

Resource power can also change by acts of God, that is by events outside the interactional system under consideration, on the assumption

that these changes are noticed. In the previously mentioned case of the Catholic girl's school, the overall tone of student militancy, for example, was not really under anyone's control, but was part of developments in society at large.

Another possibility is that apparent resources can be exposed as unusable or false. A may threaten to leave B, his wife, and go and live with C instead, but when B calls A's bluff, it may turn out that C has no interest in the proposed arrangement. A may call a general strike and be ignored. A might be stuck in a modern war with a Maginot Line. And so on. Another parochial school anecdote, dating from the time when stockings had seams in them, illustrates this point. Girls were required to wear stockings, but some girls broke the rules and merely drew a line up the backs of their legs with an eyebrow pencil. I am told that the sisters were not fooled, but that the girls nonetheless were not punished. It seems that the sisters were too embarrassed to admit they looked that closely at the girls' legs. A similar problem arises if it is illegal to conceal a weapon and also illegal to search anyone. If a policeman finds the weapon without illegally searching someone, it was not concealed.

One particular type of resource of some interest exists when B wants something from A that he cannot force A to give him. Such a resource might be money, services, or goods of whatever sort, although there may also be occasions on which each of these commodities can be forced from A. It may be, however, that what B wants is something like love, affection, or goodwill. B may want A to please B because A *wants* to, which is by definition not a forced activity. A has therefore an absolutely unassailable resource, as long as B's desire for A's good wishes continues, and to the extent that that desire is irrepressible. Thus we arrive at the well-known principle of least interest,[3] in which it is suggested that in a love relationship A controls B if B cares more about A than A does about B. The principle of least interest has, however, a loophole. B may not agree with our formulation. B may feel in fact that love can be demanded from A and may punish A with continuous and strident instances of such demands. If A cannot or will not leave the field (he might be married to B), B can make his life miserable. B cannot actually win, since he really cannot force A to love him, but A is no longer in a position to control B.

Favorableness of Outcome

As resources are a matter of awareness, so favorableness of outcome is a matter of awareness and values. That it is a matter of values is more

or less obvious. Favorableness being a matter of awareness depends on whether an outcome is valued for its own sake, or for its instrumental value in terms of other outcomes. In the latter case, favorableness depends on noticing an outcome's instrumental potentiality. Suppose that A provokes B and B thereupon thrashes A. A naïve A might be most unhappy at getting hurt, but a sophisticated A, having arranged to be beaten in front of television cameras, might chuckle all the way to the hospital, feeling that he has gained outraged support from the television audience, C. This kind of perverse or paradoxical success has of course been to the advantage of the civil rights movement, and to that of parties A representing both ends of the political spectrum. A might even attempt to reap benefits while avoiding bruises, by falsely claiming that he has been mistreated, or that rocks have been thrown at his car. Various counter moves include arguing that A's claim is false, whether it is or not, and arranging either to avoid mistreatment of A or to avoid evidence of mistreatment. The rubber hose is a part of this tradition, but of course many more sophisticated procedures have been developed. Good discipline for group B is a most valuable asset. Police force B might scrupulously handle demonstrators A in ways which raise no objection, or even keep almost totally out of sight when there are newsmen present, or when there are large crowds of potential observers, or when it is daylight. The use of tear gas can be restricted to certain neighborhoods, and special long clubs can be used in others. Even if B is caught in the act of beating A, he can claim, and usually does, that A struck him first, making it important for A to avoid appearing unjustifiably aggressive if A plans to capitalize on C's sympathy or outrage. Spouses, and in particular husbands, are sometimes prone to this kind of maneuver, in that they manage to provoke their wives to storms of irrational anger without themselves appearing provocative or even unreasonable, thus demonstrating to various third parties (such as friends, children, or one's psychotherapist) that the wife is intolerably crazy.

The subjective aspect of outcome evaluation can give it an unpredictable quality which might wreak havoc on apparently assured power. Suppose for instance that in a society such as ours, a large group of young people decide that they are not much interested in money.

There are whole classes of consensually valued outcomes which represent potential power for the unsocialized individual. If he does not care about becoming a criminal, or being rude, or being unloved, the cost effectiveness is automatically increased of behavior that may be criminal, rude, or unlovable. A great vulnerability of airline travel is that it depends on the passengers' following an ethic of cooperation and not making trouble, an ethic that is not very strongly felt by some people.

Dying would seem at first glance to be an outcome that anyone would disvalue, or at least *should* disvalue. But it is a matter of common observation that there are people willing to die in a power struggle. Although such willingness may never be rational from A's point of view if A is an individual, it can be most rational if A is a group. Every member of a group being willing to die may result in fewer members actually dying, as in the case of a fire in a crowded theater, or of an army. Thus group A might rationally find it in its interest to inculcate totally irrational beliefs in its members, relating to the unimportance of death. Paradoxical instrumentality may even be invoked, as by promising immortality in Valhalla to those who are unusually careless of their lives. (These days immortality as a reward seems to have degenerated somewhat, being less applied to war heroes than to talented baseball players.)

Generally speaking, power for A is the logical correlate of A's not minding nominally negative outcomes, and similar unconcern can be a source of freedom for B. There is, however, an obvious *reductio ad absurdum* to this source of power. If A is totally indifferent to all outcomes, or likes them all equally, he cannot really be thought of as trying to exert or acquire power in the first place. Apart from such an extreme situation, willingness to forego luxury and to endure hardship is a multiplier—a source of cost effectiveness power—which might serve A well.

It can be seen that quantitative changes in outcome evaluation affect cost effectiveness power, whereas qualitative changes affect everything. That is, cost effectiveness power rises, other variables being constant, as negative outcomes become less negative, and positive outcomes become more positive. It can literally be a whole new ball game, however, when A seeks an entirely new set of goals, or when outcomes to be avoided, or obtained, become outcomes to be obtained or avoided. And then, again, the game may not be entirely new, but may become extremely complicated, if A does not change his final objective but seeks to influence B in terms of a variety of indirect or paradoxical intermediate goals.

Setting

Contingency linkages and cost effectiveness are widely different in different terrains and settings, at different times, and for different nominal issues. For this reason, there are few resources that are more important for A than the ability to make a power move when and where he wishes (or to prevent B from doing so). Every trial lawyer knows the value of being able to select jurisdiction and judge for a case. Back-seat driving is a humble example of a situational opportunity to give orders that almost

must be obeyed by the driver no matter how much it annoys him. Napoleon has been said to have been defeated by Wellington because Wellington was clever in his choice of battleground, picking a slope that was steep enough to slow down the French cavalry, but not so steep as to discourage a charge. Jay Haley[4] suggests that Jesus Christ was crucified because he miscalculated contingency linkages in the kind of setting he chose for a power struggle; i.e., he assumed that he could not be punished if it could not be shown that he had broken the law. (There are many people around today who still make that mistake.) Cornering seems like a reasonable general term for B being placed in a situation where all alternatives damn him. For example, Martin Luther King sometimes was able to place an adversary in a position of either directly yielding or ostentatiously misbehaving, either one of which was to King's advantage. There is the story of Theodore Roosevelt getting from Congress half the money he had requested for sending an American fleet to the Orient, or in other words he had enough money to send the ships but not enough to bring them back. Roosevelt sent the fleet anyway, announcing that Congress could worry about bringing them back.

A sometimes can force a peripheral issue, such as fairness, which has the effect of making B weaker on the main issue. Dwight Eisenhower was first nominated for the presidency in this way. Hitler took over Czechoslovakia this way. A's successful demand for evenhandedness can lead to B's being cornered, as by having either to give A what he wants or to cease providing the same thing for some other more favored party, C.

Formalization of procedures

Strategies

In order to study power contests and power per se, it might help to have some formal scheme for ordering the things A might do that might have contingency and/or cost effectiveness power, given some level of resources. Although concrete strategies can of course be infinitely varied, one possibly helpful scheme for organizing them might be Fig. 1.

Umweg outcomes refer to deliberately seeking or accepting the possibility of outcomes other than one's ultimate objective, but only for the purpose of eventually reaching that ultimate objective. The most dramatic umweg outcome example is perhaps the paradoxical loss that makes ultimate success more likely. Umweg with regard to parties refers to A's

PARTIES

	direct	umweg
direct	Taking	Enlisting
umweg	Trapping	Duping

OUTCOME

Fig. 1. Organization of strategic activities.

involvement of some third party, C, in his struggle with B. If C is persuaded or otherwise gotten to help A reach his ultimate or actual goal, C has been "enlisted." If C is persuaded only to help A reach an umweg goal, then C has been "duped." If it is B himself who has been led to accept an outcome (including a continued state of affairs) which worsens his ultimate position, we will say that he has been "trapped." The word trapped may be far too strong, since B's worsened position may be far from hopeless, but perhaps it will do for our purposes.

Finally, A can approach B directly and directly compel from B what he wishes, which we shall call "taking." Presumably A's strategy would always be taking, if A believed his power to be great enough or certain enough, and of course each other type of strategy, if successful, would eventually lead to A's taking what he wants. In other words, although various permutations of strategy types might be used in any successful struggle, taking is the only one that is always last.

Acts

The acts A or B might use fall into a relatively small number of classes, namely, *yielding, resisting,* and *urging.* Yielding may mean either defeat or that a paradoxical type of umweg strategy is under way. Resisting is simply not yielding. Urging refers to the general class of acts by which A attempts to express his power over B and can consist, in my opinion, of no more than four major subclasses: *punishment, reward, threat,* and *promise.* Any urging may of course be meaningful to B or may not be, or may be meaningful to varying degrees. "Meaningful" means that an urging is credible, if it is a threat or promise, and that the positive or negative resources A uses in urgings do actually have positive or negative value for B.

Resources

The resources which are used in urgings are not readily susceptible to formal analysis, but limiting ourselves to dyadic interaction in marriage, there do seem to be some commodities or attributes that commonly appear as resources, such as those in the following list:

> Money
> Sex
> Physical strength
> Knowledge
> Attention—ignoring
> Criticism—flattery
> Competence
> Goodness
> Power

The first few items on this list are fairly vital real-life resources in the sense that under some conditions B would be just plain foolish to ignore them, whereas most of the others could have no effect on a sufficiently tough-minded adversary. Knowledge may consist of information possessed by A that might help B's strategic planning (such as the nature of A's objectives), information that would punish B if it were passed on to C, or whatever. Competence refers only to the *appearance* of competence, with which A might intimidate B. If B is socialized adequately, A's appearance of goodness can also be useful. For example, if A yields to B when he apparently need not, A may thereby accumulate goodness points, B may lose them, and A may be in a better position to urge B to give in the next time around. Plenty of Trojan horses exist that are full of not soldiers but obligations. Power itself, the last item on the list, refers to the possible involvement of metapower issues in a contest. Suppose a husband A, in urging wife B not to leave him, says that he will do anything she wishes if she will only stay. In other words he is at least in part offering his wife power over him, in return for her yielding on the issue immediately at hand.

At long last, let us return to the question of measurement. There should be no difficulty in principle in coding the various acts which have been described. Indeed, as we have seen, extant coding systems may record events which are special cases of these acts. It should also be possible to label at least some of the resources which urgings attempt to harness. In addition

to the resources noted above, role attribution of power may be a resource useful either in justifying oneself or as a reward A can offer to B.

But it may still be next to impossible effectively to study power per se in our usual experimental situations. In the first place, it is necessary to determine if the observed events are indeed a power contest. A contest is defined when a participant is urged to, or actually does, do something against his own wishes. But there will be a systematic tendency for losers to deny this fact, and to let on that the act is freely chosen.

In the second place, the problem of generality of experimental situations is not that much improved by the present conceptual analysis. An experimental situation might be unimportant to the extent that only unimportant resources are employed, and resource power might shift dramatically when the big guns are brought out. Furthermore, the choice of terrain is essentially taken completely out of the adversary's hands and is controlled by the experimenter. Umweg strategies involving third party C (the experimenters) are made more likely. Cost effectiveness is greatly reduced for the more socially disvalued urgings, such as physical violence, and threats regarding violence, sex, or money.

Finally, there may be no satisfactory way to discover or define what A is up to. Just because we arbitrarily define some event as a "win" does not mean that A's power struggle has been successful. There may be spouses, for example, who go to great lengths to accumulate goodness points by giving in right and left, and who may not make use of that resource until the experiment is long since over. In fact, the very existence of the experimenter C gives special importance to goodness (and to competence), since A gets to look good or bad (competent or incompetent) not only in his own eyes and those of his spouse, but also in the eyes of a presumed expert on the subject. Life would be much easier for us if A and B only wanted what we told them to want, and if umweg strategies were non-existent, but then, as they say, *"C'est la guerre."*

On the other hand, results from interaction situations might not be totally useless in the study of power per se, and there might be other possible courses of action that are open to us. Conventional interaction situations may leave us pretty much in the dark regarding the parties' more important intentions and strategies, but in some cases it might be possible to gather ancillary information on these matters. Then there is action research. When we take ourselves out of our protected laboratories and participate in attempts to manipulate power in real-life situations, then we at least have some idea of our own intentions and we are in a position to consider the effects of the more serious kinds of sanctions. Even without

personal participation there seem to be quite a number of "experiments of nature" going on around us, and these real-life events might be worth careful consideration. The present paper is of course partially built around such events.

It might then be possible to develop formulations which might be testable in the laboratory, but these tests would probably not consist of crude attempts directly to measure power itself. For example, the present formulations consistently emphasize the cognitive and motivational aspects of power: it has to do with *intentions,* and *values,* and *insight* into previously unnoticed causal possibilities. If taken seriously, this emphasis might suggest profitable lines of inquiry regarding persons who seem engaged in power struggles. Even the dependence of power on the eyes of the observer might be turned to advantage in studying those who see themselves as struggling over power. A question could be, "What is the range of phenomena considered by such persons, and what is the strategic effect of that range?" The very form of the present framework might be suggestive, although not very surprising, regarding the underlying psychology of power; i.e., it is difficult even to discuss power seriously without being driven into a welter of obsessional distinctions.

It seems that none of these suggestions relate in a special or unique way to power in the family. That is as it should be, in my opinion. If we are interested in power per se, it might be sensible to try and understand it better in general, and then to consider its importance in special situations. Personally, as I hope I have made clear, I think of power not as a basic component, but as a frequent but unwelcome intruder in intimate relationships.

References

1. Goffman, E.: Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969.
2. Ryder, R. G.: Dimensions of early marriage. Fam. Process 9:51–68, March 1970.
3. Waller, W., and Hill, R.: The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation, revised ed. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1951.
4. Haley, J.: The Power Tactics of Jesus Christ, and Other Essays. New York, Grossman, 1969.

Power in Adlerian Theory

KURT A. ADLER, Ph.D., M.D.

It was in 1908, while still very active within the Freudian psychoanalytic circle, that Alfred Adler developed further his theory of "organ inferiority," which he had proposed in 1904, so that it encompassed more and more psychological phenomena. It was now *feelings* of inferiority, instead of actual organ inferiority that began to assume importance; the emphasis became now the psychological, rather than the physical, compensations the individual uses, in order to overcome his felt inferiorities.

Since feelings of inadequacy or inferiority were considered basic—being constantly engendered by the physical, mental, and social difficulties in adaptation to the environment—compensations for these feelings were also necessities for successful adaptation. This striving of the individual to overcome actual or felt inferiorities, in his attempt at adaptation, was called by Adler variously a "striving for perfection," a "striving for superiority," for the "enhancement of the personality," for "godlikeness," and finally—a term borrowed from Nietzsche—a "striving for power." Adler said:

The constitutional inferiority *and* similarly effective childhood situations give rise to a *feeling* of inferiority, which demands a compensation in the sense of an enhancement of the self-esteem. Here the fictional, final purpose of the striving for power gains enormous influence and draws all psychological forces into its direction. . . . [1] The infantile satisfaction of the striving for power becomes the model and . . . the guideline. . . . [2] It would be wrong to assume that only neurotics show such guidelines. . . . In hours of insecurity these fictions become prominent and become imperatives of beliefs, of ideals, of free will. . . . Logically they are to be understood as abstractions, as simplifications, which have the task to solve the difficulties of life, according to an analogy . . . the prototypes of which we have found in the infantile attempts of dealing with life's difficulties. That we find them also in the aborigine, the primitive, is understandable, because *all* human problems demand a solution in line with the striving for power. [3]

Later on, Adler speaks of the development of neuroses:

We have up to now considered the guiding force and the final purpose of the neurosis,—which has been generated by the feeling of inferiority to be the enhancement of the personality feeling, which attempts to prevail with special force. By saying that, we do not overlook that this is merely a form of expression for a striving, a desire, whose beginnings are rooted deeply in human nature. The form of expression itself and the deepening of this guiding thought, which could also be called, according to Nietzsche, "Will to Power," teaches us that there is a special compensatory force at work, which wants to put an end to the general human inner insecurity. . . . [4] We close these critical observations by pointing to the absolute primacy of the will to power, a guiding fiction, which is constructed often precipitously and starts the earlier and with the greater force, the stronger the inferiority feeling . . . of the child comes to the fore. The personality ideal is created as the guiding star [toward which the will to power is directed]. [5]

Adler's ego psychology was roundly attacked by Freud and some others in the group for neglecting to deal with the vicissitudes of the instincts, the libido. Adler therefore tried to stay within the instinct theory, at least to some degree. The result was the famous paper by Adler in 1908: "The Aggression Drive in Life and in Neurosis," in which he postulated the existence and the primacy of an aggressive instinct, separate and apart from the libido and the instinct of self-preservation. This drive, or instinct, was determined by the difficulties in affording satisfaction to the organs. According to Hitschmann, one of the oldest of the Freudians, who wrote a history of the aggression drive, Freud was impressed with Adler's paper, and in "A Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" (1909) Freud wrote:

Alfred Adler in a suggestive paper has recently developed the view that anxiety arises from the suppression of what he calls the "aggressive instinct," and by a very sweeping synthetic process he ascribes to that instinct the chief part in human events, in real life and in the neuroses. . . . I cannot bring myself to assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct alongside the familiar instincts of self-preservation and sex, and on an equal footing with them.[6]

It was not until 1923 that Freud appended a note to this passage, stating:

. . . . Since then I have myself been obliged to assert the existence of an aggressive instinct, but it is different from Adler's. I prefer to call it the "destructive" or "Death instinct". . . . My disagreement with Adler's view, which results in a general characteristic of all instincts, being encroached upon for the benefit of a single one of them, remains unchanged.[7]

It took Freud another six years to write the following passage in "Civilization and Its Discontents":

A powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as part of the instinctive endowment of men. . . . Homo homini lupis[8] [man is wolf to man]. . . . I can no longer understand how we could have overlooked the universality of non-erotic aggression and destruction and could have omitted to give it its due significance in our interpretation of life.[9]

It did not take Adler that long, however, to abandon completely the concept of an "aggressive instinct" and, for that matter, all of Freud's libido and instinct theory, because, as he stated, he did not want to share the responsibility for some of its absurdities, and because he felt he had smarted long enough under the shadow of the instinct theory, or, as he called it, "Freudism." Years later, referring to this period and to his paper on the aggression drive, he wrote:

In 1908 I hit upon the idea that every individual really exists in a state of permanent aggression, and I carelessly called this attitude the "aggressive instinct." Whoever reads this paper will find it in the basis of that psychological school which later developed as instinct psychology. But, soon I realized that it was not at all an instinct, but a partially conscious, partially not-understood attitude toward the tasks of life, and in this way I arrived at an understanding of the social influences on the personality, the degree of which is always determined by the individual's opinion about the facts and difficulties of life.[10]

Phyllis Bottome, one of Adler's biographers, quotes him as jesting to his friends: "I enriched psycho-analysis by the aggression drive. I gladly make them a present of it."[11]

But, long before Adler had completely abandoned the aggressive instinct and instinct psychology, he had already considered the importance of social influences and had used the term social feeling from 1908 on, when he first developed the concept of this feeling as a counterforce to the aggressive feeling and the "will to power." He wrote in 1912:

> Nothing in life and in the development of mankind is set to work with such secrecy as is the construction of the personality ideal [because it always implies the detriment of others, avarice, envy, a desire for superiority, depreciation of others]. This concealment is accomplished by the use of a counter-fiction in the form of "social feeling". . . . It is the safety coefficient for the guiding line to power, and the harmony of both fictions, their mutual compatibility, are the sign of mental health. . . . [12] It is one of the triumphs of the human wit, to help the ascendance of the power idea, by adapting to the counter-fiction of social feeling, to shine through humility, to be victorious through meekness and submission, to humiliate others through one's own virtues, to attack through one's own passivity, to cause pain to others through one's own suffering, to pursue masculine ends through feminine means, to appear big through making oneself small. Of such short, however, are the crafty devices of the neurotic.[13]

In the same year Adler further extended the importance of social feelings as a counterforce to the power drive and aggression. He wrote:

> As the most important regulator of the aggression drive, we have to consider the social feeling which is inborn to everyone. It is the basis of every relation of the child,—to people, to animals, to plants, to things, and it signifies our being the assent to life, the reconciliation with life. Through the cooperation of social feeling,—with its rich differentiations—(love of parents, love of children, sexual love, love of country, love of nature, of art, of science, love of humanity) with the aggression drive, there arises an attitude towards life, a view of life, and through that, in reality, the human psyche.[14]

This last was written in 1908 and is the final paragraph of Adler's paper on the aggression drive.

The great attraction that Nietzsche's expression will to power originally had for Adler was first that there was a philosophical equivalent for a striving Adler had discerned in people, and second that Nietzsche had, parallel with his will to power also coined the expression will to seem,

and this fitted very well with Adler's concept of the cross borne by so many neurotics. He wrote in 1912:

> They [the neurotics] aim far beyond the humanly possible, and their character traits are mixed with so much evasiveness, that one can easily see: Here is missing the belief in oneself. In the end, they do not rise anymore to the "Will to Power," but only attempt to achieve a "Will to Seem." The more they feel like "nothings," akin to dust, in their childhood, the more they crave and strive for god-likeness. They feel related to God and to the artist, when they can make something out of nothing, which their phantasy exaggerates enormously with the use of arbitrary valuations. Ever stronger, there emerges such egotism . . . that a permanent irreconcilability with life is created.[15]

Much of Adler's work and that of his collaborators was interrupted by World War I. In 1919, one year after the holocaust, Adler wrote a foreword to the second edition of his book *The Neurotic Constitution.* He wrote:

> Between the two editions lies the World War with its continuations; lies the most fearful mass neurosis, which our neurotically sick culture has decided upon, devoured by its striving for power and its prestige policy. The dreadful course of events confirms in a horrifying way the modest thoughts of this book. And they reveal themselves as the demonic work of a generally unchained lust for power, which throttles, or cunningly misuses the immortal social feeling of mankind.
>
> Our Individual Psychology is far beyond the dead point of a descriptive psychology. In our sense, to know and recognize a human being means: to rescue him from the errors of his wounded, whipped up, but impotent strivings after god-likeness and to make him favorably inclined towards the irrevocable logic of communal life, toward social feeling.
>
> A review of the development of my Individual Psychology reveals the uninterrupted development of a psychological investigation on three planes, which interpenetrate each other: Out of the inferiority feeling of the child there arises the restless striving for power, which finds its barrier in the demands of society the exhortations of the physiologically and socially determined social feeling,— and goes astray. This short and easily graspable hint will perhaps help avoid the senseless prattle of certain freebooters and history writers.
>
> The serious reader will, so I hope, arrive with me at the point of view, which makes it possible for us to see every human psyche as progressively striving for a goal of superiority, so that movements, character traits and symptoms invariably point beyond themselves. The realization thus gained, will, of course, burden him with a task for all his life: To progress with the demolition of the striving for personal power and go ahead with the education for the community.[16]

The irritation shown by Adler in this foreword with the history writers and "freebooters" is due precisely to the distortions and misrepresentations that Adler's work suffered in regard to his concept of the "striving for power." In fact, shortly after the First World War Adler was known as much for his *Streben nach Macht* as he was for his "inferiority complex." The main misunderstanding was that Adler was *promoting* the "will to power." Also, in the American translation of "The Neurotic Constitution," done in 1917 without his knowledge or permission during the war, not only distorted this concept but perpetrated also a great number of other distortions. Even as late as 1932 Adler felt obliged to counter this distortion as follows:

> Here begins the misunderstanding, as if Individual Psychology not only conceives the psyche as striving for power, but also promotes it. This striving for power is not *our* madness—it is the madness we find in others. A goal of *"overcoming"* is an abstraction, unacceptable to the human psyche in the stream of life. We have to come to a much more concrete concept. Thus, every individual arrives at a concrete goal of overcoming through his creativity, which then is identical with his ego. It is our task to find out in which direction a human tries to overcome. His opinion about it rules him. [17]

In all his later writing Adler more and more stressed the evil through seductive striving for personal power and differentiated it sharply from strivings for superiority, strivings for perfection, strivings to overcome obstacles, strivings for mastery. He wrote:

> The striving of each actively moving individual is towards "overcoming," not towards power. Striving for power, for personal power, represents only one of a thousand types, all of which seek perfection, a security-giving plus-situation. . . . [18] The psychological archetype of the line of human movement is the striving for perfection, which is supported by the weakness of the child—by his ever-present inferiority feeling. It is the striving for the solution of life's problems, in the sense of the individual as well as mankind. There are millions of variations of the striving for perfection, a large part of which can be regarded as a striving for personal power. This [latter] movement-form, more or less lacks the proper degree of social interest, must therefore be designated as erroneous and carries in itself the signs of later inadequacy in the event of an emerging social problem.
>
> The neurotic strives for personal superiority and, in doing so, expects a a contribution from the group in which he lives, while the normal individual strives toward the perfection which benefits all. [19]

Adler, as is known, was tremendously interested and involved in the rearing of children in the family and in school. He wrote:

> There is no doubt that the present education in the family promotes the striving for power and the development of vanity tremendously. . . . [20] Unfortunately we can not deny that parents are neither good psychologists, nor even good pedagogues. Today the main trends in family-upbringing are the various degrees of family egoisms. . . . To that must be added that the organization of the family itself has not been able to rid itself of the concept of leadership by the father and paternal authority. With that the trouble begins. This authority, which is based only to the slightest degree on social feelings leads, only too soon, to an open or secret resistance. Unreserved acceptance can hardly ever be found. Its greatest damage is that it sets an example of striving for power, by showing the child the gratification gained from the posession of power; it makes him desire power and makes him ambitious and vain. Now the children want to get as much as the father; they too want to be distinguished and demand from others the same obedience and submission, as they are accustomed to see from the strongest person in their environment.
>
> Thus it is nearly unavoidable in our family-education that there hovers in front of the child's mind a goal of personal superiority. [21]

More and more, Adler devoted his speeches and his writings to social issues: the education of parents, children, and teachers; the problems of race, sex, and class relations; the problems of war and peace, unemployment, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, and so on. He wrote:

> The common people seem always to have been on the track of social interest, and every intellectual and every religious uprising has been directed against the striving for power . . . but all this always ended again in the thirst for dominance. All social legislation of the past, the teachings of Christ, and the tablets of Moses have fallen again and again into the hands of power-craving social classes and groups. These abused the most sacred concepts, resorting to the refined tricks of forgery, in order to channel the always-emerging and creative manifestations of social interest into the paths of power tendencies. Thus social interest was rendered ineffective for the common weal. . . .
>
> The present stage of our culture and insight still permits the power principle to prevail. However, it can be adhered to no longer openly, but only through the exploitation of social interest. An unveiled and direct attack of violence is unpopular and would no longer be safe. Thus, when violence is to be committed this is frequently done by appealing to justice, custom, freedom, the welfare of the oppressed, and in the name of culture.
>
> The truth and necessities gathered from the coercion of communal life of

man are distorted by those who cultivate the power principle and whose deepest intention is always: "through truth to falsehood"! It is in this way that the disastrous exploitation of social interest by the striving for power comes about. Social interest is transformed from an end into a means and is pressed into the service of nationalism and imperialism. [22]

In 1928 in a now little-known book, Adler published a chapter entitled "The Psychology of Power." It was in a collective work with the title *Power and Powerlessness,* and among the contributors were Mahatma Gandhi, Romain Rolland, Norman Thomas, Stephan Zweig, and others. Parts of this chapter have been translated by Professor Ansbacher in Vol. 22, No. 2, of the *Journal of Individual Psychology,* November 1966. To quote from the original:

To be big, to be powerful!, that is and always was the desire of all small ones and those who feel small. Every child desires higher goals, every weak one, superiority, and every hopeless one, the zenith of perfection; indivuduals as well as the mass, peoples, States, Nations. Whatever people strive for originates from their urgent attempts to overcome the impression of a deficit, of insecurity, of weakness. . . . The Individual Psychologist can assert with certainty that general, as well as individual suffering is related to the fact that we have up to date structured our guiding personality ideal too little with a view toward communal feelings and too much with a view to personal power. The large army of problem children, neurotics, psychotics, alcoholics, drug addicts, criminals and suicides present in the last and deepest analysis the same picture: Battle for personal power, or desperation over the fact that they could not achieve power in a socially acceptable way. The desired end-form considered perfect, still today is superiority over others; this, our guiding ideal is concretized as power over others. . . .

How did this evil come into the world? The personal striving for power is a concretization of the general striving for perfection! And it is the most seductive one, especially in a culture, pressed hard from all sides. [I am reminded here of a statement made by Father Berrigan: ". . . we are seduced by violence, not as a method, but as an end in itself." [23]] But even in the animal kingdom we find enough tendencies for a softening of the wild battle, social or herd instincts, obviously to safeguard the species and to prevent their extermination. The force of evolution directs human beings much more upon the road of social feelings. . . . Without the most developed division of labor man is condemned to perish or to forgo development. . . .

The result of individual- and mass-psychological research therefore states: The striving for personal power is a fateful delusion and poisons the communal life of the people. Whosoever wants social life must renounce the striving for power over others. To accomplish things by force may seem to many a self-evi-

dently correct idea. And we must acknowledge: It seems the simplest way, to bring about by means of force, all that is good and auspicious, or even just that which has to come anyway in the course of history. But, where in the life of mankind, or its history has such an attempt ever succeeded? As far as we can see, everywhere, even the use of the mildest power arouses a counter-will, even where the well-being of the downtrodden is intended. The patriarchal system, the enlightened absolutism are such frightening examples. Even their God, no people have been able to tolerate without opposition. . . . The victorious fight of the proletariat against the coercion of capitalism shows clearly this development; but the growing power of the workers organizations can, if carelessly handled, elicit smaller or greater resistance in insecure characters. Wherever questions of power are at stake they clash,—regardless of the excellence of their intentions or goals,—with the will to power of the individual, and opposition is created.

Into the love of parents, there seeps the poison of love for power, and seeks, in the name of authority and filial duty to hold on to the appearance of superiority and infallibility. There arises, then, in the children the urge to overtake their educators and do them in. The same is true for teachers.[22]

Here I am reminded of the statement of John P. Spiegel, writing on "Campus Conflict and Professorial Egos":

In my view, what needs to be changed is the pyramidal structuring of power in our bureaucracies and communities—a stratification that arranges persons and groups in positions of inferiority and superiority. Such a change, I believe can not be brought about without a simultaneous change of values, such that individualistic achievements can no longer be used to disguise or dilute the destructive impact of authoritarianism and elitism in a self-advertised democracy.[24]

Adler continues on the evils of the strivings for power:

The power of men over women robs them of the highest enjoyments of erotics, and *must* in a more developed culture bring women to rebellion against their female role. . . . Also love is full of these deceptions, and demands from the partner far-going submission. The lust for power in the man demands submission from women, insisting on their so-called "natural destiny." The result is the destruction of all unself-conscious relations and a paralysis of valuable forces. The lovely games of children will betray to the knowledgable a unified system of satisfaction of the lust for power. [Adler, by the way, predicted that it would take two more generations for women to achieve real equality.]

Modern psychology, however has shown that the origins of the lust for power, ambition and striving for dominance over others, together with their abundance of ugly accompanying symptoms are not inborn or unalterable. They

are, however, implanted early into the child and the child receives them passively from an atmosphere that is soaked full of desires for power. . . .

One thing only, can save us: "Distrust of any predominance." Our strength lies in convictions, in the organizing forces, in a philosophy of life, —not in the power of arms and not in martial law. . . . War is not the continuation of politics with different means,—it is the greatest mass-crime perpetrated on the community of man. What sums of lies and artificial incitement of base passions, what thousandfold rape was necessary, in order to stifle the indignant outcry of humanity?

Into the narrow confines of the nursery break the waves of the striving for power of our society. The lust for dominance in parents, the servant relations in the house, the privileges of the small child,—direct the view of the child irresistably to the winning of power and dominance, and let only such positions appear to him desirable. . . .

Social feelings demand a different ideal, namely that of a saint, albeit purified of the phantastic and of the dregs that originated in the belief in miracles. Neither school nor life are later able to remove the firmly rooted, exaggerated striving for personal significance at the cost of others. It would be a gross delusion to see intoxication with power only in the individual. The mass too, is guided by the same goals, which act the more devastatingly, because in the mass psyche the feeling of personal responsibility is appreciably diminished.

We need the conscious preparation and furtherance of a tremendous community feeling and the total dismantling of avarice and the power of individuals and Nations.[25]

It would seem that, of all the powers over others to strive for, the power over life and death of others is the most awesome one. Many professions are in the possession of that power, and those who seek such professions can therefore be in danger of misusing this power for their own aggrandizement, in their attempt to cover up or undo their feelings of inadequacy in one area or another—if not for personal gain. Among these professional occupations stand out judges, policemen, soldiers, district attorneys, physicians, politicians of all sorts, and murderers. Murderers have confessed to a feeling of power when they hold a vial of poison or a gun in their hand. Politicians, such as kings, dictators, presidents, governors, sheriffs, are usually too sophisticated to make such confessions. All those, however, will be in greater danger of misusing their power if they are, or feel they are, small, ugly, or inferior in any deep-seated way. The example of a soldier recently tried for mass murder can *not* be explained, except by his need to give himself an illusory lift of feeling powerful, with which to counteract his devastating feeling of being so small. History will judge our present and past leaders for their actions in the light of Adler's expositions about the seductive lure to use power over others in compensation for *their*

feelings of inferiority, when their feelings of empathy for mankind are not great enough.

References

1. Adler, A.: Über den Nervösen Charakter, 4th ed. Munich, Verlag J. F. Bergmann, 1912, p. 24.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
6. Freud, S.: Collected Papers, Vol. 3. New York, Basic Books, 1959, p. 281.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
8. Freud, S.: Civilization and Its Discontents. London, Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 85.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
10. Adler, A.: Zwangsneurose. Int. Z. Individualpsychol. 9:2, 1931.
11. Bottome, P.: The Life of Alfred Adler. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939, p. 64.
12. Adler, A.: Über den Nervösen Charakter, 4th ed. Munich, Verlag J. F. Bergmann, 1912, pp. 47, 48.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
14. Adler, A.: Heilen und Bilden, 2nd ed. Munich, Verlag J. F. Bergmann, 1913, p. 25.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
16. Adler, A.: Über den Nervösen Charakter, 4th ed. Munich, Verlag J. F. Bergmann, 1912, p. iv.
17. Adler, A.: Persönlichkeit als geschlossene Einheit. Int. Z. Individualpsychol. 10:82, 1932.
18. Ansbacher, H. L., and Ansbacher, R. R. (Eds.): The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. New York, Basic Books, 1956, p. 114.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
20. Adler, A.: Menschenkenntnis, 2nd ed. Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1928, p. 221.
21. Ibid.: pp. 221, 222.
22. Ansbacher, H. L., and Ansbacher, R. R. (Eds.): The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler. New York, Basic Books, 1956, pp. 455, 456.
23. Berrigan, Father D.: Letter to the Weathermen. Village Voice, Jan. 21, 1971.
24. Speigel, J. P.: Campus conflict and professorial egos. Reflections (Merck, Sharp & Dohme) 6(1):20, 1971.
25. Adler, A.: Die Psychologie der Macht. In: Kobler, F. (Ed.): Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit. Zürich, Rotapfel Verlag, 1928, pp. 41–46.

Power and Omnipotence

PAUL R. DINCE, M.D.

Although Freud did not address himself in specific fashion to the study of power, the function of power has been implicit within the framework of psychoanalysis since its inception. Treatment has from the beginning constituted a joint struggle by analyst and patient against the disabling power of neurosis. The concepts of drive, danger, and defense incorporate the motif of power, i.e., the need for self-protective mechanisms of sufficient strength to contain or neutralize that which endangers the individual from within or without. When psychoanalysis speaks of a tyrannical superego, it implies the power of the introjected, powerful parent. The dynamic force of the drives, the incorporated and elaborated aspirations, of the individual exerts the kind of influence (power) upon the individual which inhibits totally free choice. When Freud referred to the helplessness of the infant and the real or felt helplessness of the adult, he was describing a feeling state of powerlessness. The human need to seek and obtain gratification and security from others implies the need for power, in the sense of a capacity for influence over others. Power is an ingredient in the transactions which take place within all object relationships and is thus an ingredient in the interlocking forces which determine personality. The

aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to enable the individual to discover and facilitate those resources which will minimize feelings of powerlessness and permit him to assert reality-based influence over the self and others.

As I understand Kurt Adler's presentation, Alfred Adler's frame of reference is wedded to the drive for power, power which seeks to compensate for childhood feelings of inferiority and which comes into conflict with the demands of social living and the inborn social feelings. The neurotic is defined as an individual who seeks personal superiority, expecting a contribution from the group in which he lives, whereas the normal individual "strives toward the perfection which benefits all." In the organization of personality and the etiology of neurosis, Adler points to the "absolute primacy" of the will to power. In my discussion I plan to list a number of questions elicited by this formulation, to suggest that Adler's considerable contribution emphasizing the striving of the neurotic for irrational power and the intrinsic role of social influences in *shaping* the personality tends to preempt consideration of other factors of importance, and, last, to cite a basic factor which I believe underlies the ubiquitous striving for one form of power.

The major inconsistency in Adler's formulation derives from a failure to distinguish adequately between the recognized drives in all human beings for doing, learning, mastery, self-realization, and superiority from that which engenders the striving for competitively based exploitative power and that which engenders the striving for power which possesses magical and omnipotent characteristics. To state the differences or to claim that neurotic (pathogenic) strivings for power are a concretization of the drives for mastery (nonpathogenic) is simply not enough. If pathogenic strivings for power are derived from normal requirements for mastery, the mechanisms by which this process is effective must be delineated. A similar defect in clarity exists owing to the failure to specify the components of the social feeling and to define, if it can be defined, what is meant by the course of action which is best for all.

There is a recurrent tendency to speak of that which is inborn or physiologically determined—the social feelings as a prime example—which parallels an inflexible negation of the importance of other inborn drives in the evolution of personality. Adler employs terms such as the thirst for power and the lust for power without defining the source of the component of pleasure or gratification which accrues to the individual who utilizes power to inflict moral or physical injury upon another. Perhaps Adler should not have minimized his "gift to psychoanalysis" when he abandoned his concept of the aggressive drive and sought to understand

sadistic behavior purely in terms of social learning. This is an issue which transcends considerations of theory living as we do in an era in which man's very survival is threatened by his capacity for violence and destruction.

I question further the insistence upon the surrender of predominance as a goal without giving credence to the fact that all life, be it organismal or social, is hierarchically structured, that no degree of social coherence or stability has ever been achieved without a hierarchical organization. Those to whom the group turns for leadership will always have to seek and accept predominance and power. The issue therefore is not that of the eradication of power and predominance but of the ways in which these mandatory functions are utilized. The conclusion that power and predominance can be eliminated as significant forces in human social existence is untenable. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than within the biosocial unit of the family wherein parents are given the responsibility to nurture, protect, and acculturate their young during the prolonged period of dependence and relative helplessness which characterizes human childhood. The biologically determined dependence of the young automatically invests enormous power in the parents who, as we know, can use that power wisely, with empathy, to facilitate maturation and self-realization or can use it exploitatively, narcissistically, destructively. Useful power is power which protects when protection of another is required; it facilitates, enhances, even gratifies the requirements of others. Those who seek to eliminate power do so in the service of defensive and reparative goals arising out of past injury at the hands of abusive power in an attempt to ward off anticipated further injury.

The investment of sensual and erotic feeling in the parent of the opposite sex, the processes of psychosexual maturation as they occur within the context of the parent-child relationship, the ipsisexual rivalry of the young with the mature, are dismissed as forces in the determination of personality and neurosis. To separate these forces from consideration of the power parameter seems to constitute an expedient in the service of maintaining an "individual viewpoint," a viewpoint which is uncompromisingly teleological in nature. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in Adler's paper, "Individual-psychological Treatment of Neuroses" (1913) wherein he states, ". . . father and mother are at times invested by phantasy with the role of lover or spouse until the bond is firm enough to secure an evasion of the marriage problem." The possibility that the marriage prospect is viewed by the individual as fearsome because of the perceived dangers attached to those very fantasies and the accrued evidence that such fantasies are integral to childhood and adolescent periods of development is negated.

Human development, functioning, and malfunctioning are consti-tuted of a mosaic of forces, a fabric of interwoven strands which precludes any one-dimensional approach to the understanding of psychopathology. Taking issue with the Adlerian emphasis on the will to power, an emphasis which gives the will to power a position of absolute primacy, does not con-stitute an exclusion of the power dynamic or of the vital role it plays in certain forms of psychopathology. The principle of multiple functioning, as originally explicated by Waelder, appears a far more balanced and useful way to approach the complexities of human behavior. The miasmic concept of the "striving for power breaking into the nursery" or, at another point, "the lust for power, ambition, striving for dominance . . . which the child receives passively from an atmosphere soaked full of desires for power" is a further example of the one-dimensional approach which minimizes individual differences and which negates the multidimensional aspect of human endowment, experience, and function.

In any discussion of strivings for power as observed in psychoanalytic practise, the issue of omnipotence or magical power must be considered. Some comments about the striving for omnipotence, its place in the or-ganization of neurosis, and its relationship to another biologic aspect of the human condition, man's mortality, are in order. By its very nature, psychoanalysis attempts to remove the burden of taboo from any and all aspects of human experience so that these aspects may be understood and integrated in objective fashion. Freud was partially successful in lifting the sexual taboos of his time; Adler and other psychoanalytic investigators have focused their attention upon other aspects of function which man, by and large, prefers not to know about. Perhaps the most neglected area of psychoanalytic research is that concerned with the role played by the awareness of death in personality development. The reason for this neglect is not obscure and requires no extensive elaboration here. Suffice it to say that man is the only creature born with the capacity to anticipate his own demise.

In a paper published in 1968, Max Stern stated, "the taboo against death, our constant companion . . . still seems to be unbroken. In our daily life we show the unmistakable tendency to push death aside, to eliminate it from life." He ascribed to Freud a degree of responsibility for the psychoanalytic neglect of the subject of death, citing Freud's statement in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that "the fear of death has no meaning to the child." Stern's theses in his paper are: (1) the fear of death which emerges at an early age is essentially a fear of repetition of mortal terror experienced in the ubiquitous early biotraumatic states of object loss from which no

individual is spared, and (2) integration of this fear is a necessary part of man's development and deficiency of this adaptation is an integral part of neurosis.

Clinical experience indicates that it is syndromes of mortal terror — of an overwhelming sense of panic which threatens dissolution of the ego and feelings of abject helplessness—which we are most likely to counter by relying upon omnipotent fantasies and goals. Psychoanalytic work with adolescent patients likewise reveals the impact which the heightened fears of death, so common at this time of life, have upon the adolescent in inducing and perpetuating omnipotent fantasies, obsessional rituals, and behaviors which have as their consequence self-destructive and/or destructive effects. It is not infrequently observed that a marked change in the life pattern of an adolescent is preceded by fears of falling asleep, a period of preoccupation with death and its attendant terror, and nightmares. Where the tendency to act out is primary, we see the emergence of anti-social behavior, immersion in the drug culture, partial or total abandonment of school and educational goals, and precocious, aimless sexual activity. When acting out is precluded and repression, rather than denial, is the primary defensive resource of the adolescent, obsessional, hysterical, or psychotic manifestations may ensue. We are all aware of the frequency of depression and the tendency to act out magical fantasies of rebirth in the middle-aged individual confronted by the diminution of powers and the death of peers with the porousness of previously held illusions of immortality.

The thesis which I cite here is that the roots of pathogenic strivings for omnipotent (godlike in Adlerian terms) power over people and events abide within the terror of the young child experienced in separations from the mothering person, separations which become inextricably fused with the concept of death. Awareness of the reality of death does occur at any early age owing to a storied or actual death of a family member, pet, or neighbor. When fears of death become interwoven with concepts of punishment as retribution for "badness," the pathogenic structure takes further shape. Conscious and unconscious attitudes of parents to their roles as parents or to the respective siblings within the family, transferences to individual siblings, and parental responses to oedipally based childish competitiveness are some of the experiential factors which influence how a child comes to view his world and what part of his experience will be cathected and made most meaningful. When we consider the capacities of the young child to deal with the reality of death we realize that those capacities are minimal. Denial of the reality is inevitable as well as repression of

those inner strivings which have become associated with expectations of reprisal. Death and danger of death appear in the dreams of children, although the child dreamer never dies, for the terror is intolerable. The reparative mechanism, associated with the function of denial, is available through omnipotent fantasy, the conviction that one can control the uncontrollable, possess power over significant others which assures that they will never abandon the child to the empty limbo he fears. To be little is also to be powerless and therefore defenseless, vulnerable to all the dangers one fears; to be big fosters the illusion of safety, of invulnerability, of immortality. To go from below to above, as Adler states, is the inevitable thrust of human growth, but where we see what he describes as godlikeness, that godlike position has defensive and reparative aims and is traceable to exaggerated fears of destruction. To ascribe the search for omnipotent identity and power to feelings of inferiority is to overlook that which frequently lies behind feelings of inferiority, the sense of being damaged, vulnerable, and helpless in the face of anticipated annihilation.

Extrafamilial experience has provided for exaggerated burdens and apprehensions related to death for those whose childhood years have occurred during the past generation. With the bombardment of young children with the communications of their electronic baby-sitters, annihilation, mayhem, and death are confronted in continuing fashion. Before the advent of television, messages of punitive annihilation were delivered by means of childrens' stories, "fairy tales," and the like, but children then could be reassured, however tentatively, that they were being confronted with make-believe—that which was not real. The children of the past generation have been confronted with the undeniably real thing in their bedrooms and living rooms—death in live action and sometimes in color. They have observed the violent deaths of esteemed and idolized people with whom they had made constructive identifications. In the evening news, children have been treated to the spectacle of American soldiers with whom they also identified, killing and being killed to the accompaniment of falling bombs and chattering machine guns. Could one say that it wasn't real, that it was only a story? I cannot but believe that the daily confrontation of children with these products of a death-dealing society has required from them a unique adaptive burden.

There are many ramifications of the subject of the young child's intrapsychic response to the concept of death which require exploration by psychoanalysts working with children, adolescents, and adults. Although the integration of one's death will always be the major adaptive task

confronting man, there are experiential forces within the family and outside the family which can intensify or ameliorate that adaptive task.

It is unnecessary to resort, as Adler has, to an economic explanation for man's tendency to strive toward an omnipotent state of power. Early and excessive anxiety about death, interwoven with fears of punitive reprisal from familial members constitutes the basic substance out of which the search for omnipotent power emerges. In *The Practise and Theory of Individual Psychology* (1914) Alfred Adler wrote: "I want to be a gravedigger, said a four year old boy to me; I want to be the person who digs graves for others." This was understood by Adler as the consequence of the kind of thinking which derived "from the basic facts of capitalistic trade, where admittedly the better the condition of one individual the worse that of another." That little boy's comment should be understood quite differently. He had already learned what death was and he knew the function of the gravedigger. He probably had the fantasy that death was not an accomplished fact until the gravedigger completed his work. The latter was perceived as an active agent who produced death. Knowing the terror associated with the anticipatory thought of his death, the boy was driven to discover a solution. If becoming a gravedigger would enable him to control death instead of his being its victim, such power would have to be his own.

The assumption that all of man's pathogenic strivings for power derive from a social system in which abusive and irrational power are rampant is not tenable. Man's historic struggle has taken place in the context of his powerlessness in the face of nature, including those forces which predict and determine his finite existence. Although mankind must and will pursue the achievement of forms of social organization which will minimize the abuses of social power, the compelling search for power in the face of that which renders him powerless will continue.

References

1. Adler, A.: The Practise and Theory of Individual Psychology. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1923.
2. Koestler, A.: The Ghost in the Machine. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1967.
3. Stern, M.: Fear of death and neurosis. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Ass. 16:1, 1968.
4. Waelder, R.: The principle of multiple functioning. Psychoanal. Quart. 5:45–62, 1936.

Power: The Cultural
Approach of Karen Horney

HAROLD KELMAN, M.D.

"The Quest for Power, Prestige and Possessions" is the title of Chapter 10 of Karen Horney's *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time.*[1] Elsewhere *(New Ways in Psychoanalysis)* she stated that "acquaintance with a culture which in many ways is different from the European taught me to realize that many neurotic conflicts are ultimately determined by cultural conditions."[2] This direction in her thinking had been implied in "The Technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy,"[3] in which her growth-oriented, life-affirming, freedom-seeking philosophy was already evident. She wrote, "Psychoanalysis can free a human being who has been tied hands and feet. It cannot give him new arms and legs. Psychoanalysis, however, has shown us that much that we have regarded as constitutional merely represents a blockage of growth, a blockage which can be lifted."[3] For her, constitution was not something fixed and unchanging but represented plastic possibilities to be shaped by organismal environmental interactions. In that paper she also defined her holistic concept of blockage and distinguished it from Freud's mechanistic notion of resistance.

Among the reasons Horney did not then proceed with the development of her philosophy regarding the nature of man was the stage of psycho-

analytic thought and her relative youth in the field. What turned her interest to *Feminine Psychology*[4] was the fact of being a woman, her clinical observations, and a shift from an almost totally female practice to one predominantly male, occasioned by her becoming one of the most sought-after training analysts at the Berlin Institute.

She opened "The Flight from Womanhood" with "In some of his latest works Freud has drawn attention with increasing urgency to a certain one-sidedness in our analytic researches. . . . Psychoanalysis is the creation of a male genius, and almost all those who have developed his ideas were men. It is only right and reasonable that they should evolve more easily a masculine psychology and understand more of the development of men than of women"[4] (p. 54).

She added, "Science has often found it fruitful to look at long-familiar facts from a fresh point of view," a position as relevant today as when it was originally made. "The new point of view," she continued, "came to me by way of philosophy, in some essays of Georg Simmel. The point that Simmel makes . . . is this: Our whole civilization is a masculine civilization . . .[4] [p. 55]. Now Simmel thinks that the reason why it is so difficult to recognize these historical facts is that the very standards by which mankind has estimated the values of male and female nature are 'not neutral, arising out of differences of the sexes, but in themselves essentially masculine. . . . We do not believe in a purely 'human' civilization, into which the question of sex does not enter, for the very reason that prevents any such civilization from in fact existing, namely, the (so to speak) naive identification of the concept 'human being' (German, *Mensch*) and the concept of 'Man' (German, *Mann*) which in many languages even causes the same word to be used for the two concepts"[4] (p. 56).

Having evolved a so-called feminine psychology to confront a male-oriented one, Horney proceeded with an evaluation of the philosophical premises of Freudian psychology. In *New Ways* she said, "My dimly perceived doubts as to the validity of psychoanalytic theories" were "encouraged and stimulated" by Harald Schultz-Hencke, who questioned "the curative value of infantile memories and emphasized the necessity of analyzing in the first instance the defensive character trends a neurotic has built up." Horney adds that "an elucidation of certain philosophical concepts brought home to me by Max Horkheimer helped me to recognize the mental premises of Freud's thinking"[2] (p. 12). She credits Erich Fromm with having widened her knowledge regarding the crucial significance of cultural factors and for pointing out the lack of a cultural orientation in Freud's work. After her arrival in the United States she mentions the

influence of many, among them William Alanson White and Harry Stack Sullivan, Franz Alexander and Abram Kardiner, Harold D. Lasswell, John Dollard[1] (p. 20), Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Edward Sapir[1] (p. 16). In *Helping People*[5] some of the historical, philosophical, sociological, and theoretical currents which contributed to the direction of her thinking are identified.

Personal factors which may have molded her ideas are contained in a biography.[5] Ellenberger demonstrates with rigor and scholarship the crucial impact of such factors. In *The Discovery of the Unconscious* he presents "a detailed and objective survey of the great dynamic psychiatric systems, notably those of Janet, Freud, Adler and Jung. An interpretation of facts and systems is proposed, on the basis of an evaluation of the socio-economic, political and cultural background, as well as the personality of the pioneers, their environment, and the role of certain patients."[6] Ellenberger notes "striking similarities ... between the basic concepts of Freud and Jung, on the one side, and certain concepts of Romantic philosophers and psychiatrists on the other"[6] (p. vii). He gives Janet "priority in the discovery of the cathartic therapy"[6] (p. viii), not Freud, and clearly delineates the differences in Freud's and Adler's Jewish background and family constellation as crucial contributory factors for their later theories.

I have the strong impression that short round men produce different kinds of theories than tall flat ones. The shape of their universe, the feel of it as they move in it, and the eye height from which they view it would influence their perspective on the nature of man-in-his-world. Ellenberger's researches reveal that "Adler's individual psychology cannot be considered as a 'distortion of psychoanalysis,' but as a return to and elaboration of the ideas Adler had developed during the six years of his pre-psycho-analytic period"[6] (p. ix).

It has been said that Horney's ideas were strongly influenced by Adler's thinking. Such statements were made after she became famous, but a psychohistorical analysis of Horney's ideas does not bear this out. Now that there is an upsurge of interest in Adler, notable during his 100th anniversary and with Horney's ideas less center stage, the above allegations are seldom heard. Clearly the psychohistorical orientation is essential to an understanding of power, or of any other idea, is appearance, acceptance or rejection, long life or early demise.

In the late thirties many Freudians said that what Horney was presenting was not psychoanalysis. A historical analysis[5] (Chapter I) of the evolution of certain crucial psychoanalytic concepts reveals that many

of Horney's ideas originally considered as deviations have appeared not only under the heading of ego psychology but in such a fundamental concept as Balint's "primary love."[7] This evolution does not prove Horney was right but demonstrates that we are all influenced by the currents of thought that impinge upon us and that their formulation and evolution in a particular discipline extend over time and require the efforts of many. In "Classical Psychoanalysis Since 1939" Kanzer and Blum put it this way, "Deviant movements, which now tend to show wide areas of agreement with the established schools . . . may find representation and mutual tolerance in official psychoanalytic organizations."[8]

In 1937 Horney stated that some might wonder whether her viewpoints were not "somewhat Adlerian. There are some similarities with certain points that Adler has[1] [p. ix] stressed, but fundamentally my interpretation rests on Freudian ground." She added, "Adler is in fact a good example of how even a productive insight into psychological processes can become sterile if pursued onesidedly without foundation in the basic discoveries of Freud"[1] (p. x). She similarly criticized Freud because of his one-sided fascination with childhood and the past.

In another place, after having discussed the quest for power, prestige, and possessions, she states that "it is an achievement of Alfred Adler to have seen and emphasized the importance of these strivings, the role they play in neurotic manifestations and the disguises in which they appear. Adler, however, assumes these strivings to be the foremost trend in human nature, not in themselves requiring any explanation; their[1] [p. 186] intensification in neurotics he traces back to feelings of inferiority and to physical inadequacies." She added that "neither Adler nor Freud has recognized the role that anxiety plays in bringing about such drives, nor has either of them seen the cultural implications in the forms in which they are expressed"[1] (p. 187). She was also critical of Nietzsche's "one-sided evaluation of the wish for power" in his *Will to Power*[1] (p. 186).

Horney's criticism of one-sidedness was not accidental. It was an expression of her continuing attempts, which became most explicit in *Neurosis and Human Growth*,[9] to expose and undercut the either/or, oppositional, dichotomous thinking which characterized Freud and to underline the need for and/and thinking, expressive of process and system epistemologies, integral to the holistic approach, and essential to understanding whole human beings interacting with their changing environments.

Regarding the strivings for power, prestige, and possessions, Horney held that Freud also saw "many of the implications of these strivings" but that he did not regard them as belonging together. The striving for

prestige he saw as an "expression of narcissistic tendencies" and those for power and possessions as "derivative of the 'anal-sadistic stage. . . .' Later he assumed them to be an expression of a 'death instinct'"[1] (p. 187). Of this concept she was severely critical in "The Role of Aggression in Civilization: Some Thoughts and Objections Regarding Freud's Death Instinct and Drive for Destruction"[10] presented in a panel on "The Problem of Civilization and Medical Psychology" arranged by Henry Sigerist when he was professor of the history of medicine in Munich before coming to Johns Hopkins.

In *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* Horney regarded anxiety as "the dynamic center of neurosis"[1] (p. 41). She gave a holistic description of fear and anxiety, distinguished their differences, and concluded that "*hostile impulses of various kinds form the main source from which neurotic anxiety springs*"[1] (p. 63). She postulated that as a consequence of adverse life circumstances, while growing up, the child develops "an insidiously increasing, all-pervading feeling of being lonely and helpless in a hostile world. . . . This attitude . . . is the nutritive soil out of which a definite neurosis may develop at any time. Because of the fundamental role this plays in neurosis," said Horney, "I have given it a special designation: the basic anxiety; it is inseparably interwoven with a basic hostility"[1] (p. 89). There are "four principal ways in which a person tries to protect himself against the basic anxiety: affection, submissiveness, power and withdrawal"[1] (p. 96).

For Horney all neuroses were "character neuroses" because the main disturbance lay "in the deformations of character"[1] (p. 30). They arose out of the individual's attempts to deal with individual provocations leading to basic anxiety and the character attitude resulting in defenses. Her definition of neurosis was, then, "a psychic disturbance brought about by fears and defenses against these fears and by the attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies." She added that such a disturbance is a "neurosis only if it deviates from the pattern common to a particular culture"[1] (p. 29).

Horney's definition of neurosis kept changing as her ideas evolved. Central to her efforts was a search for a theory and therapy of the neurotic process as a special form of human development.

What defense against anxiety a person uses depends on differences in individual gifts, his psychic structure, external circumstances, and cultural factors. "Winning affection means obtaining reassurance through intensified contact with others, while striving for power, prestige and possession means obtaining of reassurance through loosening of the con-

tact with others and through fortifying one's own position"[1] (p. 162).

In the healthy striving for dominance there is strength whereas the neurotic's compulsive need for power is an outcome of weakness "born of anxiety, hatred and feelings of inferiority," and it is with this issue of compulsive, sick, and irrational power and its individual and cultural determinants that I am concerning myself. For a Pueblo Indian the striving for prestige would be definitely discouraged and, because the possessions of all are about the same, the striving for possessions would be meaningless as would the striving for dominance or power. By contrast, in our social structure "power, prestige and possession can give a feeling of greater security"[1] (p. 163). Such striving occurs when the attempt to find reassurance from anxiety through affection has failed. Power, prestige, and possession serve not only as a protection against anxiety but also to liberate hostility. In our culture competitiveness, as one of the ways of doing so, is a highly regarded character attitude and is rewarded when successful.

The striving for power serves first as a protection against helplessness, one of the basic elements in anxiety; second, it protects against the feeling of being or being regarded as insignificant[1] (p. 166). The quest for prestige also serves the function of defending against feelings of insignificance. Such a person is exceptionally vulnerable to feelings of humiliation. Protection against feelings of helplessness and insignificance[1] (p. 172) or humiliation can be defended against in "our culture, by striving for possessions, inasmuch as wealth gives both power and prestige." Horney continues, "The irrational quest for possession is so widespread in our culture that one recognizes that it is not a general human instinct, either in the form of an acquisitive interest or in the form of a sublimation of biologically founded drives. Even in our culture compulsive striving for possession vanishes as soon as the anxieties determining it are diminished or removed"[1] (p. 173).

Horney's words, over 30 years after they were written, are almost prophetic for our time. Our youth are in revolt against these three values. Horney continues, "The specific fear against which possession is a protection is that of impoverishment, destitution, dependence on others"[1] (p. 173). But our youth do not fear impoverishment but welcome it as freedom. They experience themselves not as destitute but as unburdened. They welcome dependence on others, specifically their peers, and experience it as love and find it beautiful.

"The domineering characteristic of the neurotic striving for power does not necessarily appear openly as hostility toward others. It may be disguised in socially valuable or humanistic forms"[1] (p. 174) or in so-

called civilized trappings. The varieties society offers for doing so are myriad.

When the craving for "prestige is uppermost, hostility usually takes the form of a desire to humiliate others"[1] (p. 178). Our language is replete with expressions such as "make them crawl," "make them eat dirt." How far this need can go, while combined with the need for power, was expressed by an aspiring young executive who told me, with a cynical, gloating laugh, "It is not enough for me to succeed but also my best friends must fail."

"In the striving for possessions hostility usually takes the form of a tendency to deprive others"[1] (p. 180). One of the commonest forms in our culture is backfiring today. Many parents have sacrificed for their children or been overpermissive in an effort to possess them. They pile up a debt of obligations, guilt, and hostility in their children. They ask their children to turn their back on their own authentic identities and submit to the value systems of their parents. Their children must love them in return for the way they have been loved, and when children do just that, their parents are bewildered and/or outraged.

Horney roughly schematized the aims and functions of the neurotic striving for power, prestige, and possessions as follows: When the aim is power, it is to reassure against helplessness, with hostility expressed as the tendency to domineer. When the aim is prestige, it is to reassure against destitution with hostility expressed as the tendency to deprive others[1] (p. 186).

Horney opened *New Ways* with "My desire to make a critical re-evaluation of psychoanalytic theories had its origin in a dissatisfaction with therapeutic results"[2] (p. 7). In this book she brought up to date, revised, and expanded her basic philosophy and methodology as well as her theory of the nature of man and neurosis first outlined in 1917.

In a chapter devoted to "Culture and Neurosis"[2] (Chapter X) she again defined the limitations in Freud's understanding of cultural factors[2] (p. 168): "The relation between culture and neuroses . . . is primarily not quantitative but qualitative: What matters is the relation between the quality of cultural trends and the quality of individual conflicts. The difficulty in studying this relation is one of diverging competences. . . . The way to overcome the difficulty is by cooperative work"[2] (pp. 171–172).

In *Self-Analysis* Horney defined what she meant by neurotic trends and listed 12. Among them were the neurotic needs for power,[11] (pp. 56, 57) to control self and others through reason and foresight, and to believe in the omnipotence of the will. Six other trends reflect aspects of the need

for power. They are the neurotic needs to exploit others[11] (p. 50), for social recognition and prestige[11] (p. 58), for personal admiration, for personal achievement, for self-sufficiency and independence, and for perfection and unassailability.

Our Inner Conflicts[12] focuses on relations to others as individuals, groups, and society as a whole. The neurotic solutions people use in their attempts to solve what Horney called basic conflict are delineated. To solve conflict people *move toward* others, *away from* others, or *against* others. Around each of these solutions a whole system of needs, inhibitions, and character attitudes develops. What had been subsumed under power now appears as a constellation of attitudes characteristic of people who *move against* others, the so-called aggressive type.

"Since the relation to others and the attitude toward the self cannot be separated from one another," Horney asserts that "the contention occasionally to be found in psychiatric publications, that one or the other of these is the most important factor is not tenable"[12] (p. 47). Her position is that the internal or centripetal, the external or centrifugal references, the intrapsychic and the interpersonal, in the individual and in his environments, in their physical and psychological aspects, must all be taken into account. In terms of hierarchical structures,[13] systems organization, and flow patterns within and between structures, Horney's thinking is holistic, hierarchical, and Janus faced or Janusian.[14] It faces inward and outward, upward toward supraordinate systems in a hierarchy of dominance and autonomy, and downward into subordinate systems arranged in hierarchies of subordination and integration. Such ways of thinking characterize our current most evolved epistemologies regarding nature, animate and inanimate.

Many of these ways of thinking became explicit in *Neurosis and Human Growth*.[9] Now she saw neurosis as a disturbance in relation to self and others and defined the neurotic character structure as a hierarchy of defenses from the most comprehensive to the most localized and specific. The function of this protective structure is to deal not only with basic conflict but with central conflict as well. The latter is between all that is healthy and all that is sick. What originally had been subsumed under the need for power, and next came under the aggressive type, now became the expansive solution with the subtypes of narcissism, perfectionism, and arrogant vindictiveness. The latter contained most of the characteristics subsumed specifically under the need for power.

In *Neurosis and Human Growth* process and system language became more evident, particularly in her concept of the pride system. The inter-

personal reference becomes extensively explicated in her goals in therapy, which are that the patient "will become more aware of the broader issues involved in his particular life and in the world at large. . . . He will gradually experience himself as part of a bigger whole. . . . This step is important not only because it widens his personal horizon but because the finding and accepting his place in the world gives him the inner certainty which comes from the feeling of belonging through active participation"[9] (p.365). The external reference involves not only society and culture but the cosmos as well.

Although the explicit focus in this paper has been on culture and power, another is implied. Has Horney's holistic approach been congruent with and in the confluence of new directions of thinking in the human sciences? In *Helping People*[5] I attempted to demonstrate that she had made use not only of psychodynamic and existential orientations regarding the nature of man, but also of newer value-free and value-full methodologies of science which her theories integrated.

In *The Pornography of Power,* philosopher Rubinoff asserts that "The study of man . . . proceeds from an existential-phenomenological interpretation of experience, one which seeks to explain the human condition from the standpoint of agent rather than the observer"[15] (p. 18). He argues against those who assert that the gap between subjectivity and objectivity "can ever in fact be bridged." "Subjectivity is not a threat to objectivity but is, on the contrary, the very condition of its possibility"[15] (p. 19), he asserts.

In *Logic for the Sciences and the Humanities* Northrop argued that there could be scientific methodologies for all human disciplines from biochemistry to astrophysics, from poetry to theology. He solves the dichotomy by what he refers to as epistemic correlations. He sees the issues as the closing over of the subject-object dichotomy from on top after it has happened. Rubinoff wants to prevent it from happening by starting from below and by maintaining a continuity with subjectivity through intersubjectivity.

Rubinoff follows anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer's definition of pornography. It "is the description of tabooed activities with the purpose of inciting hallucinations or delusions for private enjoyment. Some aspect of human experience is treated as inherently shameful or abhorrent, so that it can never be discussed or referred to openly and experience of it tends to be clandestine and accompanied by feelings of guilt and unworthiness. The unmentionable aspect of experience then becomes a subject for private fantasy charged with pleasurable guilt or guilty pleasure"[15]

(p. 6). Gorer's definition appears in his article "The Pornography of Death," regarding which there is an expanding literature as there is on the pornography of violence and despair, while the pornography of sex is rapidly losing its attraction.

Associated with the idea of power is that of progress. "With the idea of progress came the idea of identifying value with pragmatic and hedonistic goals, goals which can be pursued only through the exercise of power." Rubinoff adds, "Through the corruption of progress ideology, brought on by the very attempt to live up to it, the pursuit of truth is replaced by the quest for power." He further asserts that "Power is the chief goal of all progress-oriented societies"[15] (p. 4), a frightening reality of which we have become painfully aware.

In *The Achieving Society* McClelland,[17] an experimental psychologist, argues in essence, not that the values of society are antihuman and have failed but that they have failed because the engineering has been bad. He postulates a psychological drive which, under certain conditions, gives rise to behavior exemplifying the achievement ethic. He formulates the reorganization of human life literally from the cradle to the grave, not only for the West but for the slipshod East and laggard underdeveloped countries. This life training is to enhance achievement toward the ends of progress, prosperity, profit, prestige, and of course power. According to the ethic of the achievement drive, the "sense of achieving is the source of" life's "meaning, while the material rewards obtained through satisfying that need are . . . the sources of human happiness"[15] (p. 68). This ultimate nightmare can be offered as a solution to the problems of the human condition because of its being value free, its impersonality, scientific objectivity, detachment, and alienation.

For centuries the myth of progress and the myth of power were offered, in the form of the Christian and the science myths, as an escape from eternal human suffering. History has made of the myth of progress a blasphemy for which science is currently being made the main culprit, and religion has lost its power to be blameworthy. And science is being blamed because it supposedly operated on the premise of being value free.

In his seminal *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology* Gouldner asserts that the belief that sociology can be a value-free natural science is an illusion. Reviewing the history of sociology he shows that the "infrastructure" of a theory, the sentiments and assumptions on which it rests, the image of man it conveys, the connotations it "resonates," and the political directions in which it leads, are really what are determining. Regarding functionalism's "Panglossian optimism," of which Parsons is the main proponent, Gouldner states that its pretensions of "high science,"

detachment, and objectivity are based on an infrastructure which supported the role of naked power in human affairs, promoted the political interests of established authority, and therefore gained access for functionalists to strategic university careers, other institutional bases, and funds to successfully disseminate their ideas.[18]

"A sociology of despair"[15] (p. 28) is really a "pornography of despair masquerading as science"[15] (p. 29). Rubinoff adds that such a sociology is "not only a pornographic exploitation of human misery and despair but also a pornographic pursuit of power—one of the chief sources of that misery and despair"[15] (p. 30), as Gouldner also asserted. It is not value free, but full of the values that feed it which it in turn aids and abets. Gouldner, in exposing a hidden value-full infrastructure to an apparent value-free suprastructure in sociology, underlines the necessity for a science which remains aware of and uses its value-full subjectivity and appropriate methodologies and keeps them both continuous and contiguous with the apparently value-free ones. I attempted a response to this issue in answering the question "What is technique?"[9]

Also pertinent is Mumford's *The Pentagon of Power*.[20] His target is not science but the megatechnics of the megamachine backed by the "power complex" or "the pentagon of power." The main components in this system are the five P's: power as energy, particularly atomic, which the state can use; political process backed by weapons; productivity for the sake of profit; and publicity or propaganda by which the elite obtains authority and credibility. A number of reviewers of Gouldner and Mumford's books laud them for their definition of the problems and their insights, and, although recognizing the immensity of what they are asking, fault them for failing to come up with solutions.

My effort has been to show that the content of Horney's ideas, and the epistemologies she used, were in tune with and reflected some of the main currents and directions of thinking in the human sciences in the Western World particularly in the last half century. With the references to philosophy, sociology, political science, and experimental psychology following upon the earlier psychohistorical evaluation of Horney's psychoanalytic theories focused through the issues of culture and power, I hope this position has been in a measure confirmed.

References

1. Horney, K.: The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York, W. W. Norton, 1937.
2. Horney, K.: New Ways in Psychoanalysis. New York, W. W. Norton, 1939, pp. 12–13.

3. Horney, K.: The technique of psychoanalytic therapy (Die Technik der Psycho-analytischen Therapie). Z. Sexualwiss. 4, 1917; Amer. J. Psychoanal. 28:3–12; 1968.
4. Horney, K.: Feminine Psychology. Kelman, H. (Ed.). New York, W. W. Norton, 1967, p. 56.
5. Kelman, H.: Helping People: Karen Horney's Psychoanalytic Approach. New York, Science House, 1971.
6. Ellenberger, H. F.: The Discovery of the Unconscious. New York, Basic Books, 1970, p. v.
7. Balint, M.: The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression. London, Tavistock Publications, 1967, p. 65.
8. Kanzer, M., and Blum, H. P.: Classical psychoanalysis since 1939. In: Psycho-analytic Techniques. Wolman, B. B. (Ed.): New York, Basic Books, 1967, p. 139.
9. Horney, K.: Neurosis and Human Growth. New York, W. W. Norton, 1950.
10. Horney, K.: Der Kampf in der Kultur, Einige Gedanken und Bedenken zu Freud's Todestrieb und Destructionstreib. In: Das Problem der Kultur und die ärztliche Psychologie Vorträge d. Inst. f. Gesch. d. Medizin. Univ. Leipzig 4:105–118. Leipzig, Thieme Verlag, 1931; Amer. J. Psychoanal. 20:130–138, 1960.
11. Horney, K.: Self-Analysis. New York, W. W. Norton, 1942.
12. Horney, K.: Our Inner Conflicts. New York, W. W. Norton, 1945.
13. Whyte, L. L., Wilson, A. G., and Wilson, D.: Hierarchical Structures. New York, American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1969.
14. Koestler, A.: Beyond Atomism and Holism: The Concept of the Holon. Perspect. Biol. Med. 13:131–154, 1970.
15. Rubinoff, L.: The Pornography of Power. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1967.
16. Northrop, F. S. C.: Logic for the Sciences and the Humanities. New York, Macmillan Company, 1945.
17. McClelland, D.: The Achieving Society. New York, The Free Press, 1967.
18. Gouldner, A. W.: The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology. New York, Basic Books, 1970. Review by Berger, B. M. In: New York Times Book Review, Oct. 25, 1970.
19. Kelman, H.: What is technique? Amer. J. Psychonal. 29:157–169, 1969.
20. Mumford, L.: The Pentagon of Power. The Myth of the Machine, Vol. II. New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970. Review by Holton, Gerald. In: New York Times Book Review, Dec. 13, 1970.

Machismo

ABRAHAM FORTES, M.D.

The unique behavior of the Mexican male known under the term of *machismo* does not figure in the Spanish dictionaries but it does exist in the dictionary of Mexican terms or words known as the *Diccionario de Mejicanismos*.[1] *Machismo* comes from the word *macho*, which means male as a noun, but used as an adjective, under the influence of the Indian tradition in its semantic evolution, the word means superiority in size, condition, power, or another attribute, such as *platano macho*, which means a huge banana. In this dictionary, *machismo* is defined as gross, coarse, rough, or uncivil, vulgarity substituting for virility.

Machismo, an acting out

Machismo is thus used to refer to a type of behavior of the Mexican male that has the following traits: overestimation of a masculine attitude; an ambivalence toward women that consists of a deep-seated dependence and superficial expressions of contempt and underestimation of them; the necessity of having many women and bragging about many sexual affairs; and treatment of his own wife as inferior and his mother as a superior,

83

asexual woman. It includes a special kind of courage in which the values of human life are nil; one should risk life as in Russian roulette, with, however, the special connotation that a woman, in the fantasy of the *macho*, will admire his action and glorify his death. This risking of one's own life is related to the male genitalia, hence the saying "You need balls to do it."

In the sexual aspect of *machismo*, the male must *dominate* the inferior woman. The male should be brave enough to fight with any other male and to risk his life. One should not tolerate any insult or doubt in respect to one's virility *(hombría)*, or permit another male to compliment the woman who is accompanying him. He should not permit another man *to look at him persistently*. He should show fearlessness in the face of any danger. These attitudes are expressed in phrases such as the following: "I am the father of more than four"; "Let's see how courageous you are: let's fight until one of us is dead"; "I'm more *macho*"; "I take nothing from anyone"; "Here's my pistol and with it I give advice to everybody"; "Nobody can insult me."[1]

Since this behavior *(machista)* is peculiar to the Mexican male and is not present in other parts of Latin America conquered by the Spaniards, we should look for the psychodynamics among the interaction of the Aztec and Spanish culture. If the Spanish culture were the determinant of *machismo* we would find it in other Latin American cultures. We must therefore examine the basic personality structure of the Indian man and woman before the arrival of the Spaniard and also their family life and the upbringing of children.

Aztec marriage was symbolized by the actual tying of the edges of the *"tilmantli,"* the cloaks of the bride and groom, and once so joined they were supposed to be "hitched for life."[2] Marriage was permitted only between members of different clans, for since all[3] clan members were considered to be of the same blood, to marry within the clan would be incestuous. There was no goddess of love in the Aztec pantheon.[4]

There was no fixed rule as to whether the man went to live with the woman's[5] clan or she lived with his. Certainly the man did not partake of his bride[6] during the first nights: the right referred to by anthropologists as *jus primae noctis* was enjoyed by the uncles, the brothers, and even the father of the bride. This was not regarded as incest, but was done to save both the bride and groom from what Levy-Bruhl called the "mysterious miasma of marriage." The great Aztec warriors had their concubines: "Montezuma had many women as mistresses," writes Bernal Diaz.[7]

Child raising. The children were breast fed until the age of 4 or 5,[8]

during which period the mothers refused sex relations with their husbands in order not to get pregnant until the child had reached the age of 4 or 5. At that age the male children were taken to the temple *(Calmecac Tel-pochcalli)* [9] to be educated and indoctrinated by the priests and prepared to be warriors. There they remained until the age of marrying or the time to go to war:

> . . . My children, listen to what I wish to tell you, because I am your father, I am cautious and rule this province (city or town) by consent of the gods, even though what I do is often taken by the gods and by the men who are to die, to be wrong and defective. You who are present here, you the first born and eldest of your brothers, and you also who are present, the second and third, and you who are at the last, the youngest, know: that I am sad and troubled, because I think one of you is to turn out useless and good for nothing; that one is to turn out with so little ability that he knows not how to talk and that not one of you is to be a man or is to serve a god. Oh, I don't know if any of you will be of any use, or will deserve the dignity and lordship that I own, or if by fate none of you is to be useful or if the office and dignity which I possess is to end. Perhaps our lord has decided that this house in which I live and which I built with so much work will fall to the ground and be as a dunghill, and that memory is lost and that there will be no one who remembers my name, nor anyone who will make mention of me, but only forget me in death. Hear now what I want to tell you, how you will know how to make yourself worthy in this world. . . . [10]
>
> . . . My daughter and woman who has come to the world, sent by our lord who is everywhere; you have come to a weary place, a place of work and labor where there is cold and wind. Take note, my daughter, that from the middle half of your body I have cut and taken your umbilicus, because your father, *Yoaltecutli,* lord of the night and your mother, *Yoalticitl,* goddess of the baths, have so ordered. You will be inside the house as the heart is inside the body, you will not have to wander away from home; you will not accustom yourself to go anywhere; you will be as the ashes with which one covers the home fires; you will be as the hearth where the pot is laid; in this place the lord buries you; here you will have to work and your chores will be to bring water and grind corn in the *metate;* here you will sweat alongside the ashes and the hearth. [11]
>
> Beloved and tender son, obey the doctrine which was left us by *Yoaltecutli* and *Yoalticitl,* your father and mother. From the middle half of your body I cut your umbilicus. Understand and know that here where you were born is not your real home because your are a soldier and a servant; you are the bird called *Quecholli.* You are the bird which they call *Zaquan* and you are also bird and soldier who is everywhere; not only is this house where you were born in a nest, but a stopping place where you have come: it is your pathway to the world; here you blossom and flower; here you fall away from your mother as the cut piece falls from the rock; this is the cradle where you lay your head, this house

is only your stopping place, your own land is another; you are destined for another place which is the battlefield where wars are waged, for that place you are sent, your office and station are war, your trust is to give the enemy's blood to the Sun to drink and the bodies of your enemy as food to the earth whose name is *Tlaltecutli;* your own land, its heritage and fate, is the house of the Sun in the heavens; there you will praise and delight our god the Sun whose name is *Totonametl;* through destiny you will deserve and be worthy to die in this place and to have in Him a good death. And this thing that I cut from the middle of your belly, is this; something owed to *Tlaltecutli* who represents the sun and the earth; when the war begins to stir and the soldiers join arms we will put it in the hands of those who are brave soldiers so that they will give it to your mother and father, the earth and the sun; they will bury it in the middle of the battlefield where war takes place; this is the sign that you make of your profession of this office in war and your name will be written on the battlefield, so that neither it nor your person will be forgotten; this is the offering of the maguey thorn, and smoke stem and of branches of *acxoytl,* that which is cut from your body and it is very precious; with this offering your penance and oath are confirmed, and now all that remains is for us to await worthiness, dignity and prosperity, which will come to us from your life and toil; my beloved son, live and work; I wish you to be gifted by that which is everywhere. . . . [12]

Education and possibilities

. . . and still for the most part the children were brought up by their mothers, if they were able to do so, and if not, those who could give the children milk were looked for, and to see if the milk was good they let fall a few drops on a fingernail and if it did not run off the nail, because it was thick, then it was accepted. The mother, or wet nurse, who gave milk did not change the food with which they began to nurse; some ate meat and some ate fruit; after nursing for four years and being good friends of their children and having brought them up with such love, these women, so as not to become with child while nursing found excuses as often as possible not to be with their husbands and if they became widowed while nursing a child, by no means did they remarry until the child had been raised; and if a woman did not follow this manner of life it was accepted as a great treason. [13]

. . . When they were five years old, the children of the nobles were sent for in order to be taken to the temple to serve there, so that they would be taught and would well know their duties in the service of their gods, and they were raised with much discipline and punishment and they were considered as first in everything, and he whose work was not diligent was severely punished. They continued in this service until they married or were old enough to go to the wars. [14]

After admission to the *Calmecac* or to the *Telpochcalli* and after staying there many years, the boys left on getting married or on reaching the age

of fighting. After 5 years of age, the education was of men and for men, in the hands of priest-teachers, *tlamatinime*. In this way there existed a group of teachers who had the obligation of transforming the Aztec into what the culture needed of him: a unity of warriors, conquerors who should dominate others; he would have to behave as such, strong, patient, practicing self-denial, cruel, and proud with a conscious feeling of great superiority.

> ... They should be masculine men, in order to adapt themselves to the explicit rule which this meaning entails. From this we understand that the worst insult paid to an Aztec was to say that he was not a man.[15]
>
> ... Those who committed the sin of being homosexual would inevitably die without pardon, and such a crime was so abhorrent amongst them that the worst offense that one could cause another would be to call him *cuilon* which means homosexual in their language.[16]

So far we have been using historical and societal data in order to establish a man-woman opposition, deeply rooted in the Aztec culture, of which *machismo* could be an expression.

We may now consider a few myths, all centered around a more general cosmogonic myth, as a means of confirming the above-mentioned oppositions. It is an indirect method of analysis, because myths cannot be said to fully and faithfully reflect the cultural reality of any given society. Part of the social organization may be left completely outside the mythical corpus or may appear transformed. Even more, social reality, in a myth, can be contradicted or simply negated.

As we have seen, the Aztec man is a soldier and the Aztec woman is a child bearer. The selected myths will make references to the "souls" of the soldiers killed in battlefield, to the women who died turing childbirth, and to the sun god for whom the Aztecs waged war in order to feed him with human blood.

General data

The Aztec culture was orientated toward that of an imperialistic society by means of war to such an extent that the basic activity of women was reinterpreted in purely masculine terms. Sahagún tells us:

> At the time of delivery, which was called the hour of death ... when the child was delivered, the mid-wife yelled like a warrior fighting in battle and by this means let the patient know that she had come through her ordeal like a man and had given birth to a boy.

If a woman was considered as a "soldier" under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that a woman who died in childbirth was believed to go and live in the house of the sun:

> ... goddesses who were called *Cihuapipíltin*. They were said to be women who died during their first childbirth; it was said that they became goddesses and lived in the house of the Sun.

But, a little farther along in Sahagún's work, we find a specific place in heaven (the house of the sun) assigned to them:

> ... the west, where it was said was the dwelling place of the goddesses called *Cihuapipíltin* ... It was said that these goddesses are everywhere in the air and appear whenever they want to see those living on earth, and they start children's illnesses such as that of pleurisy getting into human bodies. ... In the sign known as *ce ozomatli* [howling monkey] it was said that the goddesses known as *Cihua-pipíltin* came down to earth harming the children by wounding them with pleurisy. ...

The warriors killed in battle were called *Teoyaomiqui*. This was also the name of the god of dead warriors. These *Teoyaomiqui* included those sacrificed on the stone in the sacrifice to the sun where the breast was cut open and the heart removed. They accompanied the sun from early morning until noon:

> That which the Ancients said about those who went to the house of the Sun, was that all the brave men who died in battle and all the other warriors who died there, they all went to the house of the Sun; and they all lived in the eastern part of the Sun; and when the Sun rose, there in the morning they put on all their armour and went to receive him and shouting and making noises, they went in front of him with great solemnity, fighting with joy and thus they carried him to the zenith at noon which is called *nepantla tonatiuh*.

When the cortege had ended, the warriors

> ... scattered throughout the heavens and its gardens sucking nectar from the flowers until the next day.

They were changed into hummingbirds.

> ... after four years had passed the souls of these dead warriors were turned into different types of birds of richly colored feathers and they spent their time

sucking nectar from all the flowers in the same way that the *zinzones* [humming-birds] do here on earth.

The name of their god was *Huitzilopochtli*, meaning the left-handed hummingbird. He initiated the migration of the *Mexicas* to the central plateau *(Tenochtitlan)* and finally became their chief god.

Huitzilopochtli-Sun had to fight every night against his enemies, but his victory was assured thanks to the human blood which was spilled in the battlefields and on the stones for human sacrifice, to the postmortem glorification given to the warriors and to the women identified as warriors, and finally to the attributes conceded to those warriors and women.

The Aztec group, from the time of their migration, had decided on their vocation: to dominate and survive by means of arms. All of *Huitzilopochtli*'s interventions move in this direction up to the time that the Aztecs became established in the lake of Mexico. They killed and destroyed in order to live. This orientation of their society obviously had its repercussions within the culture itself and the intergroup relations, where, for example, the Aztecs, in trying to establish rationally a well-organized empire, remained at the level of violent exploitation, war, and sacrifices. Obviously, at the first opportunity which presented itself, the coming of the Spaniards, the Tlaxcatecans moved against the Aztecs in order to destroy them.

With regard to the Spanish image of man and woman, I would like to quote some fragments of the Epistle of Melchor Ocampo that is officially read during the civil marriage ceremony in Mexico and which dates from the nineteenth century. The Spanish image of man and woman is essentially the same as the Aztec's in the sense that the woman is indoctrinated to be the "weak" party and the man the "strong one" to protect her.

The married couples are and will be sacred to one another more so than one is sacred to one's self.

The man, whose sexual qualities are basically *courage* and *strength* [emphasis is mine] will give to the woman *protection, food* and *guidance;* he will treat her always as the most delicate, sensitive and fine part of himself *and with the generous and magnanimous benevolence that the strong owes to the weak* especially when this weak part is given to him and society has entrusted her to him.

The woman, whose basic qualities are *abnegation, beauty, compassion, perspicacity and tenderness*, ought and shall give *to her husband obedience, assistance, complacency, consolation and advice* and treat him as a person who sustains and protects her, *and with such delicacy so as not to provoke the irritable brusque and hard part of his character.*

(The translation is mine, with the shortcomings of one who translates a poem into another language, but it gives the essential part of the Epistle of Melchor Ocampo.)

It is obvious that the Spaniards as well as the Aztecs considered women as secondary and weak beings whom they had to protect. We see that protection repeated in the *machismo* attitude and should ask ourselves against what or whom women should be protected, probably against the hidden aggressiveness of men derived from an unconscious fear of women.

In the behavior of the Mexican *machista* we can identify a conduct that would imply a secret envy in man of the inexhaustible sexual power and capacity of procreation of woman. What else would be the reason for the illusion and wish of the *macho* to sexually exhaust the woman and his destructiveness and spite of life, advocating death instead? It seems as if, in his envy of the female capacity for procreation, envy that she can bear children and he cannot, he would say: "It's true that I cannot give them life but I can give them death."

I would venture to say that if the Aztecs had been conquered by the French or English, whose cultures were diametrically opposed to that of the Aztecs, the outcome would have been a very different one from the combination of Aztecs and Spaniards, whose cultures had many basic traits in common and whose virtues and vices were reinforced by the amalgamation of both cultures. [16b] If we speak of the negative aspects of those cultures, that does not mean there were no positive aspects too, but since we are focusing on trying to understand the behavior of the *macho*, we are concentrating on those factors that would give us an understanding of how such a behavior came into being.

What was common to both cultures, Aztec and Spanish, was their fear of women and therefore they tried to dominate them and, through that, to dominate their inner fears of those "creatures." The men in both cultures were warriors, frequently absent from their families but especially from the families that resulted from the Spanish warriors' inseminating Indian women. The children of those families lacked a masculine figure with which to identify. The male children were brought up by women to live in a male culture.

There are some similarities in their cultures: The Aztecs had to feed their thirsty gods with blood, just as the Spaniards, in a manner of speaking, had to feed their hungry gods with flesh. The Aztecs glorified death and life ever after for the "heroes," and the religion of the Spaniards considered mortal life as a "purification of the life forever after." [17]

From the amalgamation of the two cultures, Aztec and Spanish,

there was born a new family structure, the main characteristic of which was the "absent" father of the family. The so-called mestizo family was formed by the Indian mother and no father to share the education of the children because the father was Spanish and his legitimate wife lived in Madrid or Seville. The Indian mother repeated the Indian traits of abnegation toward her children and considered herself inferior to men. The children, having no father figure to identify with, seemed to have enacted in *machismo* an identification with an idealized father, in which force, power, and courage to fight and die were equated with masculinity.

Conclusions

1. We should consider *machismo* as an acting out of an idealized father image, as a result of a lack of masculine identity formation during the development of the son's personality.

2. The type of behavior described as *machismo* has many of the qualities that the warrior needed to have in order to fit in with the culture. He had to be fearless of death and, even more, he had to wish for death as ultimate goal and glorification of his culture.

3. In the *machismo* behavior, on account of unconscious strong incestuous impulses, women are made objects of conquest; they are desexualized and overpowered. On the other hand, power is sexualized; as the saying goes: "One needs balls to die." One needs balls to lay a woman but why to die? In the Mexican folklore songs and in many sayings we find a displacement of sexuality from the genitalia to weapons of aggression. One sings "With my pistol I give advice. I came because I came and I'm going to transplant this rose into my garden even if she has a gardener and let's see what happens." [18]

4. *Machismo* behavior is to deny a deep-seated dependency on the mother that is produced in an upbringing in an environment where the father is absent from the family and where there is no masculine object of identification.

5. *Machismo*, in its aspects of man's sanctification of his own mother and expressions of sexual profanation of the mothers of others, is an acting out of a conflict which serves as a defense and is, at the same time, a satisfaction of an incestuous feeling toward the mother. In this behavior the mother figure is split in two: one is a saintly, asexual mother, one's own mother, and the incestuous impulses are projected onto the mothers of the others.

6. One defends his own mother against a sexual attack by a "stranger"

—his absent, idealized father with whom he strives to identify and at the same time needs to attack. This makes the masculine identification very difficult.

7. The aggrandizement of the masculine image (denial of the fear of death, fancied "inexhaustible" sexual power) is determined not only by the fancied father image but also by the mother's unconscious wishes for and expectations of her sons.

Currently the family constellation and structure are changing in Mexico, particularly in the sense of the disappearance of the absent father in the family. The concurrent de-emphasis of *machismo* would support our hypothesis that the family structure is a result of the amalgamation of the two cultures producing a special behavior in the Mexican male who lacks a good masculine image for identification and instead identifies with unconsciously distorted and hypertrophied images resulting from mother and son's fantasies on the absent father.

References and notes

1. See the various definitions of *machismo* given in the *Diccionario de Mejicanismos*. (a)Aramoni, A.: Psicoanálisis de la dinámica de un pueblo. México, UNAM, 1961, pp. 275–277.
2. Von Hagen, V. W.: The Aztec: Man and Tribe. New York, The New American Library, 1961, p. 59.
3. The quotation is from Von Hagen, *op. cit.*, p. 59. Also see: Vaillant, G. C.: The Aztecs of Mexico. Pelican Book, 1960, p. 117: "Incest laws like our own prevailed, with the further restriction that marriage must be outside the clan." However, the most authoritative work on the subject is Katz. (Katz, F., *Situación social y económica de los aztecas durante los siglos XV y XVI*. México, UNAM, 1966). See page 118: ". . . en ningún lugar (de las fuantes) se hace alusión a la exogamia dentro del calpulli." There are no definite conclusions on this matter.
4. Quotation is from Von Hagen, *op. cit.*, p. 60. See Tlazo teotl and Xochiquetzal. The former is goddess of carnal love and the latter is goddess of flowers but has something to do with love.
5. Von Hagen, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Most likely, patrilocality must have prevailed, for "la tierra y otras propiedades eran heredadas de padres a hijos. La mujer dependía generalmente del hombre" (Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 118).
6. Quotation is from Von Hagen, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61. Those data sound like wild speculation. See Vaillant, *op. cit.*, p. 118: ". . . the bride and the groom, . . . retired for four days of penance and fasting, and not until that period elapsed did they consummate their marriage." It is known that, after the Conquest, the right of jus primae noctis was exercised by "hacenderos," but the resistance and the reluctance shown to such a practice would suggest that it has no deep-rooted origin. Among other things, it was one of the motives for the deep resentment against the Spaniards, which finally culminated in the Independence.

7. Diaz Del Castillo, B.: Historia de la Conquista de Nueva España. México, Editorial Porrúa, S. A., 1962, p. 154. See Katz, *op. cit.,* pp. 141, 164: "Sólo a los nobles se les permitió tener varias mujeres." "Los miembros (de la orden militar de los *cuacuahtin*) gozaban de los privilegios de la nobleza, es decir, exención del pago del tributo, derecho a tener varias mujeres y a usar prendas de algodón;. . . "

8. Zurita, A. de: Breve y sumaria relación de los señores de la Nueva España. México, Chávez Hayhoe, 1941, p. 108. Prolonged breast-feeding could have been used as a means against new pregnancy. Vaillant, *op. cit.,* p. 116, says: "Education began after weaning in the third year."

9. Katz, *op. cit.,* p. 140 (Calmecac); pp. 158–159 (Telpochcalli).

10. Sahagún, Fray B.: Historia general de las cosas de Nueva Espana, 4 Vols. Tomo II, México, Editorial Porrúa, S. A., 1956, p. 121.

11. Sahagún, *op. cit.,* Tomo II, p. 186.

12. Sahagún, *op. cit.,* Tomo II, pp. 185–186.

13. Zurita, *op. cit.,* p. 108.

14. Zurita, *op. cit.,* pp. 108–109. Bear in mind Zurita is speaking about "los hijos de los señores." As far as we know, the Calmecac was almost exclusively opened to the noble's sons.

15. Aramoni, *op. cit.,* pp. 73–74.

16. (a) Pomar, J. B.: Relación de Tezcoco, México, Chávez Hayhoe, Mexico, 1941, p. 31. (b) Aramoni, *op. cit.,* p. 278.

17. The origin of the bloodthirsty sun god is probably to be found in the legend of the "Fifth Sun." About that particular nihilstic *Weltanschauung* there is much to read in Nahuatl literature, especially poetry.

18. Monge, J.: La feria de las flores, cited by Aramoni, *op. cit.,* pp. 204–205.

19. Bermudez, M. E.: La vida familiar del mexicano, México, Antigua Librería Robredo (México y lo mexicano 20), 1955.

20. Paz, O.: El laberinto de la soledad. México, Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1964, p. 68.

Power and the Two Revolutions

DANIEL YANKELOVICH

The current scene

Foreign readers of our newspapers and magazines must think we are a nation obsessed with power. They read about black power, student power, gay power, womanpower, power to the people, the power of business, the power of unions, the abuse of power in our foreign affairs, and so on. Many domestic observers as well have concluded that power and power-lessness have become the leading leitmotivs of our times. There is in the air today a feeling that the institutions of the society, especially the power structure, are so inequitable or so unresponsive or so outmoded that fundamental change is needed and that it should come about through radically new distributions of power.

When, however, we conduct studies among cross sections of the general public, we see a different picture. The average American does not think in terms of power. Power is not an organizing principle for either his personal life or his response to institutions. It is true these days that the public finds itself off-balance—disturbed about the war in Vietnam, queasy about the economy, and distressed by crime, taxes, and welfare. But the average citizen does not diagnose his problems in power categories. Rather, the personal life-style of most people exhibits the workings of

the reality principle. When people inevitably find hopes thwarted and their ideals unfulfiilled, they scale down their demands. They accept and settle for less.

Faithful to the traditional values of the American ethos, most people seek to control their own lives and destinies insofar as they are able. The conditions of modern life, however, have badly eroded this ideal of autonomy. People today have far less to say about where they will live, whether or not they will be employed, where the economy is heading, how their children will behave, and even how many children they will have. Yet, people's typical response is not to challenge the system or seek to redistribute power. They say, in effect: "We'll just have to look to others—the government or employers or other institutions—to do for us what we cannot do for ourselves." Hence, the widespread support for medical care, education, income maintenance, unemployment benefits, wage-price controls, and even government support for those unable to take care of themselves such as the aged, the sick, the mentally retarded, and the needy.

I am not suggesting here that the majority are passive, acquiescent, or satisfied. In fact, a rumbling undercurrent of unrest, distress, and dissatisfaction runs through the land. I merely wish to note here the sharp contrast that exists between the mass of citizens whose perceptions and lives are not organized around power issues and the various groups for whom these issues have become central.

I make this contrast because I wish to deal shortly with revolution. And when speaking of revolution it is relevant to know that the mass of citizens are not in a revolutionary mood. We should, however, derive scant comfort from this fact. Revolutions are not made by majorities. If public opinion analysts were active at the time of the French Revolution, the opinion polls would probably have reported that 62.5 percent of the French people expressed satisfaction with the performance of the monarchy and that 31 percent thought that Marie Antoinette had a sweet tooth. Nonetheless, the stability of the public does exert a strong influence on the flow of events. The majority acts as a drag on the momentum of social change, slowing its tempo and blunting its sharp cutting edge. But the agencies of change nevertheless move slowly and relentlessly forward.

And this, I think, is the cardinal point. Our social critics do sound too shrill a note. Their apocalyptic vision does overlook the underlying stability of the country. But on balance, they are more closely attuned to what is happening than is the public at large. The forces of change are, in fact, transforming this country. We are living through one of those rare

eras in history when the spirit and quality of an entire civilization are in the process of changing character.

What are these forces for change? And why are they expressing themselves today in the language and psychology of power? Social critics such as Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Robert Nisbet, Seymour Martin Lipsett, and Irving Howe have all addressed themselves to this point. They speak of a crisis of legitimacy. Bell writes: "The key question for any political system—and this is the triumph of Max Weber over Marx in contemporary social thought—is the legitimacy of the system."[1] Bell then quotes Martin Lipset's definition of legitimacy:

> Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. . . . Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.[2]

From this point of view, if a crisis of legitimacy is in the making, it must be due to a breakdown between the values of people and the institutions of the society whose purpose is to embody key social values. Instability and the loss of legitimacy are the price we must eventually pay for any serious disjuncture between values and institutions. Today, unfortunately, whole libraries are being filled with the indictments social critics heap upon us for the failure of our institutions to live up to our values.

We should note that legitimacy, authority, and power are all aspects of the same whole. Inevitably, power becomes an issue when legitimacy is threatened. This principle may be seen at work in the crisis of the universities, which depend for their successful functioning on the acceptance of their authority and legitimacy by all participants. If their authority is challenged, they have very little power to fall back on. One power they do have—the power to expel students—was effectively suspended in the 1968–1969 period of campus turmoil because of the conviction, shared by administrators, faculty, and students alike, that to expel a student was, in effect, to jeopardize his life by sending him to Vietnam—a form of massive retaliation to which the Ivy League schools, in particular, were reluctant to resort. You will recall that when the legitimacy of the university was questioned, the issue of power and who was to share it came immediately to the fore.

In a recent issue of *The Public Interest*, Irving Kristol observes that our capitalist society has traditionally conveyed three promises to the citizenry: one is that of continued material improvement, a second is for

individual freedom, and a third is for an intangible form of self-fulfillment and self-actualization that Kristol characterizes as a "virtuous life in a just society."[3]

One reason the majority of the public is lest restive than, say, the black minority or college students is that most people believe the society *is* living up to its promises. By and large, people do feel they can look forward to continued material improvement without undue sacrifice of their freedom. As for the third promise, although many of our citizens may feel something lacking in their lives, they are too preoccupied with the practical problem of improving their material lot to feel that their needs for self-actualization and "the virtuous life" are being thwarted by the system. On the other hand, blacks, welfare recipients, some of the other ethnic minorities, and, increasingly, those workers and lower-middle-class families who are caught between the recession and inflation do question the ability of the society to deliver on its promise of continued material improvement. The Women's Liberation movement also divides along class lines, with one group stressing material improvement in the form of equal pay, day care for working mothers, and better work opportunities for women, whereas another group stresses the constraints on women that interfere with their individual freedom, and a third group emphasizes the failure of our masculine-dominated society to provide opportunities for women to fulfill themselves as whole persons.

The college protest movement, largely upper middle class in origin, feels most acutely what they regard as our society's failure to deliver on the third promise. Many college students devalue material well-being because they take it for granted. Instead, they make an emotional commitment to self-fulfillment and self-actualization—to "the virtuous life in a just society." Kristol writes: "My reading of history is that, in the same way as men cannot for long tolerate a sense of spiritual meaninglessness in their individual lives, so they cannot for long accept a society in which power, privilege and property are not distributed according to some morally meaningful criteria."[4] This statement must, I think, be qualified. Characteristically, those who find themselves on the short end of power, privilege, and property are less likely to be agitated by considerations of social justice than those who are overendowed with these privileges. As Hannah Arendt has observed, revolutions are always started by people who are not oppressed or degraded but cannot stand it that others are.[5]

The challenge to our institutions that comes from the blacks and other ethnic minorities arises from the demands of the people who want in. Outside of the college population, it is the desire to enjoy a bigger share

of the benefits of society that motivates the largest number of dissidents. The opportunities for better education, more social mobility, a higher standard of living, a home of one's own in a neighborhood of one's choosing, and an equal share of the dignity accorded to the average middle-class citizen—these are not revolutionary demands. Pursuing them does not undermine the basic structure of the society as it is presently constituted. On the contrary, success in achieving these goals would strengthen the authority and legitimacy of the system in its present form.

There are, however, some dissenters, mainly from the student protest movement, who truly desire revolution, not inclusion. Yet here, too, a vital distinction must be made between two different concepts of revolution. One is political revolution in the traditional sense of a take-over of political and economic power. The other kind is a cultural revolution— fundamental changes in peoples' values which may or may not be accompanied by the take-over of power.

This latter meaning of revolution is the central theme of Charles Reich's book, *The Greening of America.*[6] Surprisingly, a similar perspective is offered by the French intellectual Jean-François Revel, who believes that such a revolution in values is not taking place in the United States. In his book *Ni Marx, Ni Jesus,*[7] Revel writes: "The revolution of the twentieth century will take place in the United States . . . it has already begun to develop there." Revel sees Cuba, China, and Russia as political revolutions that failed. He has in mind "a social, cultural, moral, even artistic transformation where the values of the old world are rejected, where relations between social classes are reconsidered, where relations among individuals are modified, where the concept of the family changes, where the value of work and the very goals of existence are reconsidered."[8] Revel is quoted in a recent interview as stating his belief that such a revolution began to emerge in the United States in the mid-50's with the civil rights marches and flowered in the student upheavals of the 60's, the black power movement, Women's Liberation, and the opposition to the Vietnam war. Strikingly like Charles Reich, he believes that the most fundamental changes will come about in the United States more or less painlessly— that is without bloody revolution—owing to basic shifts in the value structure of the society. And he includes, particularly, that bastion of capitalist power, corporate industry, which he feels will evolve by virtue of our on-going value shifts to "preserve its dynamism while draining it of what is left of its capitalist control." Like Reich, Revel admits that this is perhaps a "slightly utopian scenario," but his is certainly an unusual perspective to come from a French thinker of the Left.[9]

Power, it should be observed, is central to both conceptions of revolution. The conventional revolutionary thinks of power as flowing "from the barrel of the gun" and is prepared to draw upon the full repertory of political tactics for seizing power—organization, confrontation, the ideological indoctrination of the people, working from within, and, if necessary, using violence to seize the instruments of power. Not surprisingly, Reich has been attacked by Marcuse for promoting a naïve "establishment version" of the revolution. Marcuse thinks it is silly and sentimental to conceive of those who hold power as surrendering it to something as soft headed as a shift in consciousness.[10] But Marcuse's traditional view of power is, in turn, troublesome to those who seek a cultural, moral, and aesthetic revolution in values, as distinct from a political revolution. For the adherents of this view, the issue of power is also decisive, but in a quite different sense. They mistrust power. They see the quest for power as one of the key values that must undergo radical transformation.

Curiously, their view of power is eloquently expressed by a thinker familiar to everyone in this room. I refer not to some contemporary existentialist philosopher, nor to a prominent student spokesman, but to Alfred Adler writing in the early 1920's, shortly after World War I. For Adler, of course, the psychology of power originated in the individual's urgent attempt to overcome deficiency, weakness, and the feeling of powerlessness. Adler spoke of "this poison of craving for power."[11] He saw the quest for power as responsible for the destruction of all spontaneous human relationships. For Adler, the striving for personal power is a "disastrous delusion." The simplest means to everything seems to be by way of power, but this simplest means always leads to destruction. All too often, the typical ideal of our times is the isolated hero for whom fellowmen are mere objects. The sickness of our civilization, in Adler's view, is precisely the high valuation placed on power and individualism at the expense of a sense of community. You will recognize here vintage Adler, but at the same time an ultramodern theme of the counterculture.

Both conceptions of revolution—political and value revolution—and both conceptions of power—power as the prize of political revolution and power as the poison that eats away our sense of community and humanity—have flowered to their most advanced state in the student protest movement.

I have estimated that almost half of the current college student population—about 45 percent—is emotionally involved in one or another aspect of the student protest movement. That is, over three million of the eight million college students currently in college are wrestling with these issues

of power and revolution. The majority of college students—the 55 percent—are the familiar and traditional career-and-family-minded young people whose purpose in going to college is to advance their material well-being, to have a better job, and to enjoy a more secure position in the society as it now exists. Although the media have exaggerated its political revolutionary side, I regard the student protest movement in its role as vanguard of a revolution in values as perhaps the most significant social phenomenon of our time. And I think that when the Vietnam horror is finally ended, the more benign aspects of this revolution will take hold more firmly.

There are two themes which, in combination with a changed attitude toward power, make up the core ideas of the revolution in values. One is the search for an alternative to what we may call McNamarism—the highly developed conception of efficiency and organization that has dominated the technological side of our civilization. The arch symbol of McNamarism is the cost effectiveness mode of management with its emphasis on the abstract, the quantitative, the tangible, and the mechanically manipulable aspects of reality. All too often alternatives to McNamarism are put forth negatively, as opposed to technology and efficiency, rather than as in favor of something positive. The counterculture in its present stage has not yet come to grips with the constructive and positive side of the technological life-style. Yet despite its negative quality, the reaction to long-standing values associated with scientific-technological world views bears the seeds of an important new development in social values.

The other component of the new world view relates to nature and all that is felt to be natural—in the various senses of preserving the natural environment, being closer to nature, seeking out natural foods, looking natural, being one's natural self, and being in tune with one's inherent biological nature. Perhaps no other theme so characterizes the emerging *Zeitgeist* as this groping but deeply rooted quest for redefining our relationship with nature. These themes—the de-emphasis on individualism and of power relationships so as to enhance our sense of community; the rejection of technological rationalism so as to open up new modes of being, perceiving, and experiencing; and the emphasis on harmony with nature as distinct from mastery over it—are the materials out of which the cultural revolution is being shaped.

You will recognize in these themes echoes of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European continental thought—Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and Dilthey and Husserl and Weber and Heidegger. What is new is their

interjection into the life stream of American culture by millions of young people who may never have read a word written by these European intellectuals.

The main vehicle for these new values—the student protest movement —is however, seriously bogged down by a contradiction between the two conceptions of revolution—power-seizing revolution and cultural revolution. On the surface, the differences between the two have been blurred because those who espouse a New Left political revolutionary position also hold many of the new values. Similarly, those who are moving toward a new culture consciousness share, at least for now, the radical political diagnosis of the New Left. Furthermore, both groups share the estate of being students and common feelings of alienation and estrangement from our society.

And yet, the alliance between the New Left and the counterculture is makeshift and unstable, since it is based on incompatibility between means and ends. There is something inherent in the process of seizing political power that leads almost inevitably to the betrayal of the new values, especially those based on a profound mistrust of power. Conversely, the Revel-Reich concept of a revolution of consciousness as the means for bringing enlightenment to those in power probably is a bit naïve: some old-fashioned political clout may do wonders in educating the power structure to the merits of being in harmony with nature. Nonetheless, I think that of the two forms of revolution in the air today, the revolution in values with its profound mistrust of power, technological rationalism, and mastery of nature is by far the more significant for the future.

Psychoanalytic considerations

As a student of the history of ideas, I am fascinated by the process of cultural diffusion, whereby new values incubating in the student culture slowly become integrated with more traditional values. It is a vital process of renewal for the society, and the student protest movement is making an important contribution to us all. But I cannot escape feeling troubled over the personal fate of the young people who make up the movement. I am afraid that one part of the present generation will be sacrificed. The disparity between the outlook and values of the young protesters and the ability of our institutions to respond to their needs may be so great that many of these young people may become totally embittered, alienated, anarchistic, or hopeless in their outlook. Inevitably, some will swing to the opposite extreme, embracing the traditional values with a vengeance

and turning angrily against their old selves. Many will live out the familiar process of gradual adaptation and assimilation. But some will be lost souls. And it is this concern that brings us directly to psychoanalysis—both as therapy and as theory.

With respect to therapy, many observers have noted that the tensions of the society do carry over to the types of patients analysts see in their offices. At least the overt symptoms of patients' distress reflect the conflicts in the larger society. Wheelis, Erikson, and many others have remarked on the change in the types of patient who seek help from an analyst from Freud's day to the present. Erikson notes that the classic cases of hysteria which loomed so large in Freud's practice have virtually disappeared. In the 1950's and 60's analysts saw many patients, especially younger ones, whose central concern related to their quest for a surer sense of personal identity. Today, the themes of power and powerlessness and how the individual can find a satisfactory life for himself in this society are likely to appear with increasing frequency.

Conflicts over power can cause considerable psychic mischief. Although I have distinguished sharply between political and cultural revolution in order to draw attention to their incompatibility on the issue of power, these are not emotionally distinct matters for most young people. Power has become a preoccupation of those who feel alienated and want to change things. Many young people are ambivalent, swinging from one extreme where violence is embraced and an ideology of power is held obsessively, to the other extreme where all matters associated with power are held in abhorrence and disgust. The issue of power becomes confusing and disturbing—psychodynamically as well as politically.

The psychological consequences of power conflict can be very great. When power becomes a central organizing principle in a person's life, it can create large-scale transformations of personality and perception. Often, the individual ceases to see the sources of conflict within himself; he locates conflict as taking place solely between himself and the society. Ideology seizes his imagination and governs his perceptions. He acts out his fantasies, often gaining much pleasure in the process. He justifies his aggression as honest anger in the form of moral indignation. He creates confrontations which permit him to recapitulate important personal dramas. He experiences wide springs of mood, alternating between heroic euphoria and despair, nausea and disgust.

The despair comes in part from the deep-rooted expectation that the anger will be met with fierce retaliation by stronger forces. This converts many youth confrontations into self-fulfilling prophecies of failure. As

Arendt observes, students feel a "curious despair as though they already knew they would be smashed. As if they were saying, 'at least we want to have provoked this failure.'"[5]

The despair also comes from the actor's recognition that he is being drawn deeper and deeper into artificial role playing and distorted perception. Sometimes he thinks he is going mad. And even though he may justify madness for others on ideological grounds, as is the fashion in some circles today, the thought that he himself may personally be mad he finds most distressing. Most people do not live their lives on a heroic plane, and the young power-obsessed individual often has a deeper yearning for ordinary everyday life than he may wish to acknowledge.

I am not, of course, implying that people who organize their lives along power lines are pathological. I *am* suggesting that when such people do find themselves in a neurotic bind, it is difficult for them to seek out help because they see the source of conflict in the institutions of society, not in themselves. And when they do seek help, it is difficult for the analyst associated with the traditional establishment values of the society to establish an alliance with them. And even when psychoanalysts have established a working alliance with such patients, the issue of reality becomes a major stumbling block.

When young college-bred patients bring up their feelings of alienation, the difficulties of finding a satisfying personal life for themselves in our society, and the unresponsive or destructive character of many of our institutions, the analyst cannot sweep these feelings aside or easily interpret them as projections. Nor can he unwittingly assume that the ideal end result of the analysis is to make the young patient feel more comfortable and at home in the society. In principle, analysts are not supposed to make such assumptions. In principle, they are concerned with freeing the patient from the neurotic traps that whip him about, presumably leaving him freer to change the society if he wishes to do so. But in practice, the unconscious goal of the therapist may be adjustment rather than greater freedom to change things, especially if the analyst happens to share the dominant values of the culture. At least, this is the criticism many young people have about psychoanalysis, and it causes them to approach it with deep mistrust. And, in fact, psychoanalysts may have great difficulty in respecting the reality of values they do not share, particularly among young people from their own world.

These considerations bear on how some of the tensions in the larger society affect psychoanalytic practice. The other side of the matter is how the psychoanalytic profession can contribute what it knows to help the

society. Most psychoanalysts and knowledgeable observers believe that psychoanalysis does have an important contribution to make to our understanding of the great forces at work in the society. Even if he should wish to do so, the analyst cannot escape the social conflicts that surround him. Everything he sees or reads reminds him of insights gained after much struggle in his own clinical practice. He knows, in some deep sense, that the conflicts of his patients do illuminate those of the society at large. He senses that the unconscious forces so familiar to him in his clinical work are, when they appear on the social scene, badly misunderstood by our political leaders, managers, and other decision makers in the society. Yet when the psychoanalyst seeks to apply his understanding to the events of the day, something almost always goes wrong.

Consider the student protest movement I have been discussing. Just the other day I read an article in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* written by a distinguished European analyst. He questioned whether the student protest movement was not merely a form of "regressively infantile conduct." For this analyst, the standard of judgment is adult behavior as implied by Freud's reality principle, i.e., the learned capacity "to resist the peremptory urge to vent unpleasure signals . . . and to postpone the demand of [one's] hurt narcissism" (p. 104). He sees the protesting students as expressing the undisciplined pleasure principle, unable to restrain their impulsive demands for instant gratification.

Happily these days, we read fewer and fewer of these extreme forms of psychological reductionism which discuss complex adult behavior in terms of infantile learning in the light of the early Freudian metapsychology. Unfortunately, however, this particular interpretation differs mainly in degree and not in kind from other psychoanalytic observations on the society.

Consider, for example, Lieutenant Calley. The extraordinary public reaction to Lieutenant Calley's sentence and the agony of public feeling it evoked must be regarded as one of the significant psychological events of our time. There are, I am sure, hundreds of psychoanalysts who have answers to some of the compelling questions raised by this event. Why did the public identify so intensely with a man convicted of murdering unarmed women and children? Why did the public passion subside so quickly? What role was played by denial, by guilt, by projection? Why do so many people feel that in the Calley conviction and sentencing they personally had been betrayed? And, above all, the important practical question: What meaning does the response to the Calley incident have in interpreting public feelings about the war and how to end it?

Two articles by prominent psychoanalysts discussing the public reaction to the Calley case recently appeared in the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times*. One was well written but platitudinous. The other was insightful, but so dark and impenetrable in its obscure reference to instinctual response that it could not be understood even by a number of thoughtful psychoanalysts to whom I showed the piece.

We are left, then, with a puzzle. On the one hand, there is no doubt—at least in my mind—that the trained clinical sensitivity of the analyst does have vital relevance to the great events of our day. I refer not only to the Calley episode or the youth protest movement, but also to issues of racial strife, the various tendencies to confrontation and polarization in the society, the spread of drugs and violence, the Women's Liberation movement, the fading but still powerful ideological commitment to anticommunism among the public, and the challenge to the institutions of work, church, family, flag, and standards of sexual morality. Psychoanalytic experience has something useful to impart to us on all of these topics. Yet, despite its wealth of insights, there seems to be an invisible obstacle that, with a few notable exceptions, prevents the analyst from making the invaluable contribution he wants to make, the society expects him to make, and the country vitally needs.

I believe the reason psychoanalysts find it so difficult to apply their insights to the larger society is the very same reason that psychoanalysis has difficulty on the therapeutic side with borderline problems: prisoners, poverty-ridden patients, and the others who find themselves caught up in social conflicts where intrapsychic and reality factors are inextricably mixed. All these types of patients have one thing in common: for each, reality factors must be taken into account as well as purely subjective experience. For borderline patients, a reality factor may be characterologic conflicts with the analyst; for poverty patients it may be not having rent money or a telephone or someone to look after the children. Here is where psychoanalysis has great difficulty in giving reality its just place in the scheme of things.

Psychoanalytic concepts, especially in metapsychology but also in clinical theory, constitute a self-contained solipsistic body of observations and inferences dealing with the intrapsychic processes of the single individual. As such, psychoanalysis is locked within itself with few windows open to the real world. This limitation is not fatal to the understanding and conduct of psychotherapy with certain types of neurotic patients, but it effectively blocks psychoanalysis from fruitful development as a science and as a general psychology of human behavior. Psychoanalysts

are privy to aspects of the human personality that no one else can see. As individuals, psychoanalysts are often cultivated people who compensate for the weaknesses in the theory through their own personal wisdom. But the theory itself, especially in its metapsychological forms, is not sufficiently helpful in bringing into perspective the whole person enmeshed in the realities of his relations to objects, to others, and to the institutions of the society. Clearly, the problem has been recognized, or at least felt, by everyone concerned with psychoanalysis. Of the many approaches made to solve it in recent years, some, I think, are dead ends and others are quite promising.

One approach is exemplified by those who would eliminate the metapsychology altogether and concentrate instead on the development of a pure clinical theory. This approach has particular appeal to some clinicians and to medical students, who quickly become impatient with everything except clinical material dealing with individual psychopathology. This narrow focus solves certain problems, but leaves the present dilemma of psychoanalysis unresolved. It builds no bridges between psychoanalysis and the world.

Another approach was taken by the late Heinz Hartmann, who attempted to neaten up the classical Freudian metapsychology so that psychoanalysis might serve as a general psychology. Hartmann's intelligence and dedication are well admired, but by starting with the very premises that lock psychoanalytic theory into its subjectivist prison, Hartmann could never hope to break through. And he did not.

A more promising approach comes from Erikson and others who have developed a small number of psychosocial concepts, such as identity, and have accrued a body of knowledge and insight around them. Identity, for example, is a vast improvement over Freud's concept of ideal image, which is an intrapsychic term referring solely to a mental phenomenon presumably located within the envelope of the skin of the individual. In contrast, identity reaches beyond the individual: you must identify with someone or something. To be sure, Freud developed his own rich and complex theory of identification on which Erikson has built. But Erikson goes beyond Freud precisely in reaching outward from the individual to others.

Power is an equally fruitful psychosocial concept, having the same ability as identity to link the individual with the world. In contrast, aggression is a purely intrapsychic concept that can be too readily discussed by exclusive reference to the individual's intrapsychic processes.

The theme of this conference, "Power and Personality," and the

concept of power itself are an announcement by psychoanalysis that the study of power relations can be translated from the domain of sociology and political philosophy to that of psychology and psychoanalysis. This helps to build a bridge. One has power over somebody or something. Power cannot be intelligently discussed without referring beyond the individual to his enmeshment in the world. Psychoanalysis can build bridges to other disciplines by means of such psychosocial concepts, and power is a particularly useful one.

A related approach to going beyond the intrapsychic so as to carve out a proper niche for reality is represented by workers such as the British analyst D. W. Winnicott. Indeed, Winnicott's approach may be more congenial to clinicians than Erikson's, since Winnicott is primarily concerned with the day-to-day technical problems of the clinician such as when to interpret and when to refrain from interpretation in the interests of permitting the real characteristics of the analyst to play a more important role in the therapy. In a recent paper, "The Use of an Object," Winnicott observes that psychoanalysis has always had its greatest difficulty when attempting to take reality into account. "Psychoanalysis," he writes, "always likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are environmental, except in so far as the environment can be thought of in terms of projective mechanisms" (p. 712).[15] But, of course, the environment is real, and in many instances cannot be even provisionally suspended for the sake of focusing on subjective experience. Winnicott is concerned in this paper with how the aggressive drives help to establish reality for the infant by providing him with a sense of the independent existence of objects. He describes the complex process whereby an infant seeks to destroy an object in order to establish its independent existence. If the object *can* be destroyed, it has no independent reality for the infant and becomes part his subjective fantasy. It is only when the object survives destruction that it is placed outside the arena of the infant's omnipotent control and enjoys its own independent reality.

We have here the original paradigm of power relations with the world, based on developing the infant's sense of what is real. Winnicott hypothesizes that a disturbed sense of reality—and power—can be regarded as having been caused, at least in part, by something having gone awry in that critical stage of early development when the infant first establishes the reality of independent objects by seeking to destroy them. The assumption in orthodox theory, Winnicott states, is that aggression is reactive to the encounter with reality, whereas here, he says, it is the destructive drive itself that "creates the quality of externality." According to the traditional

Freudian metapsychology, the transition from pleasure principle to reality principle is due to frustration, whereas for Winnicott, it derives from the infant's first realistic power relations with the world.

I find the Erikson-Winnicott approach hopeful because it accommodates within the same theoretical frame of reference the influence of the culture and the role of instinct. The culture is taken into account by means of an emphasis on those critical life experiences, institutionalized by the culture, that relate to the development of basic trust, object use, and other phases of development necessary for healthy human growth. And, at least by implication, a role is carved out for instinct, since the capacity to develop basic trust and the tendency to destroy objects are instinctually rooted.

Erikson's paradigm of the development of basic trust in the individual is closely related to Winnicott's concept of how infants constitute reality with their first experiments in using objects. In both, the infant is seen within an epigenetic perspective where certain instinctually rooted, age-specific capacities come to the fore at various life stages, each stage dependent upon the successful integration of the preceding one. At each stage, biologically rooted potentials are given concrete shape and expression through learning that takes place by virtue of certain critical experiences. The culture protects those nurturant institutions which assure the individual of a good chance to have these all-important critical experiences. Psychoanalytic practice reveals how heavy the toll is on human life when these critical experiences have not taken place and the individual is left without a sense of basic trust and with deficits of perception and difficulties in relating to others and to the world.

This approach from the clinical side closely dovetails the one developed by my co-author, William Barrett and myself.[16] We start from a completely different point of departure, not from clinical material but from philosophy. Curiously, philosophy has been struggling for several hundred years with a problem very similar to that of psychoanalysis—a conceptual impasse that led to the eventual isolation of philosophy as a fruitful method for studying reality. This impasse was finally broken in recent years, and it seemed to us that the lessons of modern philosophy had a direct bearing on the similar problem faced by psychoanalysis and some of the other human sciences.

One concept focuses precisely on those critical experiences the individual must have if he is to develop free from crippling mental illness. The institutions of the culture are, at least in part, organized to permit the infant, the child, and the adult to undergo the critical experiences he

needs for his development. If the institutions fail, the individual cannot develop properly. The emphasis here is on the culture, the social structure, and the environment as it is organized to fulfill developmental needs.

Another concept is that of instinct, reformulated so as to be free of many of the logical problems that have beset this ancient and much abused term. Let me conclude with a brief discussion of instinct since it is so central to the theme of power and personality. The issue is, of course, one of the central controversies in psychoanalysis.

You will recall that several years ago, some of the sharpest divisions within psychoanalysis polarized around one's stand on instinct. Sullivan, Horney, and others stood on one side playing down Freud's theory of instinct and stressing instead the importance of cultural and social factors. On the other side, the strict Freudians held fast against deviations from orthodoxy. They sharply criticized the revisionists whom they accused of being "Pollyannas" and wishful thinkers who wished to turn their backs on the darker side of human nature. The strict Freudians emerged as presenting the hard line on instinct and human nature, the revisionists as offering a soft line. The hard-liners stressed an invariant human nature based on instinct, the sexual etiology of all the neuroses, and the reduction of the so-called higher aspects of man's behavior—our social values and personal goals and purposes—to the basic drives of sex and aggression. The revisionists de-emphasized instinct and an inherent human nature and emphasized instead human flexibility, motives other than sex aggression, and the importance of social and cultural influences.

Today we recognize the large element of inappropriate ideological passion vested in these two positions. Fortunately, we no longer stress what divides us and we are free to see that the differences were not as sharp as they first appeared. Today, there is less theoretical opposition to the idea of instinct although many analysts still reject the concept because it is so troublesome conceptually to define, identify, and take into account. On the other side, even the strictest Freudians have come to recognize the role culture played in Freud's own thinking, as reflected in such works as *Civilization and Its Discontents* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

Although the thrust of Freud's discoveries had been to find those constants of human nature that cut across historical epochs and cultures, Freud himself came to believe that his discoveries had a topical relevance to the historical situation of his own day. Human culture, he argued, always involved the burden of repressing instincts. Looking at his own society, he concluded that the social sanctions which promoted instinctual sacrifice, especially of sexual experience, had become shaky in the society of his

day. The quandary of civilized man presented itself in the form of the European bourgeois of the turn of the century, struggling to carry on his social tasks while fettered by a cramping and repressive sexual code.

Looking at our own society, we realize that Freud overgeneralized his own historical epoch. We bring to bear a broader perspective on instinct and culture than that of sexual and aggressive energy pressing for discharge against the bulwark of institutionalized defenses. We see in clinical practice, as well as in the society at large, the outlines of vast social conflicts that are at least as fundamental as the clash of social mores with sexual tensions and yet are wholly different in content and dynamics.

The preoccupation of the student protest movement with nature, community, and power exhibits, I believe, a profound and perhaps instinctually rooted sense that the institutions of our society are no longer providing people with the all-important life-enhancing experiences they need to develop their full potential. Kristol is, I think, correct in his observation that our society, and particularly our upper-middle-class child-rearing practices, hold out the triple promise to our people of the satisfaction of material wants, the opportunities for individual freedom, and the spiritual promise of a virtuous life in a just society. We are struggling today with the fact that our formalized institutions are finding it difficult to deliver on these promises. The revolution in values taking place around us is an effort to square our institutions with these promises. The psychoanalytic community has a unique opportunity to make a vital contribution to this process—but to do so, it must, at long last, find a way of taking the reality of the world into account without doing violence to the reality of our instinctual rootedness.

References

1. Bell, D.: Unstable America. Encounter, June 1970.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Kristol, I.: Reflections on capitalism and the free society. The Public Interest, Vol. 22, Winter, 1971.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Arendt, H.: New York Review of Books.
6. Reich, C.: The Greening of America. New York, Random House, 1970.
7. Revel, J.-F.: Ni Marx, Ni Jesus. Paris, Laffont, 1970.
8. Revel, J.-F.: New York Times, April 13, 1971.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Marcuse, H.: New York Times.
11. Adler, A.: The psychology of power. J. Individ. Psychol., Vol. 22, No. 2, Nov. 1966.

12. Yankelovich, D.: Profile of a generation. CBS News, 1969.
13. Wheelis, A.: The Quest for Identity. New York, W. W. Norton, 1958.
14. New York Times, April 10, 1971.
15. Winnicott, D. W.: The use of an object, Int. J. Psychoanal. Vol. 50, 1969.
16. Yankelovich, D. and Barrett, W.: Ego and Instinct. New York, Random House, 1970.

Discussion by Alfred H. Rifkin, M.D.

Professor Yankelovitch reminds us how multifaceted is the human condition, and how subtle and complex the relationship between the indivudual and his society. Clearly, Professor Yankelovitch is no armchair theorist. His presentation has the fresh and vital quality that comes from close contact with the great social movements and crying issues of the day: the morass of the Viet Nam war, the horror of My Lai, and the crisis of national conscience precipitated by the case of Lieutenant Calley. Professor Yankelovitch is quite conversant with psychoanalysis and the theoretical and organizational schisms that beset our field. But I am not so sanguine that the differences between the psychoanalytic hard liners and the revisionists, as he terms them, are no longer as sharp as they first appeared. Many differences and disagreements remain unresolved. What the American Academy has sought is "to constitute a forum for inquiry into the phenomena of individual motivations and social behavior." I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Yankelovitch's view that "psychoanalysis does have an important contribution to make to our understanding of the great forces at work in this society." He goes on to say that the psychoanalyst "knows, in some deep sense, that the conflicts of his patients do illuminate those of the society at large . . . the unconscious forces so familiar to him in his clinical work are, when they appear on the social scene, badly misunderstood by our political leaders. . . . yet when the psychoanalyst seeks to apply his understanding to the events of the day, something almost always goes wrong."

Here, I believe, we have the crux of the psychoanalysts's problem in his role as social commentator. Psychoanalysts have attempted to "explain" social phenomena in terms of individual psychodynamics. The issue is an old one among anthropologists. Psychoanalysis can and does make a valid contribution, but social movements are not merely the reflection or summation of individual psychodynamics. The nature and significance of social movements cannot be directly deduced from and are not projections of individual psychodynamics. There is no inherent or fixed connection between the validity of social movements—in the present context the two revolutions Professor Yankelovitch so ably delineates—and the psychodynamic reasons why individuals espouse a particular position in relation to these revolutions. I submit that it is as misleading to explain social phenomena in terms of individual psychodynamics as it is to explain psychodynamics as the mere reflections of social laws and relationships.

Are the power revolution and the value revolution indeed antithetical?

I see them rather as complementary. Creeping McNamarism, the deification of the cost-effectiveness ratio, is more easily repudiated by those who have had access to the fruits of the scientific-technological revolution than by those who have as yet hardly benefited at all. Living close to nature, seeking our natural foods, fashioning our own tools, and so on, may seem very desirable to affluent suburban youth. It has less appeal to the denizens of the inner city asphalt jungle or to tenant farmers and sharecroppers who have had ample experience with the caprices of mother nature.

Perhaps the value revolution is in itself a power maneuver. The granting or withholding of the material rewards of the scientific-technological revolution is one of the principal weapons in the hands of the established order. But what if the rewards are no longer desirable, no longer worth having or striving for? The powerless are then suddenly liberated and made powerful by means of a passive-aggressive maneuver.

And what about the crisis of legitimacy? Perhaps this is not a change in values, but an up-to-date version on the Marxian doctrine about the predominance of the ideology of the ruling class now suddenly taken literally and demanded as a general right.

I was intrigued by Professor Yankelovitch's speculation that an opinion poll of the French people would probably have found 62 percent saying that the monarchy was doing a good job. On the analytic couch they might have expressed different sentiments. I think revolutions *are* made by the masses, Hannah Arendt to the contrary notwithstanding. They are led, given shape and form by intellectuals, by disaffected elements of the ruling class, and by the emerging middle class. But the final convulsion comes only when governmental structure collapses and ordinary people suddenly find they have, or can seize, power. What happens afterwards depends on the historical circumstances, on the balance of forces, and perhaps on the qualities of individual leaders. I agree that Americans tend not to challenge the system or seek to seize and redistribute power. There are many reasons for this state of affairs, but assuredly one of the principal reasons is that they do not believe they have the power to alter the situation. Most people believe they cannot fight City Hall, so that government in general becomes more and more removed from the influence of the ordinary citizen. Indeed, our national administration now seems to make it a matter of pride that it will not be in the least swayed by the expressed will of multitudes of Americans.

McNamarism is at work in our own field. The legitimate demand for psychiatric service to all segments of the community has fostered uncritical acceptance of the notion that psychoanalysis cannot be justified because of its cost-effectiveness ratio. Some of you may have seen the current issue of our newsletter, *The Academy,* with its delightful typographical error: "the demands for quack and easy cures for ancient frustrations."

But is psychoanalytic theory adequate to the tasks of social commentary and illumination? Is psychoanalytic theory flexible enough to accommodate the

new demands? Freud thought that, in a psychiatry for the people, the pure gold of psychoanalysis would have to be alloyed with the brass of suggestion. Clearly that is not enough, and perhaps it is not even in the right direction. Professor Yankelovitch's thesis is that psychoanalysis has not yet found a way to incorporate reality into its theoretical structure. This seems to me to be eminently correct. He says that Hartmann's extensions of Freud's theories fall short of the mark; this seems to me to be correct. I, too, see promise in Erikson's approach, but it has not yet been fully exploited.

What about Winnicott? Here we have a gifted clinician whose case reports are infused with a warm humanity, infinite patience, and an exquisite sensitivity for human suffering. And yet, paradoxically, Winnicott seems to me to operate from a theoretical base which only compounds precisely those philosophical difficulties in Freudian theory against which Professor Yankelovitch inveighs in his recent book *Ego and Instinct*. Winnicott's concept of aggression seems to me to be the extreme in the reification of abstractions. Aggression, in Winnicott's writings, emerges as a paradigm of psychic forces, endowed with hypothetical quantity, directionality, and specificity of expression—those very attributes of metapsychological energies to which Holt and other friendly critics have taken strong exception.

What meaning can we assign to the concept that reality for the infant is compounded out of objects that he seeks to destroy but cannot? What infantile behavior is the referrent of this concept? And what does the word destroy mean in this context? Does it refer to what happens to a fragile and inappropriate toy given by a doting grandparent, or to the china that is smashed when the infant tugs at a tablecloth? These infantile behaviors seem to me to be better chararacterized as curiosity, exploration, and attempts at mastery. Winnicott attaches great significance to the occasional biting of the mother's nipple as evidence of aggression. Is this not sheer "adultomorphism," if I may be permitted to coin a word?

I believe psychoanalysis must move not deeper into the nether realms of metapsychology, but rather must take into account the ways in which the infant begins to comprehend reality by interacting with it. Sullivan was closer, I believe, with his three-level model of modes of integration. Piaget points out one direction in his careful studies of the child's understanding of various aspects of reality and the evolution of the capacity to form abstractions from experience.

Power is the ability to produce effects, to control and direct the course of events in the external world. The capacity to do so is established through curiosity, play, exploration, and testing. If the role of reality and the role of power in personality are to be incorporated into psychoanalytic theory and practice, these are the aspects of the problem which will have to be studied.

part 3

POWER IN SEX AND MARRIAGE

Power in the Family: A Preface

HAROLD I. LIEF, M.D.

At the present time, the word power is much in vogue, e.g., black power, gay power, student power, womanpower. Political power has always been the subject of much discussion; long before Machiavelli, mankind had an intense interest in the subject. At first, power was placed in the hands of the gods; man was dependent on supernatural means of power as he extended his own power over nature. Gradually, man depended less on deities and more on his own resources, and an intense debate lasting centuries (still pertinent today) took place over whether power should be placed in the hands of the common man, as Euripides argued, or, after early attempts at democracy had broken down, should reside in the philosopher-kings, as Plato demanded. H. Muller states the connection between power and freedom:

> Eventually man would realize the dangers of power, make it an ugly word; yet the race would always cherish it, clinging to every gain in it, for plain enough reasons. In view of its evil reputation we must first emphasize the obvious, that without power there can be no freedom and that there is no good in impotence per se.[1]

116

Unlike political power, concern with power in the family and in marriage is of relatively recent origin. Perhaps the traditional roles assigned family members and the customary, unopposed (at least in theory, if not in practice) power of the father-husband made such concern unnecessary until the egalitarian struggle of women in the last 100 years. (Note, however, that Euripides long ago in *The Trojan Women* upheld the cause of women as well as protesting the barbarities of war.)

Interest in the issue of power in the family has come largely from behavioral scientists, and to a much lesser degree from marital and family therapists, and hardly at all from psychoanalysts. With the exception of Adler, for whom power became a central theme, it has been almost totally neglected in psychoanalytic publications. Striking confirmation of the disparity between the psychoanalyst's and the behavioral scientist's concern with the issue is the absence of references to power in Freud's writings compared with the 88 page references to techniques of measuring power in *Family Measurement Techniques*.[2] In a recent article reviewing the research related to family power in the decade of the 60's,[3] of 65 references cited, none was to a psychoanalytic journal or book, and only two were to a psychiatric journal.

Neglect by non-Adlerian psychoanalysts may be due to a deliberate avoidance because Adler made so much of the issue of power, or to un-worked-through conflicts regarding power in Freud himself (Jones, in the single reference to power in his three-volume biography of Freud, quotes Bernfeld, who wrote that at the age of 12, Freud fantasied that he would become a cabinet minister but that at the age of 17 he decided to switch from his desire to wield power over men to a search for power over nature by becoming a scientist; his relations with his colleagues and students give credence to the belief that perhaps he never altogether gave up his earlier power drive), or to the very nature of psychoanalytic therapy itself with its emphasis on the one-to-one relationship in which power is essentially a matter of transference and countertransference but hardly ever is discussed in terms of power. Even within the context of the transference relationship, it is only in the last two decades that Clara Thompson,[4] Thomas Szasz,[5] and Judd Marmor[6] in particular have called attention to this issue and its reflections in psychoanalytic training. Power is an interpersonal phenomenon and, aside from transference and countertransference, is easily neglected in studying intrapsychic function. Yet, certainly, there are abundant references to real power situations in psychoanalytic literature, such as the oedipal conflict or the battle between child and parent over feeding or toilet training or setting limits for an

adolescent. The power is real enough even though it is usually not named and labeled as such in psychoanalytic literature. It is only when he starts to treat the marital unit or the family that the therapist has to deal directly with the issue of power, even though it may be difficult to capture conceptually.

How does the dictionary define power? *Webster's Third New International* gives six primary definitions: (1) control or domination over others; (2) the capability of producing an effect; (3) influence through prestige; (4) delegated right or privilege; (5) influence through authority; (6) strength or resources. As one reads the papers that follow, one will see how many of these items come up repeatedly in the course of discussion.

While driving home one day, I heard a commercial promoting an automobile. A wife was nagging her husband to buy a particular car and, of course, expanding on the special virtues of the automobile, while he was responding that they didn't have enough money, that they didn't need it now, and so on. She kept on nagging until he finally said, "Ok, let's buy it," whereupon she leaned out the window and yelled to her friend and neighbor, "Hey, Marge, Joe just talked me into buying a new car." What are the real power relations in this situation? Who has the real power and what are the differences between public and private power? Is it the person who makes the decision or the one who manipulates the decision maker?

What are some of the appropriate questions that concern us in this workshop? There will be constant reference to the definition of power. Is the notion of power so abstract, so multidimensional, and so complicated that it has little operational utility in therapy? If it does have utility, in what ways does it? What are the relations between research in family power and its implications for marital and family therapy? How does the concept of power in the treatment of the individual patient differ from its use in marital and family therapy? How are the theoretical aspects of power related to theories of aggression? What are the connections between power and normal self-assertion? How does apparent power compare with real power? For example, what sort of power is exerted by the "victim" over the alleged aggressor, or the passive submissive person over the dominant partner? How does one discover and perhaps even measure real power? How is power used in different ways by different types of marital pairs or families? Does the use of power differentiate the family with the schizophrenic family member from others? What are the relations, really, between power and personality development? Is it possible to trace the genetic

development of power, as Kohlberg[7] has been doing for the stages of moral development?

The symposium that follows deals with these questions from various theoretical, research, and clinical viewpoints.

References

1. Muller, H. S.: Freedom in the Ancient World. New York, Harper & Bros., 1961, p. 4.
2. Straus, M. A.: Family Measurement Techniques. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1969.
3. Safilios-Rothschild, C.: The study of family power structure: a review 1960–1969, J. Marr. Fam. 32:539–552, Nov. 1970.
4. Thompson, C.: A study of the emotional climate of psychoanalytic institutes. Psychiatry 21:45, 1958.
5. Szasz, T.: Three problems in contemporary psychoanalytic training. Arch. Gen. Psychiat. (Chicago) 3:82, 1960.
6. Marmor, J.: The feeling of superiority: an occupational hazard in the practice of psychotherapy. Amer. J. Psychiat. 110: 370–376, Nov. 1953.
7. Kohlberg, L.: The developmental approach to moralization. In press.

Sex and Power

IRVING BIEBER, M.D.

It is no doubt redundant to define power at this point of the symposium, yet the concept is so multifaceted that at the risk of repetition, I shall state my version of the meaning of power as it is used in this chapter. I refer to power as the capability to influence, direct, or control matters of value in another's life. If this capability extends to matters of life and death, then the power is supreme. The wielder of power and the target may be an individual, group, institution, or government.

Human sexuality is particularly vulnerable to inhibition under the weight of power. The power of government and of organized religion more often than not has been antisexual. Certainly, in Western society, sexuality has long been interfered with through parents, teachers, and others who reflect and interpret the prevailing mores. Sexual curiosity and exploration, masturbation and heterosexual behavior in childhood, are still interdicted subtly or overtly by most parents. As psychiatrists we daily observe its consequences among our adult patients.

The fears induced by power figures or power situations that disturb and inhibit sexuality in adults can, for heuristic purposes, be divided into two categories: the prohibitive and the competitive. Subsumed under

the prohibitive category are those fears that derive from indoctrination by power figures; i.e., sex is wrong, dirty, sinful, unacceptable, and so forth. Sexuality then comes to be sensed as aggressive and antagonizing to the powers that be.

> An author I know told me a story that illustrates the equation between power and sexual inhibition. He was an enlisted man in World War II, and when inducted, he was quartered in a barracks with about 20 other men. The group soon began to confide to each other that customary morning erections had disappeared. It also became apparent that every man was affected and a real paranoid wave spread through the group. The men became convinced that saltpeter was being mixed with their food—the army's way of stopping their sexual desire. They ignored the fact that the army provided prophylactics upon request to all personnel. The group decided they would take action against this outrage. The next morning, one man awakened with an erection. Shouting, "Hey, look, fellers," he stood on a chair to demonstrate it. The following morning all the men returned to normal. This vignette highlights the dynamics of a situation in which men entered the sphere of an authority that had the power of life and death over them and they responded with sexual inhibition.

The competitive system is more anfractuous than the prohibitive. It is subject to more nuances and to broader themes of family interaction as seen, for example, in children whose cross-sex parent prefers them to the spouse or whose same-sex parent is competitive with them. As adults such persons tend to be particularly vulnerable to fears about achieving desirable heterosexual aims and objects because they fear attack by competitors. Sexual fears linked to the competitive category have their taproot in the Oedipus complex as noted in the commonly observed fear that a sexual competitor will be the preferred one who has the power to exclude and replace the self. But the even more intense fear is that a competitor will desire the same love object and will act out a predatory raid, or some other destructive expression of jealousy, hostility, or even murder. The greater the fear of a competitor's power or perceived power, the greater the probability for sexual inhibition.

> The following dream, even in its manifest content, graphically demonstrates the effect of masculine power on a patient's sexual functioning: The scene opens with the patient flying in a balloon. He is standing in its basket and attached to the rail of the basket and extending upward is a rope. It is erect like a flagpole and it is defying gravity as in the Indian magic rope trick. In the distance is Onassis' yacht. The balloon drifts toward the yacht and flies over it. The rope begins to wilt and then completely loses its erectness.

Men who are afraid of the power of authority sometimes displace it to fear of physical power; conversely, others who have a need to protect themselves against feared power develop great physical strength and agility, as sometimes seen in weight lifters, body builders, and so forth. In sexual activities, some men become inhibited by a partner they think may be able to overpower them physically. Some men are made anxious by a woman who is physically strong or shows superior athletic ability. These men tend to be uneasy with and hostile to physically strong women and are sexually inhibited with them. Women generally adapt to the superior physical strength of men and are not sexually inhibited by it; however, there are women who cannot make this adaptation and require a mate who they believe is not physically capable of overpowering them.

Power, sexual psychopathology, and adaptation

Psychoanalytic theory has dealt with the interrelationship of sex and power without explicitly defining the relationship in power terms. In Freudian metapsychology, power is located in the supergo. The supergo contains the introjects of all significant power figures of the past. The superego is formed as a reaction to the original and lasting power; in the male, the oedipal father; in the female, the mother. The ego deals with contemporary power figures and power problems. Sexual impulses must clear with the ego and superego before finding expression in action. If sexual impulses come into conflict with either of these power agencies, they cannot then find direct expression but must be handled in a variety of converted and defensive ways.

The superego can be viewed as a power system, but since it encompasses much more, such as conscience, morality, superego ideal, guilt, and other such variables, it does not come through clearly as a power system. Moreover, as such it is incomplete without including ego function. I propose to delineate a separate and distinct power dynamic in interpersonal transactions and shall discuss the interpenetration of power dynamics with the sexual system. The differentiation of the power from the sexual system helps to illuminate clearly the psychodynamics of psychopathology, sexual and other.

Sexual psychopathology is initially established and then maintained by fears of power. Homosexuality is one example. Inversion is, first and foremost, a submissive adaptation to feared power, starting in males with fear of the father and/or other family members and then generalizing to others. Once the basic, sexual concession to a feared power has been

made through the homosexual adaptation itself, power themes need not *necessarily* be acted out within a homosexual interpersonal relationship or in a homosexual act, though more often than not there is in either situation an acting out of a power play. One partner is usually dominant, the other submissive. In a homosexual act such as anal intercourse, the two systems, sexuality and power, may function concurrently. On the sexual line, the inserter enacts a masculine role, the insertee a feminine one, with both partners participating in a heterosexual charade. On the power line, the inserter is dominant, the insertee submissive. In homosexual acts that have the symbolic meaning of dominance-submission, the participants are able to function sexually because the defenses are incorporated into the sexual act itself, thus circumventing sexual fears associated with power. A dominant partner's defense is mediated through the sense of power he derives from acting out the need to control another man through homosexual contact; he has identified himself with a feared aggressor. A submissive partner may mediate his defense against power by enacting the placation of an aggressor. Ethnologists such as Tinbergen and others have demonstrated that submission, as signalized by species-specific behavior, terminates attack or threat of attack. In man, submission is not an infallible way of extinguishing attack though it is successful often enough to promote it as one way of neutralizing another's aggression.

Power dynamics may also be delineated in heterosexual activity, although the power variable in heterosexual acts is more peripheral and less common than that in homosexual ones. Krafft-Ebing, and later Freud, conceptualized domination and aggression as a normal component of masculine sexuality and submission as a normal component of feminine sexuality. Both viewed the integration of sex and power as grounded in biology, though Krafft-Ebing recognized a socially derived experiential component in the submission of women which he thought articulated with and reinforced the biological roots. Even before the 1930's some psychoanalysts, notably Adler, Horney, and Thompson, took issue with the equation of masculinity with agression and feminity with passivity. A wide diversity of opinion on this issue continues. The traditional Freudians still support the notion of a biological integration of sex and power, whereas the neo-Freudians, adaptationalists, and culturalists view the sexual and power systems as separate and distinct. In my own view, the integration of sex and power is not a normal biological synthesis; sex and power become integrated only under conditions of psychopathology or social disorder. An example of this would be a woman's submitting to rape by a soldier of a conquering army as a way of preserving her life.

Domination or submission is an adaptation to power; each is a defense against abuse of power. Power may be perceived where it does not exist, as in a transference situation, or its abuse may be perceived where there is no abuse. When power is misperceived, the defenses reflect distortions of reality and become part of psychopathologic behavior. Where I have observed an integration of sexual and power behavior in humans, the fear was generally the derivative of a neurotic and sometimes a psychotic constellation. However, in infrahumans, notably primates, a male being threatened by a more aggressive male may assume a feminine, receptive posture; dominant males often mount less aggressive ones. The distinguished primatologist Harry Harlow interprets this as dominance or power behavior, not as a sexual act. In these maneuvers, sexuality is in the service of security operations. The arousal of sexual excitation in an aggressor usually extinguishes an aggressive threat. Simulating the appearance and sexual behavior of one who customarily arouses sexual excitation in an aggressor is a defensive way of promoting the extinction of threatening behavior in an aggressor.

Defensive measures against aggression are also extensively employed in human affairs. When women use their sexuality as a way of coping with masculine power or aggression, it is thought of as feminine wiles. But men may also become seductive with socially or politically powerful women. The women may have power in their own right or through influence with powerful men. Some men are given to turning on charm with private secretaries, in recognition of the influence these women have with the head man. When a man is seductive under such circumstances, the apparent opportunism is basically submissive and placatory yet it can be concealed under the facade of being a ladies' man, and it preserves a sense of masculine self-esteem in coping with power. Similarly, flirtatious, seductive behavior in a woman may be ego syntonic and interpreted as evidence of femininity but often it is merely concealing fear and submissiveness. The use of sexuality to reduce or avert an anticipated threat is also observed among homosexuals; they attempt to arouse and seduce other homosexuals, and sometimes heterosexuals who are perceived, consciously or not, as threatening. If a homosexual succeeds in arousing a threatening male, or believes he has, or if he has sex with the threatener, the homosexual feels elated and has a sense of power and conquest. Sexual interest usually vanishes after the conquest has been made. A characteristic of one type of male homosexual is compulsive sexual activity and promiscuity. This drive is largely determined by a need to neutralize the power of men felt as dangerous.

I observed a dramatic example during World War II. As a psychiatrist in a general hospital overseas, I received an urgent request one morning to separate from the service through section 8 (discharge without honor) a sergeant who had had a series of homosexual experiences with officers whom he had accused of having abused the power of their rank to seduce him. In each case the officer was dishonorably discharged and the sergeant given another assignment. The first officer he was involved with was a second lieutenant. The sergeant then worked his way up from rank to rank until he involved a colonel. When the Judge Advocate General's office in Washington looked into the data on this case, they caught onto the pattern and requested the sergeant's discharge. When I interviewed him I found him to be an intelligent, pleasant, mild-mannered, though not effeminate young man. During the course of the interview, he came to admit that he had actively participated in the homosexual encounters that resulted in the discharge of several officers. I decided to have a few therapeutic sessions with him knowing that I could hospitalize him if he decompensated under the acute anxiety reactions he might have to the material I planned to confront him with. I chanced it and exposed the psychodynamics of his behavior in the course of only a few sessions. He was very bright and could not resist the temptation of insight and logic. He accepted my interpretations, which indeed provoked extreme anxiety. But after about a week he returned to duty and quickly settled down and performed his work well. I decided not to recommend discharge and he was allowed to remain at his post. About 4 years after the war ended, he sent me a letter telling me that he had never again engaged in homosexual activity.

Eroticizing power

As already discussed, one may cope with power by resorting to sexual maneuvers. In such instances, there is usually at least some awareness that the sexual come-on is activated by motives other than erotic ones. In some individuals, however, there may be a response to power by having a true erotic arousal and perceiving the power figure only as one of sexual interest. In investigating arousal stimuli in homosexuals, I found that often a threatening aspect of power is extrapolated and then eroticized. Certain physical characteristics are commonly associated with masculinity and power and become arousal cues, such as height, musculature, large penis, and hirsutism.

Illustrating the eroticizing of feared power is the following dream of a 25-year-old homosexual: He was in bed with a pretty young woman when out from under the bed came a massive, hairy arm, clutching a knife and moving toward him to strike him. As sexual objects, hairy men were especially attractive to him. Through-

out my clinical experience, I have found that the most intensely frightening threat to adult male homosexuals is the fear of being attacked by a powerful competitor should there be a move toward achieving sexual gratification with a desirable woman. The patient's dream had a heterosexual theme and in it he was being murderously attacked by a powerful, feared, hairy-armed male. Yet hair, which was a symbol to him of masculine sexual attractiveness, was an intrinsic part of the attacking arm. Where sexual behavior is associated with attack, having sex with a power figure can accomplish the fulfilment of sexual gratification through the homosexual route and at the same time neutralize an anticipated attack from a male aggressor by giving him pleasure.

Eroticizing power is not, of course, restricted to homosexuality. A few years ago Gore Vidal wrote a novel entitled *Washington, D.C.* In one scene a beautiful young woman meets President Truman at a Democratic convention. Her fiancé is startled when she gazes after Harry Truman with whom she has just shaken hands and exclaims, "He looks so—sexy." "Sexy?" her fiancé said in astonishment. "Good God, you *are* crazy. That's the President." "And that's what I meant," she said evenly. Her fiancé laughed and thought, "Not many girls were so honest."

I do not know of any systematic studies that have probed women's sexual responses to symbols of power such as physical size, strength, wealth, position, prestige, and so forth—or how much of a part power plays in love object choice. I have found that individuals who respond erotically to power, both men and women, have undue fears of power or are pathologically dependent and integrate the sought-after power into their security operations. In American society, where marriage for love is an accepted ideal, choice of mate for power as a salient factor is regarded as opportunistic and a poor reflection on one's moral fiber. I want to make it clear, however, that it is normal for a woman to choose an effective man and such a man may well be successful and possess power. It is another matter if she seeks him as a way of using masculine power in pursuit of her own neurotic needs. Some men identify ineffectiveness with femininity and, in pursuit of a sexual ideal, avoid effective women. Such men sometimes try to eat their cake and have it by marrying rich, ineffective women.

Masochism and sadism

Krafft-Ebing was the first psychiatrist to direct his attention to the integration of sex and power. In attempting to explain masochism, a syndrome he initially described and named, he said, "An attempt at explanation must first seek to distinguish . . . the essential from the unessential. The

distinguishing characteristic in masochism is certainly the unlimited subjection of the will to a person of the opposite sex with the awakening and accompaniment of lustful sexual feeling to the degree of orgasm. From the foregoing it is clear that the particular manner in which this relation of subjection or domination is expressed, whether merely in symbolic acts, or whether there is also a desire to suffer pain at the hands of a person of the opposite sex, is a subordinate matter." Thus, from the beginning, Krafft-Ebing assigned primacy to the power parameter in masochism. He concerned himself with the association of pain with sexual excitation but he accorded pain dynamics a secondary role. Freud, on the other hand, assigned primacy to the pain itself and ultimately attempted to integrate what he termed a lust for pain into his instinctual theory. As a result, Freud moved further away from an understanding of masochism until ultimately his formulations bore little relationship to observable phenomena. Of the two alternative explanatory hypotheses for masochism, power or lust for pain, Freud and many of his followers chose the latter. Wilhelm Reich was the first psychiatrist to question the validity of the pain hypothesis. He introduced the concept of masochism as a defense against injury by the powerful father for a boy's incestuous feelings. Reich thought that a child may invite a spanking from his father as a lesser injury when it is castration that the child really fears. Without explicitly mentioning power, Reich enunciated the principle that masochism is a defense against the threat of feared injury by a powerful figure in which a lesser injury is invited or accepted. His concepts about masochism articulated an expectation of injury with sexual wishes. Horney also formulated masochism as a defense and she expanded the basis for expected injury to nonsexual areas.

When I wrote my first paper on the meaning of masochism in 1953, I had not searched the literature sufficiently and was unfamiliar with Reich's contribution. I had, however, come to similar conclusions to the effect that masochism was a special defense against a perception of threat by a power figure in which the individual inflicted self-injury or invited or accepted it to prevent a greater injury for participating in or intending to participate in an act sensed as antagonizing that power figure. I do not restrict masochistic acts or impulses to the sexual area though I view sexual masochism as a special situation. Masochism is a particularly human adaptation, and in masochistic characters, this adaptation initially is an attempt to extinguish or cope with feared aggression experienced in a pathologic family setting. Later, it becomes an entrenched, defensive, behavioral set.

I recently saw a television play which serves as an example of masochism as a technique of avoiding aggression. The play was set in a Nazi concentration camp. The hero refused to humiliate himself and was mercilessly beaten. Another inmate complied by calling himself a Jewish pig and crawling about like one. This behavior evoked laughter in the Nazi guards and extinguished their aggression. The victim was not beaten. A technique of the blacks, particularly in the South, was to resort to elaborate, self-minimizing behavior to evoke humor in the whites, thus preventing their aggression. Stepin Fetchit is the prototype of this kind of masochistic figure whose adaptation is life preserving.

Masochism and submission have in common an adaptation to cope with feared power; however, masochism differs from submission in that it is calculated to inflict damage to self as part of a mechanism to extinguish aggression and to survive. Submission does not involve intended self-injury.

Sexual masochism is a kind of packaged defense for those who fear injury by power figures should sexual gratification be achieved. The sexual masochist creates an illusion that his sexual partner is the feared power. In such a structured situation he tolerates circumscribed pain and injury knowing, however, that the pain can be controlled or terminated at any time he chooses. Sexual excitation and orgasm are achieved through a masochistic route by individuals who would otherwise be nonresponsive or impotent.

Sadism has been traditionally regarded as the opposite or counterpart of masochism. Sadists achieve an illusion of power through inflicting pain, suffering, and injury on others. Originally sadism was described as a sexual perversion in which sexual excitation and orgasm were associated with hurting others. In common with the masochist, the sexual sadist also fears injury for having erotic gratification; defensively, he achieves it through the sadistic act. Central to the understanding of sadism is its basic relationship to a defensive need for a feeling of power. The sadist either identifies with a feared power figure (identification with the aggressor) or he overpowers his partner who may symbolize a threatening power figure and is now subdued. As in masochism, sadism has been conceptually extended to nonsexual areas. It has come to include any destructive acts against others that are motivated or accompanied by gratification.

To conclude: I have discussed power dynamics as they articulate with sexual development, functioning, and psychopathology. I should like to note that the more democratic a society, the less likely it is that sex and power will be bedfellows. In authoritarian societies, power and sex become so interlaced as to appear as a unity; in fact, theoreticians of

the past, working in a Victorian atmosphere, did interpret sex and power as a biological entity. On the current scene, youth is challenging power on many fronts. Clearly, they are challenging the right of the sexual establishment to dictate sexual standards of behavior, and more and more, our young people are separating sexuality from power. Those of us who have conceptualized sex and power as separate systems are supported by the social developments of our time.

References

1. Bieber, I.: The meaning of masochism. Amer. J. Psychother. 5:714–722, 1951.
2. Bieber, I., et al.: Homosexuality, a Psychoanalytic Study of Male Homosexuals. New York, Basic Books, 1962.
3. Bieber, I.: Sadism and masochism. In: Arieti, S. (Ed.): Handbook of Psychiatry, Vol. 3. New York, Basic Books, 1966, pp. 256–272.
4. Bieber, I.: Homosexuality. In: Freedman, A. M., and Kaplan, H. I. (Eds.): Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry. Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1967, pp. 963–976.
5. Freud, S.: Some character types within psychoanalytic work: those wrecked by success. In: Strachey, J. (Ed.): Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Vol. 14. London, Hogarth Press, pp. 316–331.
6. Krafft-Ebing, R. v.: Psychopathia Sexualis. Brooklyn, N. Y., Physicians and Surgeons, 1921.
7. Reich, W.: Character Analysis. New York, Orgone Institute, 1949.

Discussion by Harry Gershman, M.D.

Dr. Bieber's scholarly chapter is clear and logical and includes many astute clinical observations. To reiterate my points of agreement would only duplicate the paper; I shall, instead, focus on areas of disagreement.

Dr. Bieber's definition of power does not include the direction of the utilization of power for constructive or destructive purposes. This to me is a crucial distinction and delineates power in the service of health and growth versus power for purposes of defensive or neurotic needs. I wondered also why he did not define sex, which is the other component of the paper. Here too, a crucial distinction should have been made between sex in the service of health and growth and sex in the service of the infinite variety of neurotic needs stemming from inner conflicts and anxiety.

Dr. Bieber skillfully dissects and studies man's sex and power drives. However, I believe he dilutes if not destroys the concept of the whole human being coping with his own inner and outer reality. We lose track of that and find ourselves pursuing the course of independent impulses or drives, rather than the whole human being involved in his sexual or power plays.

It is in the nature of man to possess a sexual appetite for procreation and

pleasure, in a meaningful relation with a person of the opposite sex, and to have feelings of security and confidence in relation to his peers and elders. But both of these potentialities will come into being only in a healthy and growth-stimulating environment. If a person's early experiences generated much basic anxiety, we know that he will resort to neurotic defenses to survive. He may become unduly arrogant and vindictive and be on his way to a sadistic orientation to life or passively to a self-effacing and ultimately masochistic orientation. Similarly his sexual appetite may become distorted through excessiveness, diminution, displacement, or perversion. As clinicians, we know that sex can be used to relieve tension, to gain status or vanity, for reassurance, to express love, gain control, obtain a sense of power, and so on. Sex can be used in the service of power just as power can be used in the service of sex. Both sex and power can be used in the service of coping with either overt or covert anxiety. Dr. Bieber and I seem to disagree as to the source of this anxiety. I feel Dr. Bieber is unduly impressed by the ubiquitous oedipal complex with its threat of castration as the precursor of nearly all anxieties. I would prefer to place that source on the self—its attempt to cope with its world within and without.

Dr. Bieber describes the use of power as a sexual inhibition either through prohibition or competition; power can do that. However, his illustrative material is rather unconvincing. I am referring to his description of the men in the army who lost their erection because they were in the services of an organization that had supreme power of life and death over them. I am dubious of Dr. Bieber's interpretation because he is correlating the phenomenon with only one variable of the events as they occurred. That the same anxiety can intensify the sexual needs of the soldiers is a common clinical observation.

Similarly Dr. Bieber's description of the man on a flying balloon with a withering flagpole symbolizing the loss of erection in the face of Onassis' yacht strikes me as a very narrow interpretation in which Dr. Bieber discloses his profound conviction of oedipal psychodynamics. With a little imagination each and every one of us could conjecture different interpretations of the same dream.

For instance, I can think of the dreamer's curiosity about the sexual life of Onassis, a relatively elderly man with a rather young wife, or that the dream refers to the dreamer's loss of contact with reality (up in the air), or the dreamer's compensation for his impotence (not necessarily sexual), or the dreamer's detachment from his own assets and emotional health, and so on, rather than fear of castration at the hands of the financially all powerful.

The point is that utilizing the personal interpretation of dreams to corroborate one's own preferred theory is at best a dubious method. Nevertheless, I concur that power in malevolent hands by one person can inhibit the sexual striving of another individual under varying circumstances.

Dr. Bieber feels that in the realm of homosexuality the destructive influence of power on sexual strivings is most clearly delineated. His conviction that homosexuality is primarily the consequence of submissive sexual adaptation to fear engendered by the castrating male (father, brother, and so on) is well known.

However, there are other explanations preferred by other men in the field. I believe that homosexuality is primarily a reparative process whereby the homosexual seeks to ingrate masculinity in the form of another male to bolster his own image of defective maleness. The homosexual's fear of women is a consequence of his fear of being impotent sexually with them, rather than of the fear of the murderous castrating father.

In another portion of the paper, Dr. Bieber buttresses this position on homosexuality by discussing a dream of a 25-year-old homosexual who found hairy men attractive. He dreamed that he was in bed with a pretty young woman, when from under the bed there emerged a hairy arm clutching a knife and moving toward him to strike him down. This would seem to corroborate Dr. Bieber's thesis that homosexuality is the result of the fear of the castrating father—because of the desire for heterosexuality.

Again, it is questionable to defend one's own theories by personal interpretation of dreams, even when buttressed by some of the patient's associations. I had the almost identical situation in a young man who traced his homosexuality to the fact that he, as a child, was very hairy. Because of extensive hirsutism he was rendered so conspicuous that he feared going to the beaches and any other place of exposure, where he might be subjected to the ridicule of others as a repulsive hairy animal. So hair meant to him, not virility and desirability, but ugliness and unattractiveness and the reason for his rejection by women. Now he too had a dream in which he was in bed with a young woman. From a distant corner, a man with a hairy arm bearing a club was moving toward him to strike him down. The interpretation of this dream, according to my understanding, was quite different. His fear of intimacy with this young woman was not fear of castration, but fear of his own ugliness, inadequacy, frustrated rage, self-contempt. The interpretation of symbols is a very personal matter that derives from the dreamer's life experiences. Universal meaning of the same symbol cannot be applied, unless one abides by some of the Freudian techniques now abandoned by many of us.

Nevertheless, I am in complete agreement with Dr. Bieber that in the disturbed sexuality often observed in homosexuality, the healthy elements of pleasure, care, and love of the sex act are frequently replaced by overt or covert virulent competitive power struggles between the participants and often associated with masochistic and sadistic components.

Dr. Bieber's understanding of masochism and sadism as a pattern of appeasing the aggressor is likewise questionable. Though I believe sadism and masochism are aspects of a global character structure, I shall focus on their sexual aspects. In nearly all of the sexual masochists and sadists I have worked with, I have observed a capacity to adopt either role. Often one enacting the sadistic role can change to the masochistic one before the sexual experience is concluded. It would seem that the acting out of the inner fantasy is in a state of flux and can readily shift from one to the other with equal satisfaction.

This would suggest that these phenomena can be understood only when we

view them holistically, keeping in mind the interplay of the multiple dynamic variable. Thus neurotic guilt and the need for punishment, emotional deadness and the need for violent stimulation, deep mistrust and the need for ultimate reassurance, hopelessness and the need for eventual restoration of faith, helplessness and the need for control and domination, self-contempt and the need to restore injured pride, profound dependency and the need for total surrender to another person, fragmentation and the need to unify oneself around another person or emotion, self-effacement and the longing for complete surrender to death, neurotic suffering as a means of controlling others, are but a few of the elements that go into the creation of sadism and masochism.

In the sadomasochistic relationship, one of the most impressive dynamisms is the matter of testing mutual feelings. The sadist tests the sincerity and depth of the masochist by seeing if he will submit to viscious onslaughts. If, after an awful beating, the victim is still open to and willing to receive the sadist's overtures of affection and sex, then the sadist feels reassured and can lower his own walls of mistrust and hatred—and thereby fulfill the masochist's desires. Similarly the masochist is willing to pay the price of the severe punishment if after that the sadist is still willing to show him affection through sexuality. These are some of the reasons why I feel that Dr. Bieber's emphasis on the masochistic maneuver as an attempt to surrender in order to neutralize the aggressor's onslaught is incomplete.

Masochism and sadism to my mind are the end stations of a long road that a human being has traversed, suffering as he does from extensive alienation, hopelessness and resignation, emotional deadness, fundamental suspicion of people, and deep mistrust of human life. Eventually a state of despair culminates in an invitation to suffering and pain either in or out of the context of sexuality. At such times he is identified with his hated self. Thus upon that self all the indignities and contempt that are humanly possible can be thrust. By the same token, sadism is the externalized expression of the most strident, arrogant, and vindictive retaliation. The individual in such a state is identifying with his proud self, as so aptly described by Karen Horney. What he perpetrates on his victim is what he feels about himself.

In a sense, Dr. Bieber is right in emphasizing that masochism is a method of pleading guilty to the lesser crime, for the greater crime that such a person in the throes of inner conflict would have to carry out would be suicide. To avoid suicide the masochistic and sadistic strategies are evoked.

Dr. Bieber, I feel certain, though he does not so state, also believes in the psychodynamics I have referred to, but probably regards them as secondary. We differ crucially in that regard, for I feel that they are primary and not secondary considerations.

Concluding Discussion by Irving Bieber, M.D.

Dr. Gershman faults me for excluding the direction of the use of power whether for "constructive or destructive purposes," and for excluding a definition of

sex. First, my definition of power applies to the use *or* abuse of power—"the capability to influence, direct, or control matters of value in another's life." Second, the topic of our meetings is "Power and Personality." It was more or less expected that each author would define the major theme, power, as he conceives it. A definition of sex would, I think, be a digression but if it would help clarify my paper, I should be happy to oblige. Briefly, I understand sex to be what most other mortals think it to be. Psychoanalytically, I do not accept Freud's expanded concept of sex as enunciated in the three essays on the theory of sex and I do not consider preoedipal orality to be sexual. Dr. Gershman has explained to us what he thinks sex can be used for, other than fun, but he has not defined sex.

Dr. Gershman states that though I have skillfully dissected sex and power drives, I nevertheless forgot about the whole person. An acquaintance with the principles of systematics might clarify this. A cardiologist, for example, studies the cardiovascular system within a larger system quite familiar to him. Knowledge of specific systems increases our knowledge of total integration. Attention to psychological systems is hardly reductionism, as, in fact, an emphasis on holism per se frequently is.

Dr. Gershman has touched on some of his own concepts about sexuality that seem to me to be unclear and, in general, unrelated to my paper except for his criticism of my views on the Oedipus complex. Indeed, I regard one of Freud's major clinical contributions to be his discovery of the sexual theme in the family drama. But to interpret my views as ascribing nearly *all* anxiety to the Oedipus complex and to the fear of castration suggests to me that either Dr. Gershman has misconstrued my work or he is unacquainted with my papers on psychopathology.

As to the dreams that came under discussion. I have been criticized for making "a very narrow interpretation." My patient's associations during his session were not known to Dr. Gershman and so he proceeded with a series of his own associations, such as, Onassis is an older man with a young wife, and then mislabels this as an interpretation. I fear that Dr. Gershman is not following a primary rule in dream interpretation, and that is not to confuse the analyst's associations with interpretations. If he does this, he is only reflecting his own psychology. I have also been accused of "using the personal interpretation of dreams to corroborate (my) preferred theory." Actually, dream data, if used scientifically, are perfectly respectable materials for building and supporting hypotheses relative to a patient's motivations and behavior.

In criticizing my concepts about the genesis of homosexuality, Dr. Gershman states that my "conviction that homosexuality is primarily the consequence of a submissive sexual adaptation to fear engendered by the castrating male (father, brother, and so on) is well known." As presented, this statement is misleading. A correct presentation is that in the adult, salient psychodynamics involve fear of attack by other males for heterosexual fulfillment. This dynamic is the consequence of a range of psychogenetic processes including core features of the

mother-son relationship, the father-son relationship, interpersonal transactions with siblings, peer group, and so forth. Dr. Gershman seems to confuse simplicity with the naïveté of the simplistic.

Dr. Gershman chooses to "explain" homosexuality as primarily a reparative process whereby masculinity is sought by tapping another man's maleness. Restorative mechanisms within the homosexual adaptation are many, but all researchers in homosexuality are well aware of the reparative aspects. As a theoretical explication, however, it is exceedingly restricted and therefore of but limited value. I assume Dr. Gershman has data to back up his notion that a homosexual's fear of women is a consequence of his fear of being sexually impotent with them. If a man is impotent in a heterosexual situation, what is the basis of the fears causing his impotence? One cannot logically argue that a man is impotent because he fears women and he is afraid of women because he is impotent with them. Clearly, this is circular reasoning.

In discussing "the hairy dream" Dr. Gershman states that he had an identical situation. Yet my patient found hair sexually attractive and arousing whereas Dr. Gershman's patient reacted to hair as ugly and sexually repulsive. What the two dreams have in common is the image of an attacking, hairy male, but the context in which the attack occurs is distinctly different. Dr. Gershman then cautions against the use of universal symbolism, yet since his patient reacted to hair as to something ugly, Dr. Gershman proposes the same meaning for my patient, thus allowing himself the use of universal symbolism.

Dr. Gershman has offered an elaborate discussion of his concepts of sadism and masochism that was interesting, but, again, not relevant to my paper, which was not one on sadism and masochism. I have written on this subject in *The Handbook of Psychiatry*, edited by Dr. Silvano Arieti. I find in Dr. Gershman's discussion a repetitive complaint about my reductionism of complex phenomena but nowhere did he delineate the relationship of power to sadism and masochism as he conceives of it.

Finally, I have no objection to sharp and incisive criticism; when relevant, I welcome it. I have myself exercised the prerogative to criticize when I have been a discusser of the work of others. In this role, I invariably learn something while at the same time attempting to contribute to the thinking of the author. I have for many years made it a practice to send my written discussion to an author well in advance of a meeting in order to give him an opportunity to study my critique for any clarity or help it might offer. It is essential for us not to confuse a scientific forum with a debating society.

Sexual Politics: A Comment

MARIANNE H. ECKARDT, M.D.

Kate Millett's book is about the powerful male empire which has ruled mankind up to now, the empire called patriarchy. Above all it is a political book, a call for action, a voice of revolution, which hopes to unseat the power clique (half of mankind) and give women a place of equality. Kate Millett's book is an indictment of the male's misuse of power over the centuries rather than an elaboration of the vision of the accomplished revolution. She pauses only very briefly to outline a glimpse of the goal: abolish patriarchy with its ideology of male supremacy and all the traditional socialization by which it is upheld in matters of status, role, and temperament! This includes the end of the family institution as we have known it. It envisions an integration of the now separate subcultures of females and males, an economic independence of women, and a collective professionalization of the care of the young. Marriage might be replaced by voluntary associations, if such are desired.

The book entices with sexy sexual material, though it is not about sexy sex but about the power status of the gender sexes. But with all of its sexy spice the book does not inspire. Above all it lacks humor and thus perspective. The history of the woman's "inferior status throughout

135

history" is indeed colorful and amazing. What a marvelous satire such a book would make, depicting the male's battle for superiority by disfranchising the female and, in addition, blaming her for any weakness that mars the male image. Take the story of the Fall. Eve gets the blame for seducing Adam, when it is the snake who seduced Eve. And what is the snake? So women have been the butt of all that displeases: they have been blamed for the evil happenings as witches; they have been considered inferior beings (see Freud as a late proponent of this belief), they have been projected as all powerful and castrating and as the very source of neurotic happenings (see the intonations of most neo-Freudians).

I did not enjoy the book. Its wide historical sweep is governed by a pedestrian, black-and-white theme. I did enjoy Norman Mailer's answer in *Harper's Magazine*. His language flows and has wit and vital exuberance. Many of his points meet my own objections. I, too, wondered why Kate Millett has so little appreciation for the creative experimental bursts of the twenties, which, in almost all fields, initiated the forces that are still carrying us at present. Behavior stepped out of old stereotypes, as seen in new art forms, new sexual freedoms, a decisive change in women's education, and a broadening of the arena of their participation. Henry Miller, surely, cannot be regarded as a protagonist of the counterrevolution, as described by Kate Millett. He was for sex, not against women. He was liberating sex and language from its puritanical bondage and aimed to restore to sex the lusty pleasure of the erotic. He broke grounds not only for the Mailers to come but also for women.

I can't get in tune with the Women's Liberation movement. Why the stridency when so many doors are open? If they, the ladies, just did whatever they want to do, marry or not marry, have sex or not, have a career or not, no one would cry out; no one would even notice. There are serious inequities that affect women in particular; they need equal work opportunities, equal pay, maternity considerations, abortion laws, divorce laws, child care centers, and many other things, but these are an integral part of the many social inequities we are facing and are by no means the concern of women alone.

Also, while Women's Liberation makes proclamations, the rather remarkable young generation is busy trying out many different arrangements of living without pronouncements or strident ideologies.

But my greatest objection to Kate Millett's book is that it chooses to view our societal arrangement from the perspective of power control of one group over another. We psychoanalysts are sensitized to the existence of overt and covert power play in interpersonal relationships as

these stand in the center of neurotic happenings. It is the exclusive perception of relationships as a game of one-upmanship, as issues of control and power, which constitutes the very vice of the neurotic style of living, a vice equally indulged in by women as well as men. Thus I do not cherish the particular dramatic device of polarizing male and female: one as power obsessed, full of overblown male chauvinsism; the other as a sorry vision of the suppressed and oppressed suffering female. We are served colorful evidence of male prejudice, in the service of fomenting female prejudice of the male. And who needs that? Repeatedly I get calls from Women's Lib participants asking for my services just because I am a female. They cannot trust a male analyst to see them fairly! Is this liberation?

Kate Millett's arguments are annoyingly parochial. We are in a period of rapid fundamental changes. We are questioning propositions that have guided our behavior in almost all fields of our existence. There is a new flavor to our consciousness. We are asking whether technical progress is necessarily progress. We are questioning our self-destructive abuse and exploitation of the air, soil, and water. We are hard pressed to rethink our approach to urban problems, to low-cost housing, mass transit possibilities, day care centers, medical care, and education at all levels. We are challenged by the young, who, without much to-do, have decided to take their lives into their own hands and pioneer without the guidance of the wisdom of the older generation. These changes do affect the family. Never before have as many 14- to 15- to 16-years-olds declared their independence, moved to friends, or into a commune, decided to drop out, declined the opportunity for college so saved for by the parents. Furthermore, they seem not to worry about the future, and no reassuring plan aids the parental adjustment. Added to all this, surely devised to upset the needed sleep of agitated parents, is the specter of the drug culture.

These upheavals concern everyone—women, men, and the young. Women, in coming to terms with these events, are pushed to restyle their life toward greater economic and political participation. But men too are liberated. Marriages are less fixed institutions. We all feel the impact of change. The traditional formula of adaptation is conservative. But now, it seems, we have to do more than adapt to specific changes; we have to adapt to the process of change itself. Rearguard actions to hold on to the old are often so beside the point that the old word conserving hardly seems applicable. A popular trend is to embrace process for its own sake. The medium is the message. Values and "the good" are thrown out as irrelevant. But there is another trend: a new humanism. Changing means new opportunities to start afresh; a new hope to regain some of the simple human

relevancies we have lost, a new chance to push back institutions to their rightful place of facilitating social intercourse without hindering the basic purpose of serving people in a designated area. We have allowed ourselves to be ruled by regulations rather than active human care. Thus to meet the challenges of our time we need to enhance our capacity for creative participation in the existing problems rather than righteously uphold the privileges of old stereotypes.

And this brings me back to power in the family and to the power struggle of Kate Millett. Power struggle does not enhance our capacity for creative and productive living. It upholds sterotypes, black-and-white arguments. It concerns itself with matters of hierarchy, with who concedes to whom. A liberated woman does not have to be against men, or against running a delightful home, or against spending time with the kids, even when she aims at a career. We all like to enhance our opportunities in life, but we defeat ourselves if we lose the quality of true partnership, of vital ecological interdependence at all levels.

References

1. Millett, K.: Sexual Politics. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1970.

The Powerlessness
of Family Power:
Empirical and Clinical Considerations

DAVID H. OLSON, Ph.D.

.

What is the real power structure of a family? How well can an individual recall and report the power structure in his family? And how valid are an individual's reports? Although there has been little direct reference to these particular questions or to the concept of power in the psychoanalytic literature, family sociologists have given considerable attention to this concept. Unfortunately, most of what we know about family power structure from research studies has been obtained by having wives complete a short questionnaire. [1, 2]

There are at least three basic assumptions associated with relying on wives' reports of the family power structure. First, it is assumed that individuals are able to describe accurately the power structure in their family. There is increasing evidence, however, that although individuals might be willing and able to report with considerable detail and accuracy other events and phenonema, they are not able to report who actually excercises power in their family. Second, it is assumed that individual reports of "subjective reality" are equivalent to what is "objective reality." In other words, it is presumed that an individual's report has external validity. Last, it is assumed that all family members, but especially husbands

and wives, agree in their description of the family power structure. On the basis of this assumption, the wife has been used as the main informant for the family since she is often most free to participate in research studies.

In order to test the first two assumptions, this study compares several measures of power with a criterion measure of power. This tests whether individuals are able to report accurately who is exercising power in their family and whether these reports are valid. More specifically, this study compares various self-report (questionnaire) measures of power and behavioral (observational) measures of power with a criterion measure called outcome power. In addition to comparing the relative validity of these measures, this study also compares the various measures of power to see if they measure the same phenomena. Previous studies which have compared various measures of family power have found little similarity between them.[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] This means that studies will come to different conclusions simply because they used different research methods or asked questions in different ways.

Methods

The present investigation is a short-term longitudinal study of couples covering the period from the wife's first pregnancy through their first months as parents. Data were collected in three stages (Fig. 1). The first

Fig. 1. Methodological analysis of family power.

stage used a questionnaire to collect self-report data on the variables of predicted power and authority. The second stage used the "revealed difference technique" (RDT) to obtain the behavioral measure of power, i.e., process power. The RDT is a method whereby couples discuss and resolve items on which they are known to disagree, as assessed by a previously administered questionnaire. The third stage of data collection used a follow-up questionnaire to obtain a measure of retrospective power and the criterion measure of outcome power. All three stages of data collection were completed within a period of one year. When the couples participated in the first and second phases of the study, the wife was, on the average, 6 months' pregnant. The third phase was completed about 4 months after the birth of the child.

Considerable attention was given to the content of the items included in the study in order to make them relevant to the couples. The items used were developed by speaking with couples who recently had had a child and were relevant since they described decisions that needed to be made soon after the birth of the child. By incorporating relevant decisions that were somewhat controversial in nature and which actually needed to be made in the near future, it was possible to maximize the validity of the data.

Subjects

Although there were 35 couples that participated in the first two stages of the study, complete data from all three stages were obtained from 17 couples. Preliminary analysis indicated that the 17 were not substantially different from the total sample. The present analysis is based exclusively on the data collected from the 17 couples. The average age of husbands and wives was 25 and 23, respectively. They had been married an average of 3 years. The husbands had completed about 2 years of graduate school and the wives had 3 to 4 years of college. Although the average income was $7,000.00, some earned as little as $2,000.00 and others earned as much as $10,000.00. About two-thirds of the couples were Protestant, one quarter were Catholic, and the remaining were either Jewish or had no religious affiliation. In general, the couples represented a rather homogenous group of well-educated, average-income couples in their early years of marriage.

Definition of terms

The following will be a brief definition of the major concepts used in the study and how they were operationally defined (Fig. 1). The criterion

measure used in this study is *outcome power*. This measure indicates what person exercised power regarding the final decision that a couple made regarding a specific issue.

The self-report methods used in this study are predicted power, retrospective power, and authority. *Predicted power* was derived from the initial questionnaire responses of each individual in terms of who he predicted would exercise power on a given decision. *Retrospective power* was obtained from the follow-up questionnaire in which each individual was asked to recall who had exercised power on each of the same 27 items. The measure of *authority* was derived by asking the question of "Who had the legitimate right to exercise power?" in regard to each decision.

The behavioral measure of *process power* was obtained from the joint-decision session. Using the revealed difference technique, items were selected on which husband and wife disagreed on the decision they would make and the person who won that decision was said to exercise power.

This study also looked at the predicted decisions, process decisions, and actual decisions made by these couples. These measures are not entirely independent of the power measures but they do sample a less abstract level of the reporting process. The criterion measure was the *actual decision* that the couple made as assessed at the follow-up stage. The self-report measure of *predicted decision* was the individual prediction regarding the outcome of each issue obtained from the initial questionnaire. The behavioral measure of *process decision* was the joint decision the couple made after discussing each issue.

Design

A summary of the design of the study is illustrated in Fig. 1. The first stage included an initial questionnaire which was used to obtain measures of predicted power, authority, and the predicted decisions. The second stage of data collection relied on the revealed difference technique (RDT) in which couples jointly discussed items on which they disagreed. During this stage, the measures of process power and process decisions were obtained. The last stage of data collection utilized a follow-up questionnaire in which the criteria measures of outcome power and the actual decisions were assessed and a measure of retrospective power was also obtained. Although past research has not distinguished between the variables of power, authority, and decision making, this study has independent measures of each of these variables. In addition, four independent measures of power and three independent measures of decision making were incorporated into this study.

Results

The major analysis consists of assessing whether individuals are able to report accurately and validly who is exercising power in their family. More specifically, this study determined whether there is a relationship between what individuals report about the power dynamics in their family (subjective reality) and what the power structure is really like (objective reality). This was done by comparing the relationships between the measure of power and the measure of authority with the criterion measure of outcome power. The solid line in the diagram (Fig. 1) indicates the relationships of the power and authority measures to the criteria measure. The findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between any of the three power measures (predicted power, process power, retrospective power) or authority and the criteria measure. None of these four proved to be valid measures of who exercised power in the marriage. In other words, although individuals' reports of the power dynamics in their family are interesting and perhaps clinically useful, these reports do not correspond with the actual power structure in the family.

Another analysis involves the interrelationships of the various measures of power and the authority variable, excluding the analysis that was related to the criterion measure. This enables one to determine if individuals will describe the power dynamics differently depending on the specific type of question asked or the type of research method used.

Of these six comparisons of various measures, which are indicated by the dotted lines in Fig. 1, two are significantly related and are indicated by by the starred lines. The findings indicate that the authority variable is significantly related to process power and to retrospective power. However, these latter two measures of power are not related to each other or to the criterion measure.

Since the measures of process power and retrospective power are often used in family research, the finding of a significant relationship between authority and the variables of process power and retrospective power is of considerable importance. The relationship between authority and process power is particularly relevant to studies which use joint discussions of couples and interaction data to obtain information about the power structure in a family. This analysis indicates that the person perceived as the authority from the questionnaire is likely to be the person who wins the decision in the joint discussion. However, neither of these variables is a valid measure because neither has any relationship to who actually makes the decision at a later time, i.e., outcome power.

The significant relationship between authority and retrospective power indicates that studies which have asked individuals retrospectively to report who exercises power in their family are really tapping who is perceived as the authority. Again, neither of these measures is valid because they do not relate to who actually exercised power.

The description of the perceived authority is probably heavily influenced by the cultural role presecriptions and expectations, which means that the authority measure is tapping more what the relationship *should* be like rather that what it *is* actually like.

These findings raise serious questions about an individual's ability accurately to recall and report even recent power dynamics in his family. It should be emphasized that these data were elicited from individuals who were reporting events which had occurred very recently. Also the items were quite specific and factual in nature. These findings support the evidence from child-rearing research by Yarrow et al. [10] [11] that individuals are poor at retrospectively reporting their own behavior and also their behavior with others.

Another analysis involved looking at the decisions that were made at each of the three phases of the study (Fig. 1) rather than who made them, i.e., power. This involved comparing individual decisions made on the initial questionnaire (predicted decisions) and joint decisions made after discussing the issues (process decisions) with the final decision (actual decision) made, which was the criterion measure. Looking at the relationship of the predicted decision and the process decision to the criterion measure of actual decisions, there is considerably more agreement than occurred with the power measures. There is a significant relationship between predicted decisions and actual decisions and also between process decisions and actual decisions. These significant relationships regarding decision making are indicated by the starred lines in the lower portion of Fig. 1. In summary, this analysis of decision making indicated considerable correspondence between the two measures and the criterion measure, whereas a similar analysis with related power variables did not find such agreement with the criterion measure.

The finding that the decision measures seem to have a greater degree of construct validity than do the power measures raises further questions about the usefulness of the power dimension. There are obvious reasons, however, why the decision variables do relate better to the criterion measure. One reason is that there were fewer degrees of freedom in the choices for these items than with the power dimension. In regard to decisions, the individuals had only a dichotomous choice of whether they made the

decision or not, whereas with the power dimension they had at least four choices regarding who excercised the power, i.e., husband, wife, both, neither. It was interesting that in reporting power, most individuals indicated that neither spouse exercised the power. A second, and perhaps more important, reason for these discrepant findings is that the power dimension is a more abstract construct that decisions and, therefore, more difficult to comprehend and report.

Although this abstract concept of power has been of interest theoretically and empirically, this study has indicated that it is not a phenomenon that individuals are adequately aware of in their own interaction, and, consequently, they are generally not prepared or able to report when required to do so. Decisions, however, often relate to more concrete phenomena and are, therefore, easier for subjects to specify or recall.

Analysis was also done to assess whether there was any difference in the relative ability of husbands and wives in providing valid reports of the power dynamics within their relationship. The analysis indicated that there was no difference between husbands and wives and both proved to be equally poor at reporting who exercised power in their relationship. In other words, both sexes' reports of "subjective reality" were different from what objectively had occurred, "objective reality."

Conclusions and implication for clinical work

Although the criterion of "objective reality" is useful in validating measurement techniques, the significance of "subjective reality" is of particular relevance in therapeutic endeavors. The behavior of an individual is, in part, a function of his perceived reality, and a major part of the therapeutic experience is directed toward dealing with an individual's feelings and perceptions. When one is working therapeutically with just the "identified patient," the primary source of information is that patient's own subjective feelings about his experience. Unless a "significant other" is included in the therapeutic process, there is little opportunity to compare the patient's perceptions with another's report from that same family situation. Consequently, a therapist usually accepts the patient's perceptions as valid and helps the patient deal more effectively with his "subjective reality." As a result, the idea of "objective reality" has considerably less relevance to individual psychotherapy.

The one phenomenon that this study clearly demonstrates which has relevance to clinical work is that individuals are very poor at reporting "objective reality" regarding family power dynamics. What individuals

do report is their "subjective reality," which is not a very accurate representation of what is objectively there. Not only is this true when individuals describe current family dynamics, but it is equally so when they have to recall the same phenomenon soon after it has occurred. In addition, there was no difference in the ability of husbands and wives to provide valid reports of who exercised power in their relationship, for both proved to be equally poor. In a previous study by the writer,[8] it was found that husbands and wives are systematically different in their reports of family power. Husbands' reports seemed to consistently overestimate their actual power whereas wives' reports tended to underestimate their actual power in the family. Although these individuals were very poor at reporting who exercised power, they were very good at reporting what decisions were made. In other words, individuals were able to provide rather valid reports of *what* decisions were made but they were not able to validly report *who* made them.

Another interesting finding was in regard to individual differences in ability to give valid reports of power relationships in the family. A survey of individual responses indicated that some individuals in this study were more accurate perceivers of objective reality. There is no question, however, that the ability of all the persons in this study could be measurably improved. This raises another issue and that is the training of individuals to improve their awareness and ability to accurately report interpersonal dynamics. Recent research by Miller and Nunnally[12] has demonstrated that couples can be trained to improve their ability to describe their own interaction. This is also one of the objectives a therapist hopes to achieve when he is working in the area of marital and family therapy.[13]

In conclusion, this research has demonstrated that individuals' reports about family power are useful indicators of "subjective reality" but are not valid measures of "objective reality." Although this does not mean that the power concept is totally useless theoretically or empirically, the available evidence does suggest that researchers have been dealing with the same type of phenomena as therapists work with, i.e., "perceived or subjective reality." There is, however, a crucial difference in how therapists and researchers themselves perceive the type of data with which they work. Researchers have naively assumed that in using the self-reports of wives to measure the family power structure, they are obtaining valid measures of "objective reality" whereas they are actually dealing with invalid measures that are tapping "subjective reality." Therapists, however, hopefully realize that they are dealing with "subjective reality" and are willing to accept the data for what they are. It is, therefore, the researcher

and not the therapist who continues to be plagued with the powerlessness of family power.

References

1. Safilios-Rothschild, C.: Family sociology or wives' family sociology? A cross-cultural examination of decision-making. J. Marr. Fam. 31:290–301, May 1969.
2. Safilios-Rothschild, C.: The study of family power structure: a review 1960–1969, J. Marr. Fam. 32:539–552, Nov. 1970.
3. Bachove, C., and Zubaly, B. M.: An Exploratory Study on Family Interrelationships in a Small Sample of Non-clinic Families. Master's thesis, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa., 1959.
4. Bell, N. W., and Turk, J. L.: The concept of power: some observations on the power of the concept, read before the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1970.
5. Hill, R.: Decision-making and the family life cycle. In: Shanas, E., and Streib, G. F.: Social Structure and the Family. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965, pp. 113–139.
6. Kenkel, W. F.: Observational studies of husband-wife interaction in family decision-making. In: Sussman, M. B.: Sourcebook in Marriage and the Family. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963, pp. 144–156.
7. Levinger, G.: Supplementary methods in family research. Fam. Process 2:357–366, Sept. 1963.
8. Olson, D. H.: The measurement of family power by self-report and behavioral methods. J. Marr. Fam. 31:545–550, Aug. 1969.
9. Strodtbeck, F. L.: The family as a three person group. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 19:23–29, Feb. 1954.
10. Yarrow, M. R., Campbell, J. D., and Burton, R. V.: Reliability of maternal retrospection: a preliminary report. Fam. Process 3:207–218, March 1964.
11. Yarrow, M. R., Campbell, J. D., and Burton, R. V.: Child Rearing: An Inquiry into Research and Methods, 1st ed., W. E. Henry and Nevitt Sanford (Eds.). San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968.
12. Miller, S., and Nunnally, E.: A family development program of communication training for engaged couples, Monograph, Family Study Center, University of Minnesota, 1970.
13. Olson, D. H.: Marital and family therapy: integrative review and critique. J. Marr. Fam. 33:501–538, Nov. 1970.

The Two Faces of Marital Power

CARLFRED B. BRODERICK, Ph.D.

Twenty years ago Bales noted that every task-oriented group had two distinct aspects to its functioning: to achieve the task before it and to maintain the morale of its members. The issue of power and its distribution is central to both aspects of group functioning and this applies to the marital dyad as well as to other groupings. For example, in a comprehensive study of interaction in young marriages, Goodrich, Ryder, and Raush[1] found that four basic factors emerged, and power was a prominent element in two of them. The factor they labeled marital role organization included many items on control and the decision-making process. In addition, the factor they labeled marital problems featured marital conflict, based in part on a power struggle, as a central element. An understanding of both these aspects of power is important in working with married couples.

Marital power and family task achievement

The function of power in the achievement of familial goals is to make the group function more efficiently. Moreover, since raw power struggles not only are inefficient but threaten the whole system, every society has

148

devised channeling mechanisms for avoiding such struggles whenever possible. The chief mechanism for doing this is role assignment. That is, most of the important tasks and the prerogative of making decisions concerning those tasks are most often allotted by tradition.

Many areas which are not preassigned by the culture are assigned without contest according to interest, skill, or convenience. There inevitably remain, of course, a larger or smaller set of decisions in which either there is disagreement over who should legitimately make the decisions or it is agreed that the decisions should be jointly made. Most families develop policies of their own to supplement the traditional assignments and reduce the number of confrontations to a minimum. For example, in my own marriage I do the grocery shopping. (I started doing it when we were poverty-stricken graduate students without a car and my wife was pregnant.) But she makes up the list. On occasion I have attempted to be innovative but the results have inevitably been disastrous and we have finally come to agree that it is sensible and right that she should make up the list and that I should stick to it.

Studies of marital decision-making patterns over the life cycle show that couples tend increasingly to develop policies which define their arenas of responsibility in nonoverlapping ways, thus avoiding conflict, although at the cost of some of the "togetherness" of early marriage. On the other hand, early marriage is also the period at which most marriages break up. Even the higher morale typical of early marriage is not enough to offset the lack of formulated policies for allocating power in those first years.

One of the most interesting developments of our own time is that the concept of a culturally determined division of labor and responsibility according to sex is being challenged as illegitimate, arbitrary, and repressive, especially regarding women. However, it must be admitted that sex role assignment, when accepted by all parties, is a serviceable mechanism for reducing power struggles. We may be in for an increase in power confrontations, especially in the early years of marriage before substitute policies are established by each couple.

From a sociological point of view such contests may be classified as merely an inefficient mechanism for group decision making or, depending on one's social orientation, a major dynamic in achieving social change. But to the psychologist or psychiatrist it is clear that powerful personality dynamics are involved as well. It is probably in this context that the issue of power as a factor in marital satisfaction might be approached.

Power struggles and marital satisfaction

Adler is the clinical theoretician who has given the most prominence in his work to the concept of power. Whereas Freud focused upon the inherent libidinal drive and conceived of personality as the structure forged by the individual and his society to channel and control it, Adler focused rather on the perception by the child of his own manifest inferiority vis-à-vis his parents and conceived of personality as the vehicle developed for achieving a degree of mastery over others and over the environment. From this latter point of view, even the famous Oedipus complex and its resolution may be evaluated as a power struggle resulting in identification with the victor. According to this view, it is literally human nature to construe significant relationships as power struggles, whatever else they may be.

The late Don Jackson, Jay Haley, and their colleagues at the Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto, California, have more recently taken this concept a step further. They suggest that in every consequential relationship the issue of power must be dealt with in one of three ways. The two persons can behave in a way that defines the relationship as *symmetrical* and *competitive* in which case each is free to initiate action, offer criticism, give advice, and so on. They can behave in a way that defines the relationship as *complementary* (dominant-submissive) in which case the unequal status of the two is demonstrated by one initiating and the other responding, one advising and the other complying, one criticizing and the other accepting. In a more subtle exchange they can behave in a way that establishes a relationship which Haley[2] calls metacomplementary. In this case the person in the superior position maneuvers the situation so that the other person appears in charge of what happens, but only at the former's sufferance. The wife who demands that her husband be more assertive or the husband who insists that his wife initiate sexual relations would be common examples. It should be noted that continuing relationships may shift from one to another of these modes but there is a tendency over time to establish a characteristic mode.

Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson[3] develop this idea further by analyzing marital communication in terms of the attempt to "one-up" the spouse in conflicted symmetrical and metacomplementary relationships.

Implications for marriage counseling

The clinician seeing a couple in therapy needs to be concerned with the issue of power both as it functions in the more or less efficient achievement

of family goals and also as it functions as a dynamic factor in the personal and pair morale.

A young couple, married less than a year, came to my office on a self-referral. The young man was agitated and indicated at the beginning of the hour that it had been a toss-up between taking his wife to a psychiatrist, a divorce lawyer, or a marriage counselor. As it happened, she had previously had a course with me at the university and they didn't know any psychiatrists or lawyers. He did most of the talking, and when I would interrupt his energetic presentatation to get her side of it, she appeared to agree entirely with everything he said and to be remarkable serene about it in view of the intensity of her husband's accusations against her. It seems that they had a nearly perfect marriage except for one thing. That one thing had, however, assumed such importance that he was ready to adopt whatever measures were necessary to deal with it.

He had come from a Pennsylvania Dutch background, as had she, and both believed that the man should handle the money. Nevertheless, she had a household allowance and they had a joint checking account. After about 4 months of marriage he discovered, while balancing the monthly bank statement, that she had written a check for $19 to buy herself some article of clothing without recording it or mentioning it to him. He was, of course, upset. She pleaded no defense, saying she didn't know why she would do such a thing. He pointed out that she could certainly have had the article if she had only mentioned she needed it. She said she was sincerely sorry for having done such a thing and would never do it again. In fact, she couldn't imagine what had come over her. The incident, however, recurred twice in subsequent months, each time with increasing anger on his part and penitence on hers. The final blow had come when a sewing machine salesman came to the house and walked off with a check for $329 for for a new Slantomatic machine which she failed to record in the checkbook or tell her husband about. It was true that they had discussed the possibility of her getting a sewing machine so that she could make her own clothes but he considered it absolutely unforgivable that she had handled it in this way. Their rent check and several other checks bounced as a result of her behavior, and he immediately took the money out of their joint account and opened a new account in his own name. He said he felt that he could no longer trust her. He was both puzzled and outraged and could only conclude that his wife was either two faced or crazy.

During this entire recital the girl was composed, almost serene, and nodded affirmatively at several points. She agreed that he was a very kind and fair husband, that he would doubtless have approved these purchases if she had sought his approval, that it was a bizarre and inexplicable thing which she had done. She did show some resentment at his having taken her off the bank account and watching her every move, but she could see why he felt as he did.

It took only about 15 minutes in a separate interview to establish that she had been trained to accept authority and to reject her own negative feelings. She insisted that her husband was "perfect" but admitted that it was not always easy to live with someone who was always right and who treated her like a little girl. She could see that her check-writing escapades came at times when she felt especially oppressed, and she accepted the interpretation that it was in fact a gesture of defiance and independence which she could not afford to admit because it was contrary to her upbringing. It was, in effect, her move in a power struggle which she could not even admit existed.

Her husband was brought back in and rather quickly saw the validity of this interpretation. Both agreed that it was not appropriate for her to be treated like a little girl in their relationship and that there must be a less expensive means for her to assert herself legitimately. Each saw the importance to himself in helping the wife "grow up" and play a more active role in decision making in the marriage. A follow-up contact several weeks later indicated that things were going well and that both the decision-making apparatus and the personal satisfaction of the couple were progressing satisfactorily.

This case is especially interesting because it pits the husband's concern for an efficient mechanism for financial decision making against the wife's desire to change the mode of interaction from complementary to symmetrical. More commonly the two aspects may vary independently in the marital situation as is evidenced by the Goodrich, Ryder, and Raush study cited earlier. In any case, it is rare to see a couple who come for counseling in which one of the two faces of power is not a major issue.

References

1. Goodrich, W., Ryder, R. G., and Raush, H. L.: Patterns of newlywed marriages. J. Marr. Fam. 30:383–391, 1968.
2. Haley, J.: An interactional explanation for hypnosis. Amer. J. Clin. Hypn. 1:41–57, 1958.
3. Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J., and Jackson, D.: The Pragmatics of Human Communication. New York, W. W. Norton, 1967.

Discussion by Walter Bonime, M.D.

It has surprised me that in our discussion of power in the family, nothing except for a parenthetical remark by Dr. Broderick has been said about the influence of the pathological exercise of power on children. There seems, furthermore, to have been an underlying assumption that the kind of functioning that has been described is an inevitable, natural, seemingly genetically determined form of human behavior. This is an assumption consistent with the recent spate of

books such as Ardrey's *Territoriality*, Morris' *The Naked Ape*, and Lorenz' *Aggression*, all of which explain human behavior, individual and interpersonal, on the basis of biology.

The premise that aggressive and competitive behavior is inevitable underlies the concept of "sibling rivalry," a form of power play generally dealt with as a "natural" development. If, however, one realizes that the marital milieu is the developmental milieu of the children, a different possibility for the source of sibling rivalry presents itself. Dr. Broderick, in his allusions to children, related how keenly aware they were of the covert distribution of power that existed in their home, and how well adapted the offspring were for the exploitation of these forces. Inherent in such observations is the possibility that the rivalry of siblings is not part of a predetermined ontology, but is rather the result of learning.

The origins of power strivings, of competitiveness, of desire to prevail over others found in the broader social environment were introduced by Dr. Yankelovich and his discussant. Cultural forces determine some of the personality distortions which produce the marital contests which in turn create the power cravings and maneuvers of the children.

We know that a natural and inevitable degree of authority and responsibility resides in parents of any family. The nature and origins of healthy authority, and the boundaries of suitable responsibility, are not easy to define. We need to investigate and define them so that they may be better understood and more clearly differentiated from the destructive uses of strength and influence in the family and in society.

Marital Power:
Mary Todd's Influence on
Abraham Lincoln in
Historical Perspective*

JULES H. MASSERMAN, M.D.

Six score and eleven years ago, Abraham Lincoln, then aged 31, met and two years later married Mary Todd, 10 years his junior—an event that has ever since generated a host of legends and analytic interpretations about the respective backgrounds and characters of this most-discussed couple in American history. This is a relatively harmless indoor sport when confined to oracular pronouncements as to the erotic significance of Alice's adventures in wonderland, or to the relationships between Hamlet's patricidal frenzies and his rejection of Ophelia, but deplorable when applied pejoratively to great leaders of men and their relationships to the women they loved. For example, Sigmund Freud's reputation as

an objective scientist suffered greatly when, in a book co-authored with Ambassador William C. Bullitt, Freud attributed the supposed sexual liaisons of Woodrow Wilson, our twenty-seventh President, and his conduct of World War I to a lifelong oedipal neurosis stemming from his adolescent rivalry with his domineering father. Were I unthinkingly to join in such psychiatric hubris with regard to the Great Emancipator himself I could, for example, glibly point out that after Thomas Lincoln had been rejected by Sarah Bush, his first love, he married the illegitimate, unlettered Nancy Hanks, named his first child Sarah, and took the newly widowed Sarah Johnston (*née* Bush) as his second wife very soon after Nancy's death, thus creating a family situation in which his precociously mature 10-year-old son Abe and the new Sarah Lincoln almost immediately became mutually attracted in what Freudians would avidly term an oedipal triangle. I could then further expound the dubious thesis that the cerebral concussion Abe suffered at age 11 reinforced his fear of incestuous masculinity and left him not only anxious, shy, and aloof in the presence of women, but sometimes defensively discourteous to those who threatened him with friendship or intimacy. Contrary accounts could be airily disposed of: for example, since these ungallant characteristics did not fit the image of the young Lincoln that William Herndon, Lincoln's last law partner and biographer, wished to create after Lincoln's death, Herndon evolved a romantic legend about Lincoln's love affair with Ann Rutledge of Salem at age 22, whom Abe supposedly "loved better than his own life, with all his soul, mind and strength," so that when she died, "his mind wandered from its throne." Yet Lincoln himself never mentioned Ann's name in any of his writings, and only a year later—although, as always, with serious reservations—was courting Mary Owens, whom he ungraciously described in a letter to Mrs. Browning as "over-size . . . a fair match for Falstaff . . . I could not . . . avoid thinking of my mother . . . from her want of teeth and weatherbeaten appearance in general." Understandably, Mary Owens rejected Lincoln as being "deficient in those little links which make up the chain of woman's happiness," whereupon Abe, as usual, had the last word: "I have now come to the conclusion that I would never again think of marrying, and for this reason, I can never be satisfied with anyone who would be blockheaded enough to marry me." In this connection, it is a fact that Lincoln also refused to visit his dying father or attend his funeral—another item that has delighted some symbol-minded analysts. True, Oedipus had also disposed of his father and eventually foreswore Jocasta, but Oedipus sadly lacked a sense of humor—nor did Oedipus later marry, on the whole, happily.

Enough, then, of such quasi-historical speculations as to Abe's libidinal vicissitudes; it should be clear by now that no stereotyped pseudo-analytic interpretations can ever cover the complex, multifaceted character—the mystique—of Abraham Lincoln. Certain it is that, at age 30, he became attracted to Mary Todd—again short and plump like his "angel stepmother," but also vivacious, educated, refined, accustomed to relative wealth, sophisticated in Whig party politics, and certain since childhood that she was destined to be "a great lady." William Townsend described her as "brilliant, vivacious, impulsive; she possessed a charming personality marred only by a transient hauteur of manner and a caustic, devastating wit that cut like the sting of a hornet." At a ball celebrating the removal of the capital of Illinois from Vandalia to Springfield, Abe approached her with "Miss Todd, I want to dance with you in the worst way" and, as she later commented, "He certainly did." Nevertheless, despite her family's objection that "Mr. Lincoln has no education, religion, money or future," Mary decided she preferred his high ideals and forthright honesty to the courtly superficialities of rival suitors, including the redoubtable Stephen A. Douglas. Indeed, she would have married Lincoln promptly, were it not that Abe himself, now increasingly involved in state and national politics, precipitated repeated separations because, as he confessed to friends, "the prospect of marital responsibilities and bondage" filled him with trepidations as to whether he could simultaneously fulfill his husbandly duties. They therefore "parted forever" on New Year's Day, 1841—whereupon Lincoln suffered such prolonged episodes of profound melancholia replete with thoughts of futility and suicide that he wrote to his law partner John Stuart: "If what I feel were equally distributed to the whole human family, there would not be one cheerful face on earth. Whether I shall ever be better I cannot tell." His friend James Conkling also described him at the time "as reduced and emaciated in appearance . . . his case at present is truly deplorable." Lincoln was advised by his physician to travel and petitioned for a consular post in South America. Fortunately, this was denied him, and after the marriage of his equally hesitant friend Joshua Speed turned out happily, Lincoln summoned up enough courage for a sudden proposal to Mary and a quiet wedding a few days later. Commented he in a letter to a friend soon afterward: "Nothing new here except my marrying, which to me is a matter of profound wonder!"

Stories about their early life together vary widely, and some are probably as exaggerated as those now already gathering around the John F. Kennedys. Herndon's notion that Mary never forgave Abe for not appearing

at the church for their wedding on January 1, 1841, is contradicted by the fact that there is no record of a marriage license ever having been issued for that date and positive evidence that she wrote him affectionate letters soon afterward. Equally apocryphal are canards such as that on one occasion Mary forced Abe out of their Springfield house at knife point, or that on another Sunday morning he chased her around their yard shouting that she was making his life intolerable. Abe freely admitted to being a slovenly, temperamental, and sometimes remote and preoccupied marital partner, and it is a matter of record that Mary chose not to stay in Washington with him during his one term in Congress. And yet their letters to each other were generally full of tender sentiments, and when he was in political retirement from 1849 to 1854 earning a precarious living as a circuit-riding lawyer, she continued to be a patient, comforting wife and a loving mother to their children. She was often also a wise counselor; at one juncture she deterred him from accepting a post as governor of the remote territory of Oregon—a move which could well have forever shunted his career from greatness.

By most accounts, these affectionate and supportive relationships continued in the White House. True, she was self-willed, temperamental, personally extravagant, and sometimes arrogant, and on several occasions created jealous public scenes; nevertheless she tended diligently to the needs of her husband and children, comforted him when he was grief stricken at the death of their idolized 12-year-old son Willie, presided graciously at White House receptions, and did what she could to lighten his incredible burdens as President during our country's greatest travail. Abe invariably wired his loneliness when she was away from Washington, nor did the most vicious gossips ever hint of the slightest infidelity, even though she was frequently seen with, and influenced by, the handsome Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. On the contrary, Lincoln once told a reporter at a White House reception: "My wife is as handsome as when she was a girl and I, a poor nobody then, fell in love with her . . . and have never fallen out."

Other disparaging allegations about Mary Todd Lincoln should also be laid to rest. Contrary to overt public and covert congressional suspicions that she was a Southern sympathizer, she joined in her husband's indignation when Northern troops marching through Baltimore to defend Washington were attacked by rebel sympathizers, agonized with him over Union defeats at the two battles of Bull Run, remained in the Capitol with him when it was directly threatened by Confederate armies, accompanied him on his visits to hospitals for wounded Union soldiers, publicly renounced her three half-brothers who had chosen to fight against the North, became

a more ardent abolitionist, as Professor Fredrickson has pointed out, than Abe ever was, and was as troubled as he when Copperhead sentiment mushroomed after the Emancipation Proclamation and rendered uncertain Lincoln's reelection. We also know that Mary shared Abe's joy over Sherman's victory at Atlanta, Farragut's in Mobile Bay, and the resounding Republican election of 1864. At Abe's invitation, she and their son Tad accompanied him to his final conference with Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter before the fall of Richmond on April 3, 1865, leading to Lee's surrender of his sword and its chivalrous return at Appomattox.

But now the tragic denouement of April 15, 1865. It was Mary to whom Abe had first confided the latest recurrence of a dolorous dream in which he pictured a President of the Union, the victim of an assassin's bullet, being mourned in the East Room—an event also magnified out of all proportion by avid analysts. Did this really mean, as several have brazenly asserted, that Lincoln himself desired to die, and that Mary's intense anxiety—which he cheerfully dismissed—was an overreaction to an "unconscious death wish" for her husband? On the contrary, nightmares are not necessarily wishful fantasies, but rather the working through of threatening possibilities from which one wakes with heartfelt relief. Throughout his public life Lincoln had discounted many threats of assassination, and when he also told his friend Ward Hill Lamon about his dream, Abe added: "Hill, your apprehension of harm to me from some hidden enemy is downright foolishness. In this dream it is not me, but some other fellow that was killed. . . . As long as this imaginary assassin continues to exercise himself on others, *I* can stand it." So also, Mary later recalled that on the very day of his assassination, during an unguarded drive through the environs of Washington, her husband spoke happily to her of his eventual return to private practice of law in Illinois, and of prospects of a peaceful, happy future together. And at the very moment John Wilkes Booth's bullet crashed through his brain, the President of the Reunited States was sitting next to his wife fondly and publicly holding her hand.

But let us now draw the veil of "malice toward none, and charity for all" over Mary's next 17 pathetic years: her 5 prostrate weeks of grief before she could leave the White House, her petitions of poverty despite Lincoln's legacy of $110,000, her increasing isolation, hypochondriasis, suspiciousness, and progressive delusions of persecution that somehow sustained her self-image of a martyred great lady, and the profound sorrow of her son Robert, a practicing lawyer in Chicago, when, after Mary's wild spree of spending and her attempt at suicide in 1875, he and Dr. Ralph Isham had to commit Mary as "legally insane" for 3 months of

therapy in Dr. Robert Patterson's sanatorium in Batavia. It has sometimes been suggested that her aberrations were possibly due to head injuries Mary may have sustained during three carriage accidents many years previously; however, this explanation is not compatible with the fact that she never showed the defects in memory, speech, or imagery that would characterize actual cerebral damage. Instead, let us empathize with the blighted spirit that led to her subsequent sad seclusion in the home of her sister Elizabeth Edwards, her restless, lonesome travels through Europe after her civil rights were restored a year later, and her final delirium in 1882 when an ever-cherished ring inscribed "A.L. to Mary, Nov. 4, 1842, Love Is Eternal" had to be removed from her swollen finger. Let us remember instead that at her quiet burial on July 17, 1882, the ring was eternally restored, and that even William Herndon, never an admirer of Mary, admitted in retrospect that her one sustaining sentiment had been her lifelong reverence and love for her husband, from the shock of whose death her proud and sensitive spirit could never recover. We can then end this tribute, as it began, with a paraphrase of Lincoln's own eloquence, now applied not to the dead at Gettysburg, but to Abraham and his wife Mary.

"The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did. . . . It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they [have] so nobly advanced. . . that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion and that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain."

References

1. Freud, S., and Bullitt, W. C.: Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-eighth President of the United States; A Psychological Study. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967.
2. Herndon, W. H.: Life of Lincoln. Greenwich, Conn. Fawcett Publications, 1961.
3. Lorant, S.: The Life of Abraham Lincoln. New York, Mentor, 1954.
4. Sandburg, C.: Mary Lincoln: Wife and Widow. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1932.

part 4

CLINICAL APPLICATIONS

Compulsive Drives for Power

LEON SALZMAN, M.D.

The feeling of competence in individual functioning is a direct result of the ability to fill one's needs during the early developmental years. This capacity has been called self-esteem and by some "the feeling of power." It enables us successfully to integrate our later desires and goals with respect to others and the world. This is the feeling of self-esteem or self-worth possessed by persons who from early infancy accumulated evidence of their capacity to reduce the anxieties and satisfy the emotional and physical requirements of others. Some behavioral scientists, notably Harry Stack Sullivan, believed that in man the development of such feelings of power and esteem are much more important than impulses resulting from a feeling of hunger or thirst or the fully developed feelings of lust. Such feelings are essential in overcoming attitudes of helplessness, power-lessness, and total dependency of the infant and child. Only through the development of one's ability or feeling of power in these earlier years can we have sufficient faith in our capacity to deal with later situations that we cannot completely control. To the extent that such feelings grow, we can evolve into reasonable states of maturity with sufficient esteem to handle most uncertainties and adapt to those situations that we never entirely control or influence.

However, if our earliest experiences are too traumatic or our power needs too badly thwarted, there is a tendency to develop compulsive power drives to guarantee our being able to handle all situations effectively. These compulsive drives too often manifest themselves as excessive and exaggerated displays of strength when only minor assertive efforts are necessary. They are, in essence, frantic and desperate attempts to prevent being overwhelmed and overcome by forces with which we feel we cannot deal. The above formulation summarizes the dynamics of almost all the psychological theories that attempt to comprehend the excessive, all-consuming drives for power or control, in order to have authority or influence over others.

In order more fully to understand the role of the compulsive power drive in human behavior, we must first see its role as a force that is involved in the development of adequate esteem to cope with the essential necessities of human existence. However, it can, under certain circumstances, become a relentless drive whose purpose is to achieve absolute control and therefore guaranteed safety and security. This is a neurotic goal which can never be fulfilled. Ultimately the drive becomes an end in itself rather than a means to an end. The concept of power in human affairs must be examined, not moralistically or politically, but as it is used as a tool in man's development and adaptation.

Although the term power is generally used in a prejorative and moralistic sense, it is not necessarily evil or destructive if it can be used in a positive and productive way for community as well as the individual welfare. In addition, power and competence, which are synonymous in an individual sense, can be discrepant and discordant when they become a political threat and a social danger. This distinction should forewarn us not to apply individual psychodynamics globally as a basis for understanding group behavior or diagnosing political movements.

In an individual sense, the feeling of power enables us to meet and transcend developmental and creative obstacles with a feeling of confidence and esteem that permits interpersonal functioning without undue anxiety. In a political sense, it implies the use of force by persuasion or police action and by those who possess the power to influence such action in progressive or regressive ways, for the common welfare or for special, privileged individuals.

Consequently, an understanding of the role, development, and distortion of power in the development of the individual is a crucial but not an exhaustive basis for understanding the abuses of power in history. One must not overlook or minimize the interplay of other complicated

economic, political, religious, and social factors which determine historical developments. This paper, although dealing exclusively with the development of power as a compulsive process in an individual, may clarify some of the aspects of the power drive in political, financial, and other leaders. I do not suggest that the elimination of such compulsive factors in these individuals would have altered history or avoided malevolent social and political events. This individual psychodynamic explanation of history serves only to discredit psychiatry and distort history. No one factor in any event that is pluralistically defined and determined can supply the total answer.

Let us briefly review some of the theories proposed by behavioral scientists on the role of power in human affairs. Some theorists have suggested that it is a focal need which has a biological base. However, they contrast this need, which they consider normal and a response to biological strivings, with the thwarting of such power requirements, which may result in compulsive power drives owing to the feeling of lack of competence and frustration. They see a developmental relationship between a power need and a power drive and define the drive as an obsessional pattern in which an individual utilizes the personality dynamics of power operations to maintain control over his total milieu. Such a drive is derived from a state of extreme uncertainty, insecurity, and the threat of being totally annihilated.

Freud relates the term to jealousy and connects a lust for power with the libido and its development. He describes the power element in rebellion and defiance and relates it to the oral aggressive phase of libidinal development. The striving for power, according to Adler, is a masculine tendency which attempts to overcome one's inferiorities. Therefore, it is a negative and defensive force even though it may produce positive effects. Adler concerned himself with an elaborate study of the role of power and ultimately saw human psychology revolving exclusively around striving for power; psychotherapy was a process for encouraging a willingness to abandon power and become involved in social concerns and collaborative living.

Rank, who equated power with will, formulated his psychological theories around the development of will. He hypothesized that will develops as an opposing force or a resistance against pressures and that this "negative will" is a powerful force that could influence and affect others. In spite of its creative potentialities it is essentially a force against or opposed to some inner or outer compelling pressure.

Ferenczi, Rado, and others emphasized the element of power in the omnipotence of infancy which if excessive and unrestrained is translated

in later years into grandiosity. This view maintains the questionable notion of infantile omnipotence in contrast to the more manifest and evident powerlessness of the earliest years. Ego psychoanalysts, including Horney and Sullivan, generally substituted power for libido, a reflection of their emphasis of the interacting, interpersonal aspects of human development in contrast to the intrapsychic vicissitudes of the libido. Power was a concept essentially involving the effect on others, which then influenced one's view of oneself in contrast to libido, which in its inner unfolding affected character development. The element of power was more significantly noted in the Oedipus or transference situation in contrast to the role of libido. Thus the utilization of power became a key issue in post-Freudian theoretical and therapeutic developments. It reached its most conspicuous elaboration in the work of H. S. Sullivan, who focused on the positive rather than the neurotic elements in the use of power. He could distinguish between the valid use of power to pursue one's own creative development and its use to seek dominance over someone else. Powerlessness is a basic human state and therefore we need to pursue power goals to overcome the helplessness. Omnipotence and grandiosity are extreme developments whereas self-esteem and a sound ego are more constructive ways to deal with it. Power drives are not necessarily a neurotic development nor are they maladapative. They often supply the motive force for many worthy projects both personal and cultural. On the other hand, they can be so involved in the mere accumulations of more and more power that they can be socially and individually destructive.

Although the compulsive drives for power in the politician or scientist may affect the lives and destiny of large numbers of individuals, and influence the course of historical events, in psychological terms they are identical to other compulsive tendencies which may disrupt only the individual or his immediate family. However, it is rare that a politician pushed only by compulsive power drives and totally lacking in awareness of the needs of his constituents can succeed in the long run. More often, the designed, deliberate, and calculated drives for power generally are wrecked by the ill will and antagonism they tend to stir up. One does not receive a Nobel or Pulitzer Prize, become elected President, or discover a new scientific law simply by a passionate determination or calculated program designed for such a purpose. Multiple factors involving innate talent or skill, historical circumstances, and serendipitous events are also involved. However, one must be in the political race or the author of many books to be eligible for these prizes, and for this to be true, we would be dealing with ambitious, energetic activists whether they overtly

press for acknowledgment or covertly extend their capacities to the utmost limits.

Occasionally the fierce determination and the intense fixation on the goal may so preoccupy a person that he can sustain defeats and humiliations in the relentless drive for fulfillment. But the relentless, compulsively driven striving for power is neurotic and so beset by contradictory needs that the goal may never be reached or, if it is attained, may only briefly be held. In such instances we find the objective is only the goal and not the values and potentials that accompany the goal. In other areas such as science and business, compulsivity may be productive without being creative and personally fulfilling. Clearly compulsivity is not always productive in spite of the dedication and preoccupation with a task. In fact the very intensity may be antiproductive. The achievement of power and success, therefore, does not necessarily imply an underlying compulsive drive for such attainments. In fact, most frequently power and productivity are the result of rational programs and inspired leaders who are responsive to the group needs far beyond their own inner dynamics.

An examination of the role of power in political affairs by a psychoanalyst must remain rooted in his unique comprehension of personality development and its distortions and malformations in the individual. His knowledge of group processes evolves out of the interactions which influence and determine this development; it is from this framework that he can extrapolate and hypothesize about the effects of individual psychodynamics on group phenomena. Social and political forces also play a determining role in the formation of an individual character structure, which in turn affects public affairs.

However, we must not confuse our special skills with expertise in all matters relating to man and his behavior. Yankelovich and Barrett in their book *Ego and Instinct* say, "In the past wherever psychoanalysis strayed from its own narrow preserve of studying private neurosis of the middle-class person it proved to be a bust. Whether the subject was Woodrow Wilson and World War I as interpreted by Freud and Bullitt, or the labor strikes of the '30's as interpreted by Ernest Jones, or the Hiss-Chambers case of the '40's, or the student revolt of the '60's, those who applied psychoanalytic theories as an explanation for what took place and why, did it in a crassly reductionistic fashion, overplaying the particular individual's unconscious motives, and denying any reality factor."

Compulsive activity is produced by overwhelming doubts and uneasiness about one's capabilities and effectiveness and ability to exert

control over one's living. To strive to achieve such control or an illusion of such power one develops exaggerated, excessive, and relentless drives utilizing a variety of obsessional techniques, such as displacement, strivings for perfection, omniscience, rituals, doubting, and many others. There is a rigid and intensive preoccupation with these compulsive goals which becomes all engrossing. Some may manage to participate marginally in other areas aside from their compulsions, but their compulsive drives are imperious and consuming. To achieve such total control involves the amassing of all available knowledge, the obliteration of all uncertainties and expectations of failure, plus the need to drive toward perfection in all matters. However, one must avoid commitments or emotional involvements so as not to be vunerable or subject to anyone else's control. One becomes oblivious to alternatives and unable to have any perspective beyond the chosen goal. Such behavior is often extremely successful in that the total preoccupation with a task can lead one to master it thoroughly.

Individuals involved in such compulsive drives will allow no obstacle or opposition—even if reasonable or valid. Their activity does not often concern itself with considerations of its effect, but is pursued relentlessly with the conviction of one's righteousness and justification. At the same time they are unable to benefit from the experience of making an error since they can acknowledge no error. They are rigid, stubborn, and incapable of exploring or evaluating their activity.

It is not only the dedication and intensity which characterize a compulsive drive but its unavailability to any serious examination and alteration. However, if change of direction must take place, then there is a tendency to deny completely the previous patterns of action. The compulsive drive does not necessarily relate to the achievement of a valid goal but involves the fulfillment of some need to overcome doubts about one's self and one's effectiveness. Activity is not determined by consideration for others but by a neurotic attempt to deal with personal feelings of weakness and impotency. This is often the case with politicians whose major emphasis is on getting elected and who are only concerned with the program as it relates to the electoral process. The accumulation of power in a political figure is a most effective way of overcoming serious, deep-seated doubts about his capacities because he can utilize the institutional forces of money, material, and influence as well as the human resources of the police and military. When such drives are compulsive, power is sought not for productive use but as a psychological necessity. Under these circumstances it takes on the characteristics of compulsivity that I touched on earlier. Here it is expressed as an insatiable pressure to overcome anx-

iety and self-doubts which can only be assuaged by more and more power. This quickly becomes a vicious circle in that its use produces counter-reactions which need to be dealt with by increased demonstrations of control.

This development has undoubtedly taken place in many historical figures of political significance but the mere presence of drives for power does not imply compulsivity. It is the relentless, irrational, insatiable intensity that characterizes all compulsive drives that enables us to recognize its presence.

Such motivations can often be identified in the business world in the form of the driving financier or entrepeneur whose goal is merely to increase his sources of power, rather than to create viable structures. Compulsive drives when frustrated or opposed may produce massive personality disorganizations ranging from depression and suicide to schizophrenic deterioration with particular tendencies toward paranoia and grandiose states.

It is not easy to resist the temptation to label certain politicians or political activities as compulsive. When such diagnoses are made simply on the basis of newspaper accounts, we subject psychiatry to all the justified criticism of our detractors. We cannot distinguish at a distance or from historical accounts the difference between passionate and intense activity which is benevolent and motivated by standards of ethical consideration and compulsive drives which are initiated and suggested by neurotic needs and mainly serve the psyche of the activist. Not all power drives are destructive to the public welfare even when neurotically derived.

How shall we distinguish the compulsively driven saint, mystic, or political servant from the malevolent and destructive compulsively driven opportunist? Obviously one must view the effects of the activity and not simply the origins, and unless we do so our labels can be misleading as well as detrimental. Yet such distinctions are valid and necessary in order to guard against accepting all power-driven individuals as public servants who because of their passion and devotion are judged to be friends and benefactors. The value of such individuals should not be determined simply on the basis of a psychological label but on the value, benefits, and results of their activity. "By their fruits, ye shall know them!"

I therefore propose to steer clear of making leading statements about the abuse of power and the psychopathic qualities of politicians who engage in power strivings. This is very tempting particularly if one wishes adequate news coverage, but can result only in a further deterioration of the value and validity of the contribution of the behavioral theorists who,

to preserve their integrity as scientists, should limit their expertise to the areas of their competence and speak only as private citizens on matters that lie outside or are only tangential to their specialties. This I believe can be accomplished by our identifying compulsivity as well as other neurotic or psychotic developments which may affect the public interest. We also should stand ready to offer and apply such understanding when this is possible within our areas of competence and capabilities as behavioral scientists and as public-spirited citizens just so long as we ourselves see the difference and make it evident to others.

Conclusion

Power like other human capacities can become a participant in compulsive processes. When it does, it has great potentiality for good or for evil, since compulsivity involves passionate intensity and exclusive preoccupation as well as rigidity, inflexibility, and a devotion to the process rather than the person. Since compulsions, like neurosis in general, are self-defeating, it is inevitable that they must meet some public acceptance or approval in order for them to achieve the power and influence required to alter the functioning of large groups. Consequently, we would find that the successful compulsive power drive to the extent that it is being acknowledged in public life could easily be rationalized, however distorted its origins or ultimate goals. The power-driven politician would be responding to society's needs to the extent that it accepted his compulsivities. In this way a neurotic development could be socially acceptable and be mistaken for a cultural value. This fact speaks to the relativity of mental illness and defense mechanisms as well as the necessity for viewing neurotic developments in a nonmoralistic, judgmental sense even while we must view the consequences of such behavior on the community on moral and ethical grounds.

References

1. Adler, A.: The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924.
2. Freud, S.: Collected Papers, James Strachey (Ed.). New York, Basic Books, 1959.
3. Fromm, E.: Escape from Freedom. New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1941.
4. Horney, K.: Neurotic Personality of our Time. New York, W. W. Norton, 1937.
5. Monroe, R.: Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought. New York, Dryden Press, 1955, pp. 174-219.
6. Rado, S.: Psychoanalysis of Behavior, Vol. I. New York, Grune & Stratton, 1956.

7. Rank, O.: Will Therapy and Truth and Reality. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.
8. Salzman, L.: Psychology of religious and ideological conversion. Psychiatry 16:177–187, 1954.
9. Salzman, L.: Paranoid state – theory and therapy. Arch. Gen. Psychiat. (Chicago) 2:679–693, 1960.
10. Salzman, L.: Developments in Psychoanalysis. Grune & Stratton, New York, 1952.
11. Salzman, L.: Obsessive Personality. New York, Science House, 1968.
12. Sullivan, H. S.: The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York, W W. Norton, 1953.
13. Yankelovitch, D., and Barrett, W.: Ego and Instinct. New York, Random House, 1970.

Discussion by Marvin G. Drellich, M.D.

Ernest Jones, in his summary of the critical problems which remain to be clarified by psychoanalysis, has asserted that the understanding of the psychology of power is one of the most urgent problems confronting our science. He stated, in the third volume of his epic biography of Freud (1957), "The necessity for power and force in restrained measure, and on the other hand, the almost invariable abuse of such power, provide problems the solution of which would benefit the world enormously. There is a psychological approach available, the investigation of the particular type of person who seeks power. The motivation here will probably turn out to be more complex than might appear and to be connected with mysterious inner needs which impel toward that particular expression. Such considerations have also an obvious bearing on the overridingly important matter of international relations if these are ever to be lifted above their present childish level of fear, suspicion and enmity."

Dr. Salzman has addressed himself to these questions in his stimulating chapter, and I will state at the outset that I am in substantial agreement with both his tone and substance. I will therefore try to extend and detail some of his general comments on compulsive power drives and also to wade into the turbulent political implications.

Concerning the early developmental experiences which contribute to the drive for power, Dr. Salzman distinguishes between two variables: (1) the feeling of power, the capacity to influence others and fulfill one's needs, and (2) the feeling of helplessness or powerlessness. I would suggest a third variable which was mentioned but not elaborated by Dr. Salzman: the feeling of *being under the power or control of another person.* I wonder how much of the compulsive power drive derives from an individual's efforts to undo or reverse a feeling of being not only helpless, but also obliged to submit to the control and domination of another. To what extent do the early disciplinary experiences including but not limited to the toilet-training experience—cause one to feel that control of one's body and its routine functions is under the control of

another person? To what extent does parental control—especially when it is harsh, punitive, arbitrary, and inconsistent—provoke a tendency to *undo* all controls by others, to reverse the state of being dominated into the state of being dominant? We know that a substantial number of persons who display the obstinate behavior which we label compulsive or anal character traits are usually engaged in a twofold operation; on the one hand they resist all outside force, pressure, coercion, or even persuasion or suggestion which they view as someone's attempt to control their lives, and on the other hand they are often quite arbitrary and high handed in imposing their will on others. Could these persons be in the grip of the unconscious conviction that "the only way to preserve with assurance my freedom and to retain control over my own life is to seize the dominant role myself, to control all others lest I be controlled by them?" In analytic terms, I would ask to what extent a child's submission to arbitrary, punitive control by others may contribute to the later compelling need to dominate others in order to ward off being dominated in later life.

As I turn from these general psychological considerations I find it almost impossible to abstain from discussing the tantalizing question of compulsive power drives and politics.

I have recently heard of a report *(The Fiery Chariot)* by Lucille Iremonger, wife of a Conservative member of Parliament, in which she argues that there is a direct correlation between childhood deprivation, illegitimacy, bereavement or rejection, and the drive to political power. She states that 60 percent of Britain's prime ministers lost at least one parent before their fifteenth birthday, compared with only 1 percent of the nation as a whole. She asserts that a result of their loveless childhood experiences many of these British leaders shared common traits of hypersensitivity to criticism, alienation, reckless ambition, a tendency toward depression, and an obsession with the need for total acceptance. She describes Ramsay MacDonald as a particularly outstanding example. Mac-Donald was an illegitimate child who never knew his father. An extremely sensitive man, he devoted his life to a compulsive climb up the political ladder. Though outwardly he appeared to be a reserved and austere person, he was, to those who knew him, vain, arrogant, aggressive, superstitious, and subject to violent changes of mood.

Let me say categorically that I have a great deal of skepticism about the conclusion which Mrs. Iremonger drew even if her facts about family background were correct. Far more about the quality of the child-parent relationships in each instance would be needed before a tentative conclusion could be drawn for any individual prime minister, and I doubt if reliably similar backgrounds could be established for a significant number of these leaders of Great Britain. Nevertheless, I mention her speculations here in order to challenge us to think about the question of the relationship between compulsive power drive and the family background of political leaders. To my knowledge, no gathering of in-depth background data on the American presidents has been made and, if it were, all conclusions would have to be drawn with the greatest care lest we leap to facile

but insupportable generalizations. Nevertheless, it would be fascinating to look at such data about our presidents, senators, generals, and leaders of business, science, and education.

The interplay of psychoanalysis and politics involves more than the issue of compulsive power drives, as Dr. Salzman would certainly agree. Since he limited himself to the subject of power drives, I will offer a few comments on psychoanalysis and the politics of the ordinary citizen.

Jones, who obviously had a special concern for political matters, has written in his autobiography that the political views of persons in analysis are rarely altered by the analysis. Even though the roots of the patient's political views— be they right, left, or center—are uncovered and clarified in the course of the analysis, the patient's political persuasions will generally remain just what they were before the analysis. To be sure, the patient came for relief of distressing symptoms and not to have his politics altered. Further, those relatively few analysts who analyze the origins of the patient's political views are nevertheless reluctant to try to alter the patient's politics—no matter how much they may differ from his own. Another factor may be the self-serving role which the patient's politics play in his current social and economic adaptation.

Still, I think there is much we do not know even after we have exposed the infantile roots, the omnipotent fantasies, the compensations for helplessness, the anal fixations, the oedipal derivatives, the identifications with significant parent figures or reaction-formations against such parent figures. These so far unknown factors would apply to the political leader and to the political follower when we try to understand the origins of the political actions or the ideological commitments of either group. Our ignorance may derive from the fact that too many of us are wary of a searching analytic investigation of our patients' politics— perhaps in the same way that we may not thoroughly probe their religious beliefs for fear that we are meddling in areas that are not our proper concern. If this is the case we should consider whether or not this is evidence of scientific timidity.

As a final comment I would agree that power has often taken on a pejorative meaning and that the sense of power for good, power for positive and productive influence, power to enrich the lives of others, is too often neglected. In my judgment, the creative artist, performer, or interpreter may be said to have power— regardless of its infantile sources—which is as potent as it is elusive. The evocative power of Sophocles, Shakespeare, Schubert, or Giorgione may well represent the most hopeful and transcendent uses of power which impinge upon us. On a more down-to-earth level, the evocative power of a concerned and loving parent may well have some qualitative relationship to the power of the creative artist.

The Uses of Power:
A Particular Impasse in Psychoanalysis

WARREN J. GADPAILLE, M.D.

A familiar crisis in psychoanalysis occurs when an analysand, usually suffering from one of the paranoid states, loses or eschews the use of his observing ego and turns upon the analyst the full force of his pent-up rage. In better integrated patients, the analyst may not have to shift his stance of benevolent objectivity in order to demonstrate the transference nature of the outburst. In other patients, the rage is not self-limiting, and the pleasure of finally venting their rage at someone who steadfastly uses only reason in response represents a misuse of power. If the power bases inherent in both the analyst's and the patient's roles are not thoroughly understood, and if the analyst is not comfortable in the exercise of his own sometimes considerable power, such an impasse may not be therapeutically resolved.

The concept of power in the analyst-analysand interaction has received relatively little study and generally only negative comment. Sociology is more fruitful in its explorations of various aspects of power, and for purposes of this discussion I will use a basic sociological definition of power: the capacity to control the actions of others. To this I would add two additional facets. One is the capacity to control or change the attitudes

of another. Second, of particular relevance to the breakdown of analytic effectiveness, is the power of those ostensibly weaker, under particular circumstances, to negate and subvert the power of those who are ostensibly stronger.

I suggest that the possession, the exercise, and the shifts and balances of power in the analytic relationship have perhaps been only fragmentarily comprehended. It will not be my attempt to pursue these issues under the familiar rubrics of transferences and countertransferences, controlling and manipulative techniques, resistance, and so on, except in brief perspective. The very familiarity of these concepts may unwittingly stultify fresh conceptualizations. It is not my goal to offer major new concepts, but merely to suggest a different perspective on this familiar analytic impasse; let us consider whether extrapolation from sociology may contribute some understanding.

Background

Power as a human attribute and as a type of interaction between persons is given markedly different value in sociology and in psychoanalysis. In analytic psychodynamics, power is by implication differentiated from ego mastery (which is essentially power over oneself), and any importance it occupies in the personality constellation connotes some characterological distortion at least. Indeed, such reservations attach to the very concept that even the rebellion against social power is often tainted as well. It is regarded as nonresolution of the oedipal conflict with father's authority, resulting in inability to come to an appropriate accomodation with existing power structure. Conversely, the acceptance of prevailing power structure may be simply a different kind of failure of oedipal resolution. In analytic terms, power is a dirty word whether one has it or doesn't, accepts it or repudiates it.

Some students of the psychology of power[1] even state categorically that power is inherently and universally evil, that power and love are opposites, and that any degree of human development along the vector of one inevitably diminishes the capacity for the other.

Particularly is the use of any influence resembling control or power deplored in the analyst's relationship with his patient. Traditionally, almost any action by the analyst is regarded as undue influence which compromises ego growth. In an earlier paper,[2] I explored certain kinds of analytic activity designed to press the patient into a further confrontation with the constricting conflicts without violating the optimal growth con-

ditions as outlined by Eissler.[3] Without calling them the exercise of power, the maneuvers discussed were indeed that.

The weight of analytic writing, however, remains opposed to the exercise of anything that might be considered power by an analyst. From the well-known "God complex" to all the subtleties of acted-out counter-transference, active influence by an analyst is predictably regarded as a flaw of technique at the very least, or more often the expression of his own unanalyzed needs and conflicts. Although there is a wide literature dealing with coercive manipulations and "power struggles" engaged in by patients, it is usually assumed or explicitly stated that these are best exposed as inappropriate if the analyst is able to remain unresponsive to the challenge and refuses to engage in the power struggle. The analyst is envisioned as solely an "enabler" in the maturation of the analysand's ego, and this function is somehow not perceived as an exercise of power. Only rarely, as in such rather offensive little books as *Games Analysts Play*,[4] is there any suggestion that the massive avoidance of exercising power may in fact be antitherapeutic in some instances.

Sociology is more realistic about power. A basic postulate is that power exists and is exercised in every social system,[5] regardless of the difficulty in identifying the power actors. As a given in human interaction, it is not automatically subjected to value judgment, but its expressions and bases of operation are subjected to study. French and Raven[6] enumerate five bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referrent, and expert. Briefly, these may be defined as follows:

Reward power maintains itself through positive benefits and acceptance in return for conformity. The slang expression "making brownie points" refers to this base of power.

Coercive power is virtually the obverse of reward power. The threat or expectation of punishment for failure to conform is its operant influence; armed robbery might be an example.

Legitimate power depends upon group acceptance of social hierarchical norms; by virtue of membership in a particular group, there is mutual acceptance of the right of persons in certain positions to exercise particular powers. The authority of office in a democratic organization is an example.

Referrent power requires identification with the power wielder, such that the motivation to conform is internalized and the reasons for conformity become as much one's own as pertaining to another. True conscience (even if coercively initiated) epitomizes conformity to referrent power.

Expert power is derived from the degree of specialized knowledge

possessed by the power actor. Conformity is based upon benefits to be obtained from acceptance of the expert's leadership. Blind and unknowing obedience to a physician's prescription is apposite.

Warren[7] explores these power bases further, indicating that they are optimally effective under differing conditions of surveillance and produce different kinds of conformity (behavioral versus attitudinal) in various degrees and combinations. One fact should be apparent from these definitions: value judgments may not be applied a priori to any base of power. In the instance of a very active and aggressive 2-year-old, no amount of sweet reason may protect him from urban street dangers. Coercion may provide the only means of survival until the child's cortical development allows for internalization of the recognition of danger; thus even coercive power may have its humanistic place.

Even sociology, however, offers little elucidation on the subject of nonlegitimized coercion,[5] or, more specifically, on the power to render helpless as opposed to the power to gain positive control. Although little study has been done on this power base, it has gained tremendous recognition in the media as various minorities and individuals have discovered their ability to wield such time-limited but briefly limitless power. The single-armed skyjacker, kidnappers of uninvolved foreign diplomats, a few students occupying a university president's office such persons, who are generally powerless on any ongoing or societal decision-making basis, may render large institutions or even major nations helpless. I would, therefore, identify a sixth power base and suggest that it be called subverting power. Subverting power may be defined as that by which the realistically weaker member in a given power interaction is temporarily capable of negating the power of the stronger. Although elements of coercion may be present, as in the foregoing examples, there are two differentiating characteristics. Subverting power is temporary and is an interaction in which there are no lasting winners. If a genuine shift of power positions were to result from the exercise of this power base, and the newly stronger person were to try despotically to maintain his new power indefinitely, the power base would have shifted to coercive power.

In the area of political history, Kissinger has traced international stability to a "generally accepted legitimacy . . . an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and *methods* of foreign policy . . . the acceptance of a framework . . . (that) does not make conflict impossible, but limits its scope"[8] (italics mine). In discussing the effectiveness of expert power, French and Raven[6] indicate that a prerequisite condition is that the person(s) influenced must

believe that the expert does have the necessary knowledge and that the expert is telling the truth. It would appear that the continuity of exercise of any rational power requires the mutual acceptance of certain "ground rules" and most especially requires mutual respect for the agreement to avoid certain prohibited tactics; e.g., opponents will confront each other directly rather than involving hostages. In the abrogation of such rules of interaction—that is, when one party exercises subverting power—the result is either social chaos or the necessity to shift power bases.

I propose that sociological perspectives upon power may be—I think must be—applied to the "society" of two in the analytic dyad; that nothing is gained by denying that at any moment the analyst and/or the analysand is exercising definable power over the other; and there are occasions when an analyst may have to exercise coercion to salvage a therapeutic encounter.

Clinical Illustrations

The first illustration will be a clinical entity—school phobia—rather than an individual. Leventhal et al.[9] describe the syndrome as essentially a power move by the child against parents and secondary parent figures such as school personnel. Such a formulation in no way negates varied psychodynamics leading to school avoidance, but focuses upon its expression in the microsociety in terms of power. School phobias demonstrate the surprising power of the child to outwit and intimidate whole groups of adults and expose the complementary lack of firmness and inconsistency of parent and school pressures upon such children to attend school. (I am putting aside the genuine but at present irrelevant considerations of the quality of the child's school experience, and I am assuming that the adult has legitimate authority to insist upon formal learning experiences for most children.) In this syndrome, the child is using subverting power to paralyze the real and legitimate power of the parents and cultural institutions.

Although there is some opinion advising permissiveness until therapy removes the fear of school (as in Greenbaum[10]), most therapists agree that this is courting disaster and reinforcing the child's unrealistic fantasies of his own power. Leventhal sums up the recommendations that a counterforce greater than the child's must be applied at the earliest moment to cut through the child's rationalizations for avoiding school and to ensure his continued attendance. This requires that the adults involved be comfortable with the exercise of coercive power in the child's best interests.

This application of power reassures the child that he is neither as all powerful (vis-à-vis legitimate adult authority) nor as powerless (to cope with the school experiences) as he fantasizes. The relevance of this therapeutic problem to analytic practice will be discussed below.

Case 1. Mrs. Jane A. was a schizoid 26-year-old married woman with three children. She entered analysis for debilitating phobic anxieties, but the focus of treatment rather rapidly shifted to problems related to her severely paranoid character and tendencies to hysterical acting out. She was one of several children of a manipulative-exploitive and distant father and a rather ineffectual and hypochondrical mother. Her childhood was marked by a brief but full-blown obsessive-compulsive neurosis and a failure of secure female identity formation related to the lack of effective emotional encounter with either parent. Her husband was a professional, also a manipulative-exploitive character virtually to the severity of a con man; he was cripplingly adept at outwitting her in psychological games which kept her off guard, uncertain of any of her perceptions, doubtful of her sanity, and completely unable to find a dependable emotional relationship with him. But the very poverty of her self-concept made her cling to him, and his own inner dependence caused him to need her enough to accept her increasingly disturbed behavior without totally rejecting her.

Needless to say, trust was not a highly developed characteristic in Jane and was often tenuous in analysis. Throughout the first 2 years, her desperate need for help and for someone upon whose consistency she could depend was constantly at war with her fearful mistrust. There was no professional villainy of which I was not suspected of being at least potentially capable. However, her her need was greater, and provisional trust was adequate for steady improvement in self-confidence, until she began to take her perceptions of her husband fairly seriously—a position from which I could offer her little respite because her perceptions were essentially accurate. These emotions were overwhelmingly threatening to her, and all of her mistrust was mobilized defensively against me. There began a tirade of vituperation and accusations which ultimately promised to be endless. I was called dishonest, conniving, stupid, professionally unethical, and incompetent; I was accused of trying to influence her unfairly, trying to break up her marriage, competing with her husband—the list was almost endless because her lack of control was definitely increasing and the roll of my failings came to need no relevance to the actual threat she was feeling. Refusal to respond and argue was ineffective and seen as equivalent to a plea of *nolo contendere*. Interpretations were dismissed as deceptions. Patience was regarded as weakness and as an effort to keep her bound to me rather than admitting she was right and letting her be free of me.

Several months passed while every technique was used to help her recognize the projected and transference inappropriateness of her rage. They were unavailing because she had renounced any observing ego and had unilaterally

discarded the operating ground rules by which analytic interaction between us was possible. I did not consider this a psychotic break, however, but an extreme form of acting in, which both defended her from separation and gave her so much pleasure that she was unable to alter it. Finally I abruptly terminated her analysis on the basis that her feelings and behavior destroyed my basis of therapeutic influence. I pointed out that I could not remain available to her for help unless she could and would again accept my role of professional authority and agree to the conditions under which that role could be effective. I told her that I would not fill her appointments for 2 weeks, and that at the end of that time, but not sooner, I would see her once more if she wished and she could tell me if she wished to continue under my conditions. She was shocked and tried to negotiate her way out of my ultimatum, but I did not see her for 2 weeks, at which time she returned; she experienced my position as very reassuring, and the otherwise endless impasse was resolved. Analysis continued to a satisfactory conclusion.

Case 2. Georgia N. was a 32-year-old married professional woman who entered analysis after hospitalization for paralyzing anxiety and some questionable loss of reality contact. Her diagnosis was severe paranoia with borderline schizophrenia. She was the oldest of six children of a mother with a masochistic character structure and an alcoholic, abusive father. Her childhood was one of excessive responsibility for her siblings and lonely, terrified isolation from her peers. She was successful in professional training but chronically deficient in self-esteem. She married a passive, noncommunicative man almost in a sense of resignation to never being able to make a better alliance, and she actively resented his shortcomings from the beginning.

Georgia formed an immediate and tenaciously dependent, idolizing transference. It was clear as time passed without any change that this was unconsciously designed for failure, that so idealized a man must inevitably fall short of fulfilling her infantile expectations, then to become totally unworthy and despised, another disappointing male. The tenuousness of her reality contact was displayed in her constant professions of love and the fantasies not only that I, alone, could fulfill her, but that this was a realistic possibility if only I cared enough for her to heed the intensity of her need. Growth was slow but significant, but this core fantasy remained unshakable.

After approximately 3 years, circumstances in my private life led eventually to my remarriage. Georgia found out about this because she had had a slight acquaintance with my new wife, and the predicted reversal of transference exploded like a bomb. I had betrayed her, and from this point the course was very similar to that in the previous case but with even greater intensity and venom. Although function in all other areas was maintained quite well, in this delimited area Georgia's thought content became overtly delusional. My private action was an actual betrayal and my choice was specifically made for the purpose of humiliating and destroying her. She insisted that if I were really con-

cerned about her well-being I would have chosen her. No denunciation of me was too extreme. As is the essence of paranoia, every effort to break through this delusional perception was retranslated so as to fit her delusional scheme. Interpretations which offered differing explanations for her emotions were taken to demonstrate that either I was unaware of my own motives or I was consciously deceitful. Nonresponse to her bitter challenges gave no evidence of letting them run their course; such tactics were either taken as tacit admission of guilt or, since her dependence upon me remained intense, perceived as a means of maintaining her dependency. As in the previous case, the freedom to pour out violent rage, including homicidal threats, became an end in itself. This gratification, and the absence of observing ego, indicated no spontaneous or reasoned end to the flood.

In spite of the clearly delusional nature of this episode, I believed Georgia could mobilize controls rather than give up treatment. Eventually I said, "Georgia, there comes a time when certain facts are not a matter of opinion. If two people differ about whether the earth is round or flat, one of them is right and the other is wrong. That's where you and I are. You came to me originally because of gross distortions in your perceptions of yourself and others. Regardless of the strength of your emotions, you have to assume that I am honest and that I am more likely to be objective about both of us than you are. If you want to continue in treatment with me, this is not a matter about which you have any choice. It is either that, or we must terminate." I was not sure that instituting controls would result in any genuine change in her delusional system, but this offered the only milieu in which the problem could be discussed. I am still not sure. She accepted my conditions, and treatment has proceeded extraordinarily well. I do not consider, however, that the core delusion has yet been fully enough probed to verify that my position of power was reassuring enough to make her genuinely capable of basic trust.

Discussion

In the analyst-analysand relationship, under normal and functioning circumstances, the analyst exercises both expert and referrent power. The analysand expects to benefit from the specialized knowledge and training of the analyst, and also identifies with the analyst's presumed greater self-awareness and secure self-esteem; in this latter case the analysand hopes to share in the personal dividends such qualities pay in everyday life. To a lesser extent, the analyst also exercises legitimate power, in that the right of a medical expert to offer therapy is legitimated through cultural institutions. The analysand, too, exercises power. His is legitimate power on a provisional, sliding-scale basis. The analyst recognizes the patient's right to pass on the applicability of an interpretation even if the patient is mistaken; however, he does not forfeit his own expert power

to evaluate the patient's judgment in the context of his unconscious conflicts. He also recognizes the patient's legitimate power to withdraw from the relationship, whether rationally or irrationally. Seen in this perspective, the analyst is constantly in a power role.

Assuming that the power bases in this interaction are appropriate (e.g., the analyst does have adequate expert qualifications), the expected therapeutic influence can only occur as long as there is mutual adherence to understood operating conditions, the "permissible aims and methods." These ground rules not only delimit the permissible methods of therapeutic interaction, but also proscribe the various subverting power operations which would negate therapeutic influence. Many of these nullifying conditions may never be openly stated, but a thorough understanding of them is essential if one is to remedy some breakdowns of the relationship. It is obvious, for example, that in relation to the described legitimate power of the analysand, an analyst who used his patient for the gratification of his own sexual needs, yet used his aura of expert power to persuade her that this was for her benefit, would have abrogated the permissible methods for this interaction and would be exercising subverting power. This paper, however, will focus upon the operating conditions that must be honored by the analysand and assume both that the analyst's conduct is ethical and that he exercises only appropriate power.

I have mentioned above that expert power is contingent upon the trust that the expert does have the knowledge and is telling the truth. These represent two of the principal circumstances without which therapy cannot occur and must be accepted by the analysand. Because the analysand must recognize that his own perceptions may be subjectively distorted by his conflicts, he must agree to a third principle: In his inevitable doubts and mistrusts of the analyst, he must maintain a certain observing portion of his ego which allows him to consider that his attitudes and convictions about the analyst may be products of his own distortions. Although this is an oversimplified statement, I believe these are basic elements of the entente under which an analysand may benefit from competent analysis. Abrogation of any one of them is implicitly proscribed; it constitutes subverting power and nullifies the analytic process.

In the two cases reviewed, the two women patients abolished the ground rules, yet wished to maintain the relationship on their own unilaterally established terms. They thus exceeded their legitimate power and successfully subverted analysis by shifting the power base. The analyst's expert and referent power positions, effective under the original conditions of interaction, were now useless. Since these appropriate bases

are often misconceived as not representing power exercise, analysts may be tempted to continue to operate indefinitely within these power bases because they are perceived as permissible nonpower means of analytic influence. The failure to recognize the use of power as inevitable and legitimate may confuse the issue of how this power has been subverted, and an analyst's reluctance to wield power identified as such may result in endless stalemate or in his coming to regard the analysis a failure and the patient untreatable.

In these instances, the analyst must shift unblushingly to coercion: You must accept my authority or you must do without me. The expected punishment for failure to conform must outweigh the disturbed emotions acted upon to subvert the analysis and the pleasure derived from acting upon them. In those instances in which this is possible, the original agreement involving permissible methods of influence is restored and the period of acting in may be subjected to analysis. When the threat of loss is not powerful enough, then the subverting power has achieved its defined ends. The power is indeed short lived since the analyst does not remain subjected to the patient's tyranny, and there are truly no winners in the power play enforced by the patient.

The brief discussion of the school avoidance syndrome was introduced to illustrate, in a different but related context, the antitherapeutic consequences of faintheartedness in implementing appropriate legitimate and expert power.

It is my impression that the particular impasse I have illustrated is most characteristic of the various paranoid states, in which trust is tenuous at best, and rage is so omnipresent that its expression may become an end in itself. In these same states, however, dysfunction may be so great and need for help may be so intense that a determined shift to coercion by the threat of termination may often be effective.

Summary

A specific kind of analytic impasse, characteristic of paranoid states, has been discussed in the conceptual contest of social power. The observation has been made that psychoanalysis attempts to avoid the use of power in enabling change in the patient. The following premises are offered:

1. Power exists and is exercised in every social interaction.

2. The analyst appropriately exercises expert and referrent power, and legitimate power to a lesser extent.

3. The effectiveness of the therapeutic interaction in analysis is con-

tingent upon a mutual agreement concerning the permissible methods and conditions of operation.

4. The exercise of subverting power by the patient through abrogation of the necessary conditions negates the power of the analyst and nullifies therapeutic effect.

5. Subverting by the patient requires the analyst to shift his power base to that of coercive power in order to salvage the analysis.

6. Denial of power by the analyst and the unwillingness to use it result in unnecessary analytic misadventures.

There is nothing unusual or exotic about the type of impasse described; there is nothing really unique about the technique employed to cope with the crisis. It is suggested that the sociological view of power may clarify some of the analyst-analysand interactions in which power has been denied or misused. It is finally suggested that there may be a far wider applicability to the principle that the power wielded by the analyst must be recognized as such, and that there are endless means by which patients may shift to subverting power, thus requiring a purposeful shift in the psychoanalyst's power base.

References

1. Sampson R. V.: The Psychology of Power. New York, Pantheon Books, 1966.
2. Gadpaille, W. J.: The analyst as auxilliary ego in the treatment of action-in-hibited patients. Sci. Psychoanal. 11:161–181, 1967.
3. Eissler, K.: The effect of the structure of the ego on psychoanalytic technique. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Ass. 1:104–143, 1953.
4. Shepard, M., and Lee, M.: Games Analysts Play. New York, Putnam's Sons, 1970.
5. Powers, R. C.: Identifying the Community Power Structure. North Central Regional Extension Publication No. 19. Ames, Iowa State University, 1965.
6. French, J. R. P., and Raven, B.: The bases of social power. In: Cartwright, D., and Zander, A. (Eds.): Group Dynamics. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson and Co., 1962, pp. 607–623.
7. Warren, D. I.: Power, visibility and conformity in formal organizations. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 33:951–970, 1968.
8. Kissinger, H. A.: A World Restored. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957, p. 1.
9. Leventhal et al.: Therapeutic strategies with school phobics. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, San Francisco, Calif., 1966.
10. Greenbaum, R. S.: Treatment of school phobias—theory and practice. Amer. J. Psychother. 18:616–634, 1964.

Psychotherapy as a
Redistribution of Power

LESTER A. GELB, M.D.

The term power as used in this paper refers to the awesome ability that people have to affect the lives of other people: the power to determine what happens to others. The specific "power" I am concerned with is a uniquely human one in that it derives from a human being's capacity for conceptual consciousness. The power of creative intelligence, derived from conceptual consciousness, is the most important factor differentiating humans not only from other animal species, but also from one another.

I am not here concerned with creative intelligence involved in man's control of his physical environment. Nor am I going to focus specifically on the important powers which derive from wealth, from social position related to race, sex, age, and so on—though these are operative in all human interactions. I shall focus on the broad power of humans to continually affect their own and others' social and interpersonal existence. It is this power to influence the mental state of others, to move others emotionally, to control, limit, or enhance the lives of others through words and actions, that mainly determines the quality of personal and social life. A patient often comes to us for help to enhance the quality of his life or to alleviate

the suffering which comes from a deficit of power, a frustration of power, or the tyrannical imposition of power over him. Power dynamics must be one of our basic concerns in psychotherapy. The fact is that any exclusive, one-sided, or nonsharing possession of power, whether in a small or large social system, can produce suffering and limitation for all those involved in that system. This applies to mother-child, husband-wife, friend-friend, boss-worker, patient-therapist, and other combinations of human relations.

The thesis to be developed here is that psychotherapy, to be effective, must take into account the influences each person has over others in his social system. Psychotherapy must promote changes toward optimal relationships to others by each of our patients, so that each may live creatively, productively, and cooperatively. To achieve this requires, not only the development of a positive sense of self, but redirection, alteration, and redistribution of power in social relationships. This necessitates value judgments by both therapist and patient as to what constitutes optimally healthy use of this power. Such therapy emphasizes interpersonal and social relationships rather than exclusively intrapsychic dynamics.

There is no doubt that each person has different and unique human powers. His psychic status, moreover, differs from one point in time to another according to his immediate organic state as well as being constantly determined by his biological and social history. Psychotherapy, therefore, cannot make people equal, but it may promote fuller realization of each individual's power. We know that the power to move others through the creation of great works of art, literature, or music or through scientific discovery is granted to only a limited number of people. We are concerned, as therapists, with the maximum development of each of our patients. This includes maximum improvement in the quality of his relationships with others, since one fully expresses his humanity only through those relationships. Therefore, we cannot be concerned with the patient alone. If our vision is so narrow as to be concerned only with our patient's satisfactions we may, for example, relieve his symptom of anxiety and be unaware of or unconcerned about the resulting destructive impact he has on others. This is not a far-fetched consequence of therapy.

I know of a young man who went to a well-known analyst for relief of anxiety which was related to uncertainty about acceptance in his profession and in his relationships with women. He had learned to bluff and to posture, and although he was pleased that he had accomplished as much as he did in this way, he feared that others would find out that he was a "phony." After his analysis, based mostly on an oedipal formulation of his shaky attempts to impress his mother and

avoid his father's wrath, he lost his anxiety and pursued his profession and a marriage with confidence and quiet dignity. Both he and his analyst were satisfied with the treatment results. Only when I had an opportunity to observe his wife, anxiously bringing him brandy when he returned from work, standing off unobtrusively while he sipped it, and listening with dutiful admiration to to his pompous preachings, did I realize that he had bought his security at the price of exploiting his wife and others. Of course, the wife's willingness to accept a role of "weakness and passivity," should have been explored. At some time during therapy, wife and husband might best have been seen together so that the power of each to contribute constructively in their various relationships could be developed. They needed help to become aware that although her "weakness" fed his illusion of strength, she in turn may have been exploiting him to satisfy her masochistic "needs." The human power of each could have been redistributed in such a way that it would not be polarized, exploitative, or masochistic.

The redistribution of power as a psychotherapeutic goal will be illustrated here in a case of three generations of one family treated by myself and a colleague* over a period of 3 years.

The family consisted of Bruce, a young man of 19, his father and mother, his aunt (his father's sister), and his father's parents. Individual, group, and family therapy were provided.

Therapeutic intervention first occurred when Bruce, a young student, was persuaded by his father to seek psychiatric help. A bright, 6-foot, 145-pound, well-dressed college sophomore, Bruce was unable to do his schoolwork and was anxious and hesitant in speech. He was distressed by his paralyzing self-consciousness in all social situations. He was always afraid of what people would think of him and he constantly tried to make a good impression but felt he could not succeed at this.

Because he had never had sexual relations with a girl, he feared he had a weak sex drive. He usually masturbated about once a month and recalled having had a nocturnal emission only once. He feared that his erections were not as firm as they should be. He was afraid of girls, feeling there was a mystical quality about them and that, since he had a low opinion of himself, they would also think little of him and reject him. In exploring the origins of his low opinion of himself, he recalled that he had always felt pushed around and unable to retaliate both at home and with peers.

There were many hypochondriacal complaints of recent origin. He mentioned having sinus trouble, frequent postnasal drip, headaches, frequent colds, and feelings of sluggishness.

Because of his near-panic state, my treatment was aimed primarily at helping Bruce avoid a psychotic breakdown which, I suspected, was imminent. I soon felt it necessary to see his father and mother and to later refer them for ongoing treatment elsewhere. Later, I also saw the paternal grandparents, the father, and the father's sister in family sessions.

The grandparents, now in their late seventies, came to this country in the 1920's as immigrants. As a young man, the grandfather had been anxious, restless, hard working, and eager to make good so as to please his ambitious and demanding wife. She has always played the role of a refined and queenly lady. Driven by her insatiable demands, the two of them built a rather successful business which they managed to keep open day and night. The poor man rarely got more than four hours of sleep. While his wife sat by the cash register, he would run throughout the service area to be certain that everything was in order. He drove himself to oversee every detail of the business to be sure that she would not be displeased. He developed a compulsive drive for perfection and success in the business. In his own way he manifested power by compulsively attending in person to every detail and, not incidently, succeeded in exasperating his wife.

His wife (the grandmother of Bruce, my original patient) would denigrate her husband and her children at every opportunity. Their daughter and their son, Bruce's father, in their mid-forties at the time I saw them, had also been used by the mother to nurture her ambition and self-esteem. She kept her son close to her with bribes and with warnings about the dangers of the world. She favored her son over her daughter, who was more "brainy" and less easily manipulated. When he was a boy she had fed him pure cream, which she kept hidden from his sister. To this day she tries to keep her son under her power by promising to favor him in her will over his sister. His entire work experience has been in the family business. I felt it was necessary to see him because of his obvious attempt to control his own son, Bruce, through bribes, constant advice, and surveillance.

Eventually all three generations were in therapy and the need for change in the power relationships among the three generations became evident. At the time therapy began, Bruce's 47-year-old father still looked like a fat, obsequious little boy. Even though his were the management brains which had recently built the business into an extremely lucrative enterprise, he still had no equity. He now has 50 percent of the business. Nevertheless his mother still expects him to do her bidding and sabotages many of his decisions by getting his father to subvert them. Both of these men have been oppressed for years by her coercive tactics. For example, when her son recently felt free enough to express his anger at her conniving to undo a business decision that had been made, she used guilt-producing power tactics to punish and control him. She said, "I'm always the guilty one; I'm always being blamed for everything—including your stupidity." She then picked up her coat and ran out. This is typical of a long-standing pattern of blaming others for unjustly accusing her and then running out and

waiting for them to beg her to come back. Years ago her husband (Bruce's grandfather) became depressed because of the pressured situation in which he found himself. His compulsive defenses had evidently failed him. Afraid, unable to assert himself and to show his anger, he became agitated and developed crying spells. This was the only counterpower he could bring to bear against his wife. After a psychiatrist advised him to reduce his work load, she became frightened and enabled him to get a "rest" by arranging a joint vacation in Europe.

Bruce's father came to treatment at age 47, also harassed and depressed. His marriage of 20 years was in trouble because of constant friction with his wife. It was a "bad" marriage from the beginning. The wife's mother had promoted the marriage because of the money involved. The bridegroom's parents had objected to the marriage because they felt that the girl would not be sufficiently subservient to them. In fact, she used detachment and denial to protect herself against the influence of all others and suffered from a paranoid psychotic episode 9 years after the marriage when their son (my original patient) was 8 years old. As will be described later in a fuller exposition of treatment of the young man, she withheld attention and love and was frequently sadistic to both husband and son, often beating her little boy and being hypercritical of her husband. She would then "make up to them" by being loving to her son and offering sex as a great gift to her husband. Her husband considered himself very lucky when she was available to him at these times.

Their son, Bruce, learned to use many of the familial power tactics of which he was, of course, also a victim. He never saw his father and mother discuss matters rationally or come to conclusions and agreement. Everything had to be bargained for. Bruce saw his father as a weakling who allowed himself to be treated "like a rag" by the grandparents. The father in turn gained satisfaction from the fantasy of his bright son as a future mental and physical giant. He saw Bruce as a model of what he would have liked to be and pressured him to continue in college with the goal of becoming a "great doctor." This vicarious investment led him to monitor every move his son made. His son in turn, had come to use his father, the most positive figure in his life, as a source of security and guidance. Bruce, of course, had never developed any sense of self except that which derived from the grandiose wishes and expectations of his insecure father. Bruce came to therapy at the point when he realized he could not live up to these expectations or to his own developing expectation of age-appropriate independence.

It was obvious that each member of this family, in all three generations, was using neurotic manipulative tactics to maintain his or her own sense of self, as well as using power to ward off control by others. Each manipulative practice was a power tactic which isolated the other members of the family. This, of course, prevented development of a healthy expression of the power which is available to humans through cooperative, nonneurotic interaction. The potential power to help each other to grow, to share, to enjoy, to prosper,

to find self-determination and creative individuation was canceled out. Instead, psychopathology was exhibited through power practices of a competitive and manipulative nature. These included the use of bribes of money, love, food, and security; of depressive practices such as withdrawal, crying, and sulking; of angry guilt-producing accusations; and of hypochondriacal symptoms and helplessness which forced others to rally around, offering help and attention. Some of these power tactics were used for neurotic goals, and others were on a psychotic level.

When I saw Bruce it seemed clear that he did not have the resources to break away successfully from his parents. He seemed desperate, tired, and frightened. He felt he could not continue to live with his parents "as a slave and a robot," but he also felt completely inadequate to handle himself without them. There was the danger of his attempting to use psychotic solutions. Nevertheless, he was able to give an adequate and insightful description of his situation and history. He knew that as an only child of controlling parents he had difficulty in developing a sense of self. "I spent a great deal of time with them. They took me with them. I was overprotected by them. I was surrounded with material possessions which they provided." When I asked him if he had ever felt any joy or fulfillment because of his own accomplishments, he answered, "No, I was always with my father and it was always 'That's my boy' from him. My father babied me and he took away some opportunities for me to learn." Bruce felt that his mother had no love for either him or his father. As far back as he could remember his mother had become violently angry when he would not do her bidding. During these violent tirades she would shout continuously and call him names, "Everything from a pig to a faggot." The father also had periods of violent anger when his son was stubborn or provocative. Bruce would take advantage of his father's vulnerability; he enjoyed riling him by pointing out his weaknesses. The father would suddenly strike him but shortly after would make up. "It was a very emotional scene and he would embrace me and say he would never do that again." Not only did Bruce take pleasure in being able to provoke punishment and then having the closeness of making up, but he also enjoyed the sense of power this gave him—perhaps the same power that he saw his grandparents use with his father. The practice of violent behavior followed by "making up" was even more prevalent and more extreme on the mother's part. Bruce recalls that when, as a little child, he had pulled the pots and pans out of the kitchen cupboard, his mother spanked him thoroughly and made him cry, after which she seemed satisfied and embraced him. He recalls finding ways to provoke his parents, seeking a punishing situation which he knew would be followed by affection.

In the context of his more recent difficulty with members of the opposite sex, Bruce had masochistic fantasies of being tied and beaten by women. From puberty until shortly after he began therapy he had made a practice of putting on his mother's underpants and in more recent years of masturbating at these times. He was envious of the power of women and believed that he had become

strong when he put on articles of his mother's clothing. He also saw this as a way of being "close" to a woman. He explained his masochistic fantasies by saying, "I feel that if members of the opposite sex treat me cruelly it will lead to something pleasant."

When Bruce was 8 his mother required psychiatric help, having become moody, withdrawn, and paranoid, saying there were "people behind the curtains." Bruce has been able to maintain a fairly complete distance from his mother since he was 14. At that time he stopped talking to her. He found it more comfortable to avoid his mother because of her unpredictable and changeable mental states.

With his peers Bruce felt almost completely powerless. "I couldn't compete. I've always felt more secure with adults, who would take care of the social situation. I was always afraid I would say the wrong thing and I'd think very carefully first, and so I've always been hesitant and inhibited. Now people think I'm lazy because I hold back." When Bruce went to college he lived in a dormitory but had only superficially cordial relationships with his roommates. During that time he had a dream that he was on the dormitory floor and his parents were living in another room close by. The patient's associations to and interpretation of this dream indicated that, even though he was living away from his parents, he had still not broken away from them. Since he told me this dream near the beginning of treatment, it seemed that he saw me as a parent equivalent who might provide him with the security and strength to move away from his parents.

An example of the terrible threat that sexual expectations posed for Bruce is shown by a dream he had shortly before his psychotic episode: "I was at school in a country setting. [Both school and summer camp represented frightening periods of time away from home.] I was supposed to have sexual intercourse with my mother on a circular platform so that others could watch. I was excited but then when I looked at her vagina I was appalled because it looked like a mouth—it made a gurgling sound as if it would suck at and mangle my penis."

The previous day's recollection was his worry about an examination he was to take at school and the possibility of taking an "Incomplete" in the course because he wasn't feeling well and had a "respiratory condition." He felt tired and wanted to sleep. His associations to the dream elements were that the vagina was like a mouth that would chew him up just as his mother always destroyed him by her demeaning derogation of him. He also thought of his father as being passive and dominated by his own mother and his wife. "I see sex as a performance with people grading me on how I perform. The people in the dream watching me were fellow students, peers. This is the situation I actually find myself in. I guess that's why I'm afraid of the opposite sex. I really don't want to be put down and mangled. I guess that's why I have very little sexual desire. I'm afraid of sex and I guess it is represented by the ugly vagina."

There are many possible interpretations of such a dream, including oedipal and homosexual concepts. However, it seems apparent that this dream was

prompted by Bruce's view of women, as conditioned by his relationship with his mother and grandmother, and also by his assessment of the nature of his father's and his grandfather's relationships with their wives. The controlling and threatening power of the women and the passive, acquiescent behavior of the men in his family all play a part in the production of this dream consciousness. Of course one must also take into account the patient's active role in dealing with the destructive and powerful influences of his family members. His own active hypochondriacal techniques and his willingness to be dominated are rationalization as well as defense. With these techniques he can avoid having to express himself and being rejected. When I made this interpretation to the patient he added, "Yes, and I also enjoy being pitied." Despite the patient's understanding of his own power deficits, and despite my efforts to provide security and strengthening of self during the first few months of therapy, it became obvious that the patient's resources were still insufficient to maintain himself outside of his family structure. He was determined to break away from his family but he began to use paranoid and grandiose techniques to deal with the frightening reality which confronted him. He was terrified of his situation and he didn't feel he could rise above his low level of functioning. A series of anxiety dreams illustrate this:

"I rang for an elevator and an alarm sounded, as if I was doing something wrong. I felt awkward and embarrassed because an attendant was there and actually I wanted to stay on the first floor."

Another dream: "I was waiting for the elevator in my dormitory and complaining to my friends about my respiratory infections. Some woman in authority told me to go to the university clinic and gave me a stack of IBM cards to take along. We got into a taxi and cops chased us on foot. I transferred some money to my other pocket to give to the cop. I ran into a building—your office—before the cop was about to grab me. The money in my pocket seemed to increase and I constantly shifted the money from pocket to pocket. The floors in the building became all scrambled in order and I pressed all the buttons of the elevator. I rang the doorbell vigorously and you answered and we entered and I felt safe, about to have a session with you."

This dream is certainly a psychophotograph of his mounting panic and his search for safety in me as a new parent figure. The money which the family seems to have in abundance is not enough to make him feel secure and is rather a burden because it emphasizes his dependence on the power of others. It should be apparent that the patient was not merely suffering from an intrapsychic defect. He had very good reason to fear arbitrary and irrational power and authority. This had been his actual life experience. After telling the dream, he lamented, "Why do I feel so pursued, so harassed, so put upon, about to be humiliated and revealed?" This also had been his actual experience. He added, "I have always been bombarded by authority and power. Even in nursery school the teacher was nice, but what she said went. We had a regimented program of blocks, rest, lunch, songs. At camp I was pushed from one activity to another.

I was afraid of the other kids. I was always afraid to be put down by them in a competitive situation. In camp and in school I was smaller and frail. I got pushed around and I just had to take it."

The contradictions and the dilemma which the patient experienced were certainly sufficient to produce a psychotic reaction. The patient had to run and seek protection from another authority (the therapist) of whom he was also terrified. He could not as yet sufficiently trust me to be different from his parents. The patient used two maneuvers to escape from his intolerable dilemma. First, he found a girl who despite his awkward social presence accepted him because of her own neurotic "needs." To impress her and to ensure his position with her, he began to use a self-delusional grandiose pose. He acted as the suave, self-confident, worldly wise, and superior man his father wanted him to be. The girl was impressed for a while but became disillusioned as she saw through him and his pose became more transparent. At any rate, before she left him, the patient was so self-deluded by his grandiose charade that he left therapy for a while. When she left him he panicked. He quit school and returned home, complaining of stomach trouble: his food would not stay down; he felt pain and nausea. He developed an anorexia and his weight went down to 100 pounds. The anorexia nervosa seems here to be a psychotic attempt to separate from the pathological symbiotic relationship with his parents, especially the father, by rejecting their "poisonous" nurturance. Bruce soon required hospitalization. After 3 months in this protective and secure atmosphere, he again gained weight. For a while he maintained the delusion that the antidepressant he was given in the hospital was continuing to reverberate and produce physical symptoms long after it was discontinued. When the patient returned to therapy, he was able to benefit from both group and individual therapy. He used the opportunity to discover his own resources and gradually to put some of them into practice. He developed a friendship with a girl he met in the hospital and was able to enjoy a sexual relationship for the first time. Although he and the girl tended to cling to one another, they nevertheless both benefited from the undemanding companionship and the sharing and planning they were able to do together. He was aware of his tendency to let her boss him around but was somewhat able to resist this. He gave up his plans for a medical career and got a job as a taxi driver while continuing half time with his college studies. He took pride in being able to earn his own way and refused to take money from his father except for therapy. Later he got an additional job and was able to pay for his own therapy. It should be noted here that much of the patient's improvement was related not only to his own therapy but also to the therapy his father was concurrently receiving from another therapist.

The patient is now fairly emancipated from his family but is quite conscious of still being attuned to pleasing others and afraid to disagree with them. Nevertheless, he is now willing to risk the anxiety of disagreeing with people on occasion. He can even hold his ground with both his father and his mother, though, perhaps reasonably, avoidance is still the primary way he handles his

relationship with his mother. "I realize there is no being with her unless you can please her."

At the present time the patient is making his own plans to return to group therapy elsewhere. He has become interested in some political activity, and he feels happier when he is doing something active with other people. He is trying to gain the ability to participate in cooperative living but is also aware of his many fears and limitations, especially in competitive situations. A more recent dream illustrates his partial progress and his continued need to struggle:

He dreamed that he and his girl friend had a baby, which pleased him, but that his father came and claimed the baby as his own, saying he would take the baby away. He felt "angry and rotten" in the dream but felt powerless and also not sure he wanted to do anything about it. I pointed out that although he and his girl friend had been able to accomplish something for themselves, he still felt it was for his father and that it was just as well to let someone else (the father) take over the burden of responsibility.

The boy's father, while in therapy, was helped not only to relinquish his controlling behavior toward his son but also to find, in his middle age, a sense of self and dignity. He was able to assert himself in business; he lost some weight, grew a beard, and dressed in a more mature and relaxed manner. Bruce was both pleased and relieved by his father's change. "He no longer puts on his phony-jolly-rosy role. He is more realistic. He is more independent of my grandparents and although they still yell at him they don't have power over him. Seeing him change has helped me change. I no longer see him so weak nor do I feel so weak either."

Soon after Bruce's father began to change, the dynamic equilibrium of the relationship between the grandparents and their children changed. As a result, the grandmother began to feel powerless and become more anxious and vituperative. Their daughter and son, in turn, became angry, and since they were now free to express their anger, the grandparents became even more agitated and depressed. At this point the grandfather's depression became serious enough to require treatment. He was persuaded by his son to come to me for help. I insisted that as many of the family members as possible come to the sessions. Both grandparents and their children arrived. I met with these four family members eight times over a period of 5 months. The sessions afforded an opportunity for expression of fears, resentments, and other feelings on the part of all concerned. The grandmother, worried about her husband, eager to prevent him from falling apart, relinquished some of her controlling power. The grandfather, in turn, was relieved of some of his anxious, restless need constantly to oversee everything. Antidepressant medication also seemed to help him. When he became convinced that it would be to his benefit, he was able to let his son do most of the managing of the business. Both the grandfather and the grandmother became more secure as their son developed ability to assert his own power, and to make appropriate contributions to the progress of the business. They continued to protest, but nevertheless felt reassured by his strength. As a result there was a

more appropriate distribution of power. All members of the family were able to accept some contributions from one another rather than to impose or assert exclusive power. Undoubtedly, after these many years of a style of living where power had been inappropriately distributed and used, only limited changes could be achieved. But sufficient changes occurred to make it clear that even people in their late seventies are able to learn and to be relieved when they experience the power and value of conjoint endeavor.

Special note must be made regarding the power deficit which underlies the manipulative roles played in this family by the women. This is inherent in the social reality which all women have to cope with in our society. The fact that women in general have been unable to realize their ambitions or achieve economic security through their own personal endeavor has often led them to seek satisfaction through pressure they bring to bear on their husbands and sons. The aphorism "Behind every successful man there is a woman" is snide acknowledgment of the denial of opportunity, independent success, and power to women.

Conclusion

Power, in a positive sense, represents an individual's ability to translate his wishes or ideas into useful forms of expression or matter or energy, which can add to the level of satisfaction or productivity of himself and other individuals in a community. The power constructively to influence one's fellow humans enables one to participate at a maximum level in the process of human living. We have been concerned here with this power, its distribution, and the possibility for its redistribution among people within a social system. We have been specifically concerned with the use of psychotherapy as a means of redistributing this power among a group of individuals.

Some individuals exert relatively little power in this sense, being unable effectively to express their abilities because of limitations within themselves or in their interpersonal or social world. Some exert personal power to control others and bring satisfaction and productivity only to themselves or to an exclusive group. This could be called a competitive use of power. In competitive living there is an imbalance of power, creating tension of an interpersonal or intrafamilial nature. In a cooperative situation, each individual benefits from the contributions of the others, and power is distributed equitably. The psychotherapist should be concerned not only with the power deficits of individuals but also with unequal distribution of power within groups.

Power deficits in larger groups, e.g., racial, ethnic, economic, and sexual groups, relate to the levels of satisfaction and of anxiety which the individuals within these groups experience. The psychotherapist must keep these factors in mind when working with individuals suffering from mental disturbance.

On the other hand, the therapist must ascertain the specific power deficit of each patient and be concerned with the distribution of power in the various small and larger relationships which characterize his patient's life. The basic unit for the therapist consists of the patient and one or more other significant individuals. The unit which the psychotherapist usually deals with is a family unit. One or more other units in his patient's particular life situation may also concern him: work units, school units, and units comprising friends and neighbors. If the distribution of power among individuals in one of these groups is uneven or unshared, so that some members of the group are deprived and there is a state of disequilibrium and tension, the therapist has every reason to assume that he is dealing with an unhealthy social unit. It follows, of course, that the psychotherapist will succeed only with great difficulty if he concerns himself with the individual patient alone. The most effective psychotherapy will result from dealing not only with the patient who initially comes for help, but also with others with whom he has significant relationships. One of the essential functions of the psychotherapist is to promote a redistribution or sharing of power among the significant individuals with whom his patients relate.

Discussion of Papers of Warren J. Gadpaille, M.D., and Lester A. Gelb, M.D., by Morton L. Enelow, M.D.

Dr. Gelb provides us with a significant description of power dynamics in a family of three generations. He correctly and clearly emphasizes that an intrinsic factor in any patient's suffering involves either controlling or being controlled, manipulating or being manipulated, or, as Dr. Gelb puts it, "the patient suffers from either deficit of power, a frustration of power, or the tyrannical imposition of power over him," regardless of the makeup of the human relationships in which the patient is involved. Dr. Gelb's exposition definitely illustrates the vital necessity to focus on and emphasize interpersonal and social relationships in our clinical work with patients, rather than focusing exclusively on intrapsychic dynamics.

Any type of neurotic symptom is, or can be, utilized or calculated to control, manipulate, or maintain power over others—whether the behavior is obsessional, obviously manipulative, depressive, hysterical, hypochrondriacal, masochistic, sadistic, submissive, dominating, paranoid, or otherwise neurotic.

Thus, since manipulation, control, exploitation, and power maneuvers are fundamental and inherent aspects of any and all neurotic behavior, and since people do not live in isolation or in an interpersonal vacuum, I concur emphatically with Dr. Gelb that we must keep his distorted interpersonal relationships in the forefront of analysis or therapy, with all of the gross and subtle interpersonal manipulations, exploitations, and controlling and power maneuvers as some of the primary foci of analysis. No longer can the truly successful psychoanalysis be conducted with an individual in isolation from his meaningful interpersonal relationships. We cannot content ourselves with making the unconscious conscious through fostering regression and analysis of the ensuing transference neurosis and resistances involved.

Dr. Gelb points up one of the most important reasons for the failures that occur so often in individual psychoanalytic therapy, not only the obvious failures that occur after many years of analytic work by talented therapists, but also many of the supposed successes in psychoanalysis such as Dr. Gelb's example of a supposedly successfull psychoanalysis that, in reality, resulted in more distorted and exploitative interpersonal relationships. The sad outcome might have been avoided had the patient and his wife been seen conjointly · an approach assiduously avoided by far too many psychoanalysts. Indeed, distortions of manipulation and control and the various power maneuvers in the patient's meaningful relationships may never be apparent to the analyst, even after many years of analysis, without the utilization of the periodic or occasional conjoint or family approach. A completely successful psychoanalysis is almost impossible to conduct without seeing a patient together with his mate, parent, or offspring at some point or points during his therapy or analysis.

Dr. Gadpaille presents a carefully thought out exposition of his ideas of the sociological concepts of power and gives his carefully reasoned attempts to bridge the wide gap between classical Freudian psychodynamics and sociological conceptions.

My chief criticism is that he has apparently overlooked the various post-Freudian developments in psychoanalytic thinking that have been bridging these very gaps for many years. The interpersonal psychoanalytic framework of Harry Stack Sullivan, the adaptational psychodynamic system of Sandor Rado, the Karen Horney framework of societal and culturally oriented psychodynamics, all included as a common meeting ground this same incorporation of sociological conceptions. These conceptions include, among others, that:

1. Power does indeed exist and is exercised in one form or another in every social interaction.

2. The analyst does indeed appropriately exercise influence and power over his patient.

3. The power of the analyst may indeed be denied, minimized, overlooked, or misused in many possible overt or covert ways by the analyst.

4. The various overt and covert means by which power is utilized and/or avoided by the analyst must be recognized and understood as such.

5. Equally important, there are, then, endless overt and covert means of utilizing power on the part of the patient, in the analytic relationship as well as in every other meaningful relationship in his life.

Dr. Gadpaille properly points up the necessity of a particular therapeutic tactic in the treatment of paranoids, namely, the threat of termination to break the impasse of a sustained paranoid attack on the analyst. It has become generally accepted by the post-Freudian schools that power dynamics usually involve far more than simply nonresolution of oedipal conflicts. It is also generally accepted in modern psychoanalysis that active influence by an analyst when indicated is hardly a flaw of technique or acting out on the analyst's part. Indeed, flexibility in the analyst's approach is one of the hallmarks of modern psychoanalytic technique. Dr. Gadpaille's statement that "sociological perspectives upon power may be—I think must be—applied to the 'society' of two in the analytic dyad" suggests that an apparent reliance on classical Freudian concepts of dynamics and techniques has failed to work in Dr. Gadpaille's clinical experience, as it has with so many others. He correctly reemphasizes the need to find fresh conceptions, viewpoints, and techniques to deal with the difficult therapeutic problems presented by the paranoid, the masochist, the borderline patient, the negative therapeutic reation, and the many other kinds of patients that have resulted in therapeutic failures by psychoanalysts of every school of psychoanalytic thought.

Discussion of Papers of Warren J. Gadpaille, M.D., and Lester A. Gelb, M.D., by Morton B. Cantor, M.D.

That sociologists may be more open than psychoanalysts in dealing with power as a given in human interactions not automatically subjected to value judgments is something upon which we should ponder. We *have* talked about power in general theoretical frameworks concerned with personality dynamics and about what patients are doing who are *openly* manipulative, seductive, and disruptive during the therapeutic process. There is, however, less emphasis on the power struggle between all patients and analysts that is constantly and subtly present in varying degrees at different times. For the analysts who are more aware of it, the struggle *against* the power struggle becomes a problem to be dealt with, as it may be for all people in close human interactions.

The struggle is minimized or made less sharp by an offhand use of shorthand terminology: "unresolved oedipal conflict with father's authority," "transference," "countertransference," and "resistance." Many times I have heard students and colleagues just use these terms and become annoyed when I asked just *how* these were operating in the specific cases they were discussing. Dr. Gadpaille's detailed account of 2 patients clarified the therapist's conflict as he became more aware of the power struggle.

Why has power been a dirty word for psychoanalysts? We certainly *have* talked about it in the past as being part of the patient rather than the analyst. Sampson's presentation of love and power as opposites[1] is an oversimplification. If we feel that our id impulses are always threatening to take us over as analysts, then we are focused on the most negative restrictive oppositional aspect of power, what has been called naked power, the power to control primarily for our own gratification, to protect our pride positions, or to vindicate ourselves from having been "unfairly" questioned or attacked. Starting from *this* vantage point, the going gets sticky.

In a culture which admires power, being "humanistic" is then seen at an opposite pole, which is a denial of the need for power as part of being human. On top of this, we have the image of the doctor as the unselfish, all-giving, sympathetic helper. And finally we have the image of the psychoanalyst, whose special experience, knowledge, and ongoing self-analysis are supposed to enlighten him sufficiently to be "above" such needs as power in the analytic relationship. Traditionally his role has also been seen as the permissive impassive respite from the coercive external world in order to allow for the full range of the patient's unconscious emotional acting out.

As long as power was seen only in a negative sense, these were very strong reasons for the analyst to have underplayed his role in the power struggle with the patient. Kubie[2] recently wrote about analysts "running away . . . from those aspects of themselves with which the psychotherapeutic entanglement confronts and challenges them. . . . In varying degrees, therefore, each patient is a projection of the therapist's own buried self-image and of the unresolved conflicts associated with the distortions of his self-image. . . . When we treat someone else we are also treating or at least defending ourselves. This takes a great deal out of the therapist. . . ." In other words, to face the power struggle with our patients is to become aware of our own conflicts about exercising control.

I appreciate Dr. Gadpaille's attempt to dissect power by using French and Raven's theoretical model. Those five bases of power give us specific aspects to look at, but I do not feel they are clear and distinct categories, especially if we are looking to see which is legitimate (good) and which is illegitimate (bad).

All five come into play, with analysts and patients used appropriately and inappropriately to varying degrees. I see reward power playing much more of a role for both, and it is inextricably and delicately interwoven with coercive power. That word control may immediately convey coercion, something negative in terms of the role of the analyst. "Influence" suggests something more benevolent, but to the extent that we *really* mean it more in a constructive sense, why shy away from it? When we include Dr. Gelb's statements about the power to influence fellow human beings to be happier and more productive in their lives, we are talking about goals that are absolutely consistent with the direction of the analytic process.

If we get away from the word power as strictly *interpersonal*, we might also remember that working successfully with patients gives us an inner sense of

being powerful—in terms of being effective and helpful in our life's work, enhancing our own self-respect and feeling of worth in the world.

I don't see how an analyst could avoid reward power, since the patient begins to know consciously or unconsciously which material his analyst prefers him to bring up and how to work with it, what kind of atmosphere the analyst would prefer in his office, what changes the analyst would like to see in his external life, and so on. When the patient wishes to reward his analyst, he has endless means at his disposal and I cannot see how any analyst would be impervious to this to some degree. The reward for the patient, if not overt approval from the analyst, would be the absence of the analyst's impatience, irritation, and contradictory interpretations, and, of course, his continuing to see the patient.

I am glad that Dr. Gadpaille calls attention to what he calls subverting power, which I see as the patient's form of coercive power. The analyst may have legitimate, referrant, and expert power, but without the cooperative effort of the patient, he is powerless in their joint venture. The patient may exercise this power more overtly by provoking crises in the relationship which *demand* action on the part of the analyst. If the manipulative use of money and time are not analyzed beyond their manifest content, the therapeutic meetings will simply cease. When patients become openly belligerent and defiant, as did Dr. Gadpaille's two women, and the therapeutic cathartic value of the acting out no longer seems to be furthering the psychoanalytic process, action must be taken. This feeling of limited progress is also a function of how much attack and frustration the analyst can personally tolerate in prolonged doses, since the analytic process depends as much on his desire, willingness, enthusiasm, and hope in working with the patient. Just how far the patient goes in being disruptive is a measure of his despair, hopelessness, self-contempt, and need for more direct contact with the analyst.

I would like to emphasize the less dramatic and more covert ways in which patients use subverting power.

One patient had quietly and unceasingly been telling me stories of abysmal abuse at the hands of parents, schoolmates, husband, children, and friends in a way that allowed for no ready remedies for change. During one hour in which her stories were particularly depressing and hopeless, I made no comment and she did not even glance at my face as she left my office. Before she had completely closed the door to my waiting room, I heard her say to my next patient, "He's yours, what's left of him." Another patient compared the way she worked with me to sucking out the insides of an egg until nothing was left but the empty shell. Other examples of subverting power are the patient's lowering his voice to inaudibility, leaving out clarifying details, omitting bridging thoughts, not following through on upsetting problems or crises in his life which he had presented in a previous hour, willful omissions or distortions, ad infinitum.

I am stressing the subverting power of the patient because too often there is an assumption that the patient is weak and powerless in the hands of the analyst

who has all the might just by being the authority and expert. I am reminded of the story of the masochist who meets the sadist in the street and says, "Beat me," and the sadist says, "No." This example may be somewhat crude and oversimplified and I don't want to get involved with who is who and when in the analytic relationship, but *neither* member of the analytic dyad has any effectiveness without the cooperation of the other.

Of course, all these maneuvers are forms of resistance, negative transference, and defense mechanisms, and if we analyze each in terms of the specific patients, the individual psychodynamics become clearer. The behavior of Dr. Gadpaille's patients reminded me of an excellent article by Karen Horney on "The Value of Vindictiveness."[3] She had defined sadistic trends as the satisfaction to be gained from the power to subject others to pain and indignity by humiliation, exploitation, and frustration and stated that the crucial motivating forces behind these were vindictive needs. For the patient these provide the subjective values of "self-protection against the hostility from without as well as against the hostility from within" and are attempts at restoring injured pride. To the extent that the patient's attempted solutions to neurotic conflict have failed and he feels hopeless and empty, a vicarious existence through vindictiveness becomes a way of life.

As the patient begins, during analysis, to experience that alternate ways of living might be possible and that there are feelings of friendliness, sympathy, and gratitude for his analyst, his whole neurotic structure that had provided a security for him is threatened. He fights back through the resurgence of symptoms we call negative therapeutic reaction, and the defeat of the analyst can become more important than finding a constructive direction in his life. Six months later the woman patient who had said "He's yours, what's left of him" to another patient in my waiting room, told me "I may be out to make your working with me as hopeless and frightening as I can, but I hope you're strong enough to take it, because, God help me—if I defeat you, I am lost."

Since the analyst represents an attack on the neurotic structure that the patient feels has been his most comfortable method to date for getting by in the world, there is always *some* kind of power struggle going on between patient and analyst. In the ordinary course of analysis it is delineated and lived through as the transference is resolved. When the course of therapy is being disrupted either subtly or openly, the analyst must know the what, how, and why of the power struggle first. But then he has to live through it, and how he accomplishes this depends on his own personality and unique interaction with the specific patient. To avoid taking any stand is in effect to be in collusion with the patient's resistance to analysis.

I feel that despite Dr. Gadpaille's attempts at studiously looking at power *without* value judgments, he gets caught up in using French and Raven's model and "ground rules" to justify what does not really require justification. For example, he talks about the unblushing use of power.

I do not question that his patients required firm and immediate action. In fact, they were calling out for it—to be heard, confronted, and stopped, much

as do children who are caught up in their own temper tantrums. The institution of external control here by Dr. Gadpaille provided the necessary reassurance that there was somebody who could help them out of a self-limiting and fruitless cycle of behavior. That his patients continued to work more constructively with him is evidence to me of some reestablishment of trust in Dr. Gadpaille, despite his own doubts about this.

There would be less wariness about facing the analyst's use of power if we thought about it more in the positive sense of Dr. Gelb, who speaks of the power to influence fellow human beings to be happier and more productive in their lives. His paper provides an excellent example of the competitive use of power within a family and how therapeutic intervention was able to modify the power imbalance for the mutual benefit of all.

Since in the analytic relationship the patient also wields his power, the imbalance of power is not so marked as one might think. As our work with our patients progresses, the power will become more evenly distributed and both patient and analyst will benefit. In essence we both begin to respect the healthier aspects of one another and to relate on a more realistic basis rather than as projections of our own personal inner needs.

References

1. Sampson, R. V.: The Psychology of Power. New York, Pantheon Books, 1966.
2. Kubie, L.: Retreat from patients. Arch. Gen. Psychiat. (Chicago) 24:102, 1971.
3. Horney, K.: The value of vindictiveness. Am. Jour. Psychoanal., 8;1, 1948. In: Kelman, H. (Ed.): New Perspectives in Psychoanalysis. W. W. Norton, New York, 1965, pp. 27 51.

part 5

THE FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN AWARD

The Inpatient
Treatment of Psychotics

BRUNO BETTELHEIM, Ph.D.

Like everyone who wishes to understand and help schizophrenics, I am deeply indebted to Frieda Fromm-Reichmann for all that I learned from her. So you can understand how much it means to me to have been chosen a recipient of the award that honors her memory. More than a great teacher and healer, she was above all a unique and wonderful person.

The treatment of schizophrenics, more than any other human enterprise, depends not merely on what one knows—though this is certainly important—but even more on what one is. This insight, I feel, and the way she translated it into everyday action, remains Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's greatest legacy. To realize it in our practice is the greatest challenge of our profession.

True, there will be further advances in knowledge and techniques in treatment of schizophrenics. But I doubt very much that any refinements could improve on what she taught us about inner attitudes necessary to achieve our goal of helping schizophrenics develop the desire to return to reality. In this connection we ought to remember that it was not Freud's method of dream analysis, nor his adaptation of free association, nor his brilliant theories that created psychoanalysis. What was crucial was the

radically new attitude he brought to the study of mental phenomena and to the treatment of his patients.

Although no one can deny her extraordinary knowledge and understanding of even the most complex psychic phenomena, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's true genius resided in the unique attitudes through which she related to schizophrenics. Her solutions to the problems they presented in individual therapy and in hospital management, solutions which deservedly brought her much renown, were the consequence of her very special sensitivity to their needs. Of this sensitivity her conceptualizations were only a secondary image. It is her attitudes to patients' needs, even more than her objective findings, which can and should revolutionize the inpatient treatment of all psychotics.

Time permits me to present only two all-too-sketchy examples of what this goal requires in practice. The first relates to the human and the second to the physical environment we must create for the treatment of psychotics.

In order to achieve a long-overdue revolution in inpatient therapy, we must set into practice Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's realization "that the first prerequisite for successful psychotherapy is the respect that we must extend to the mental patient,"[1] and this respect can be shown to the patient by all those he encounters in the daily hospital routines only if they themselves have also become its beneficiary. Adjunct therapists will respect the patient only if they and their work are treated with deepest respect by us. This assumption underlies Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's insistence that nurses and all others who live and work with the patient during the day, and protect him at night, participate not only in staff conferences, but also in the decision-making process.[2] Hospital staff members can truly respect the patient and his symptoms only if they are first treated with utmost respect by the institution's director and by the psychiatrist in charge of the patient's treatment. And this must be done not as a utilitarian measure, a good practice to enhance the staff's efficiency in speeding recovery. This will never do. It would be merely to apply a particular method, not to create a different approach to human beings because of a change in attitude.

In order to create the right human environment at our institution, we have found it necessary to meet daily as a staff, and sometimes even twice or three times a day, to talk things over. In these meetings the feelings of the newest attendant are more important than the opinions or recommendations of the most senior psychiatrists. Because without the right feelings the attendant can never implement in his living with the patient the right understanding we are trying to give him. How the attendant feels about the patient as a person is revealed by the way he talks to the

patient, feeds and bathes and puts him to bed, holds his hand when he tries to hurt himself or others, accepts the patient's vomiting on him. All this tells the patient more about the true intentions of the institution than what happens in his treatment session with his therapist. For parallel reasons we have found it necessary for the professional staff to meet regularly, though not daily, with cooks, maids, janitors, and so on, because their attitudes too are crucial to the total treatment design.

In essence, she whom we honor today set into practice the paramount maxim of the other great native of Koenigsberg, Immanuel Kant: never to take another person for an object to be influenced or manipulated, but always to treat him as a subject in his own right, and always to act as though the principles underlying our action were to become universal principles. In the treatment of psychotics this means that every person working in a mental hospital must treat the psychotic patient exactly the way he would wish to be treated, were he in his place.

Only on the basis of such a conviction can everyone working in a mental hospital accept and respect what otherwise would be experienced as revolting. Only such an inner attitude, held firmly by everybody the patient encounters, can revolutionize the hospital treatment of psychotics. How else can Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's statement that we have learned "to approach stool smearing in the same spirit of investigating its dynamics as any other mode of expression," so that consequently it "has lost its threatening aspects," become reality in our hospital wards? How else can ward attendants accept physical attack without anxiety or hostility? And compare this attitude to the reality of all too many mental hospitals when a patient smears his stools over an attendant or physically assaults him.

All too clearly, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's example in relating to psychotic patients has not yet become the image in whose likeness our mental hospitals operate. It is not just a long distance, but an abyss, that separates the psychoanalytic insight from its realization. We all know that the patient's symptoms represent his best solution to life's problems. We all know that we must therefore never drive those symptoms underground but must treat them with the greatest respect. But compare the reality of today's mental hospitals, where more often than not conditioned reflex psychology, under the name of behavior modification, shows utter disrespect for the symptom and with it for the patient.

My second example addresses itself to the physical environment we must create for the inpatient treatment of psychotics. What is involved here was illustrated for me by one of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's patients, a young woman she had treated for quite some time at Chestnut Lodge

and then continued to treat as an outpatient. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann had suggested to the patient that she meet me since I happened to be lecturing in Washington. The patient must have found me trustworthy; she invited me to visit her in the apartment she shared with a friend, another patient. What she was most eager to show me was the bathroom. She had ingeniously decorated it as a royal chamber. The toilet itself served as her throne, with a crown designed to rest over her head when she sat down. Mastering the traumatization she had experienced around toilet training was indeed her regal achievement.

Let me give you another example of the great ingenuity schizophrenics can bring to bear in creating or using the physical environment in line with their needs, if they are only given the chance to do so. A totally non-reacting mute patient had lost trust in his safety with us, because one of his caretakers was about to leave the institution. His emotional safety put in jeopardy, he turned to the fire alarm box, which gives extra safety in emergencies. He pulled the fire alarm, which in no time brought the fire brigade to the scene. His was an emergency, so he took appropriate action. And it worked. We had not been aware of how deep his anxiety was. The pulling of the fire alarm put his anxiety and him instantly at the center of everyone's attention. It was just the experience he needed to bolster his fading self-esteem in the face of desertion.

What counted was how the institution responded. We showed our delight about the positive aspects of his action. Thereafter this nonspeaking patient announced any distress through a glance at the fire alarm box, a communication to which we could immediately respond.

What Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's patient had done, we must try to do for our patients. We must create settings which do not only convey our understanding and respect for their emotional needs, but also anticipate them. And as the example of the mute autistic patient illustrates, we must encourage patients to use the physical environment as it best serves their needs even if it is not necessarily the way we intended it to be used.

The way the entire staff approaches the toilet issue, for example, and the way the bathroom itself is made into a specially attractive place, will tell the patient much more about the true attitudes of the institution—in this case in regard to elimination—than even the most erudite and correct interpretation of fantasy material. Spending hours, when needed, cradling the patient or holding his hand while he is sitting on the toilet carries more conviction than any readiness to listen or talk about the problem. For example, a staff member's stepping into the toilet bowl and inviting a most sophisticated, brilliant, hippie-type schizophrenic

to flush her down (which the patient indeed tried to do with repeated flushings) was a turning point not only in their relation but in the patient's view of the world, from uniformly persecuting to perhaps genuinely helpful.

An anorexic psychotic adolescent girl with such a severe washing compulsion that she literally spent all her day taking showers and scrubbing herself, so that her skin was all raw, began to feel that we were not utterly disgusted with her when her therapist cleaned out with her bare hands the toilets the patient had stuffed full of facial tissues before and after eliminating. The patient then for weeks inundated not only the bathroom but her own and other rooms, too, with her real and symbolic excreta, using on the average 12 boxes of tissues a day, 2400 of these tissues, to achieve her purposes. But as her counselor not only provided all this much needed material to be shredded by the patient but, with pleasure at being able to to be of real service, carefully collected and disposed of it at night to make space for the new production of the following day, the patient for the first time related in a positive way to another human being.

The psychotic has been exposed much too much to contradictory, double-bind messages to believe what we say. He is much more ready to believe the messages he receives from what we do, as the example just mentioned suggests, and from the environment we create for him. For us, too, the way the table is set, the attractiveness of the china, symbolize the spirit with which we are received and how welcome we are to share a meal with our host. The same is true for the mental patient. Little wonder that he cannot enjoy his meals when the dishes alone tell him of the expectation that he will throw them around (a tacit message that he may try to set into action), or when the master of the house, as symbolized by the top echelon of the institution's staff, does not take meals with attendants and patients.

For us, too, certain symbols convey much deeper meanings than are easily put into words: the crucifix, the cap and gown, the passing hearse. But to the psychotic everything becomes such a symbol. Most of his mental energy goes into ruminating about the hidden meaning of each object, its color and placement, and what it tells about our intentions, and about what the future has in store for him. Everything has its private meanings and secret messages that he tries to decipher. We have learned in our institution how important it is for the patient that we construct and arrange the physical environment so that every object becomes the carrier of deep positive meaning.

Let us, then, create for the benefit of our patients and the success of of our efforts that total environment they need more than anything else

for their recovery, that physical and human milieu that embodies Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's persona, so that it will live on forever.

References

1. Fromm-Reichmann, F.: Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950.
2. Fromm-Reichmann, F.: Problems of therapeutic management in a psychoanalytic hospital. Psychoanal. Quart. 16:325–356, 1947.

Name Index

Adler, A., 23, 32, 34, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 99, 110, 123, 169
Adler, K. A., 7, *53*, 65
Alexander, F., 73
Alger, I., *32*
Ansbacher, H. L., 60, 63
Ansbacher, R. R., 60, 63
Aramoni, A., 92, 93
Arendt, Hannah, 97, 103, 110, 112
Arieti, S., *16*, 32, 33, 35

Balint, M., 82
Barchove, C., 147
Barrett, W., 108, 111, 170
Bassin, L., 10
Beavin, J., 150, 152
Bell, D., 96, 110
Bell, N. W., 147
Benedict, R., 73
Bermudez, M. E., 93
Berrigan, D., 60, 63
Bettelheim, B., *204*
Bieber, I., *120*, 129, 130, 131, *132*
Blum, H. P., 74, 82
Bonime, W., *152*
Bottome, Phyllis, 56, 63
Broderick, C. F., *148*, 152
Buber, M., 17
Bullitt, W. C., 155, 159, 166
Burton, R. V., 147

Cantor, M. B., *197*
Chambers, W., 166

Darwin, C., 20
Diaz del Castillo, B., 84, 93
Dince, P. R., *64*
Dollard, J., 73
Drellich, M. G., *170*

Eckardt, Marianne H., 6, *135*
Eisenhower, D. D., 48
Eissler, K., 183
Ellenberger, H. F., 73, 82
Enelow, M. L., *195*
Erikson, E., 17, 102, 106, 109

Farber, L., 17, 32
Ferenczi, S., 164
Fierz, H. K., 7
Fortes, A., *83*
French, J. R. P., 176, 183, 198
Freud, S., 6, 9, 11, 21, 22, 54, 55, 63, 64, 67, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 102, 104, 106, 109, 113, 116, 127, 129, 150, 154, 159, 164, 166, 169, 170
Fromm, E., 6, 31, 32, 34, 72, 169
Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda, 17, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209

Gadpaille, W. J., *173*, 183, 195, 197
Gandhi, M., 60
Gelb, L. A., *184*, 195, 197
Gershman, H., *129*, 132, 133, 134
Goffman, E., 52
Goodrich, W., 148, 152
Gorer, G., 79, 80
Gouldner, A. W., 24, 32, 80, 81, 82
Greenbaum, R. S., 177, 183

Haley, J., 52, 150, 152
Harlow, H., 124
Hartmann, H., 106
Herndon, W. H., 159
Hill, R., 52, 147
Hiss, A., 166
Horkheimer, M., 72

Horney, Karen, 17, 32, 34, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 109, 123, 169, 195, 200, 201
Howe, I., 96

Iremonger, Lucille, 171

Jackson, D., 150, 152
Janet, P., 73
Jones, E., 166, 170
Jung, C., 73

Kant, I., 206
Kanzer, M., 74, 82
Kaplan, Lillian, 15
Kardiner, A., 73
Katz, 92, 93
Kelman, H., *71*, 82
Kenkel, W. F., 147
Kerner, O., 154
King, M. L., 48
Kissinger, H. A., 176, 183
Koestler, A., 70
Kohlberg, L., 119
Krafft-Ebing, R. von, 123, 126, 127, 129
Kristol, I., 96, 97, 110
Kubie, L., 198, 201

Laing, R., 15, 19, 32, 33
Lasswell, H. D., 73
Lebedev, B. A., 11
Lee, M., 183
Levinger, G., 147
Lief, H. I., *116*
Lincoln, A., 154
Lipsett, S. M., 96
Lorant, S., 159
Lorenz, K., 21, 32

MacDonald, R., 171
Mailer, N., 136

Page numbers in italic refer to papers or discussions of papers that are printed in this volume.
Thanks are due to Miss Savilla M. Laird for aid in the preparation of the Name Index and the Subject Index.

211

Subject Index